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What is the effect of non-recognition?
The external relations of de facto states in the 
post-Soviet space
Giorgio Comai
Abstract
In a context where sovereignty is structurally challenged, sub-state actors increasingly 
engage  in  international  activities,  and  the  dynamics  of  global  capitalism  transcend 
borders, how much does international recognition still matter in practical terms? This 
research approaches this question by analysing the external relations of post-Soviet de 
facto  states,  and  comparing  them  with  those  of  both  sovereign  and  non-sovereign 
territories that share with them a set of key features.
Theoretically,  this  research  proposes  to  conceptualise  post-Soviet  de  facto  states  as 
small  dependent  jurisdictions,  thus  introducing  new  analytical  tools  and  resetting 
expectations about the nature of their relations with a patron, their level of dependence, 
and  their  long-term sustainability.  Empirically,  it  offers  a  wealth  of  details  on  how 
external assistance enables access to public services and a degree of welfare to resident 
of  post-Soviet  de  facto  states.  Methodologically,  it  argues  in  favour  of  systematic 
analysis of textual contents published on the web as an approach still under-utilised in 
area studies; analyses of purposefully created datasets of textual contents generated by 
institutions and media of post-Soviet de facto states have been structurally included in 
various phases of the research. 
Conflict and lack of recognition have been fundamental in making post-Soviet de facto 
states  dependent  and  partly  isolated.  Since  there  is  no  indication  that  widespread 
international recognition, reintegration or some other form of agreement on their status 
is forthcoming, such features should be analytically considered inherent characteristics 
of  these  entities.  Once  they  are  conceptualised  as  small  dependent  jurisdictions, 
prevalent dynamics of external relations found in these territories are mostly compatible 
with those found in uncontested territories on both sides of the sovereignty divide.
14
Preliminary notes
At the time of submission, some parts of this thesis have been published or submitted 
for publication.
Parts of Chapter 2 and Appendix B have been published in Studies of Transition States 
and Societies: Comai, Giorgio. 2017. ‘Quantitative Analysis of Web Content in Support 
of Qualitative Research. Examples from the Study of Post-Soviet De Facto States’. 
Studies of Transition States and Societies 9 (1).  
http://publications.tlu.ee/index.php/stss/article/view/346.
An adapted version of Chapter 4 has been published in Ethnopolitics: Comai, Giorgio. 
2018. ‘Conceptualising Post-Soviet de Facto States as Small Dependent Jurisdictions’. 
Ethnopolitics. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2017.1393210.
Some of the graphs accompanying Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 have been published in 
Comai,  Giorgio  (2017).  “The  External  Relations  of  De  Facto  States  in  the  South 
Caucasus”, in Caucasus Analytical Digest, Issue 94, 28 April 2017.
Some  parts  of  Chapter  6  have  been  adapted  from  the  author’s  contribution  to  Ó 
Beacháin,  Donnacha,  Giorgio  Comai,  and  Ann Tsurtsumia-Zurabashvili.  2016.  ‘The 
Secret  Lives  of  Unrecognised  States:  Internal  Dynamics,  External  Relations,  and 
Counter-Recognition  Strategies’.  Small  Wars  &  Insurgencies 27  (3):  440–66. 
doi:10.1080/09592318.2016.1151654; and from Comai,  Giorgio. 2017. ‘The External 
Relations of de Facto States in the South Caucasus’. Caucasus Analytical Digest, no. 94 
(May).
15
16
Chapter 1. 
Introduction
Political  atlases  routinely  present  all  of  the  earth's  surface  tidily  divided  among 
sovereign  states.  The  state  is  largely  considered  as  the  natural  unit  of  analysis  in 
international relations scholarship. However, this state-centric approach, as well as the 
very idea of sovereignty, is being increasingly challenged from multiple directions: from 
above (e.g. by supra-national institutions), from below (e.g. by sub-state diplomacy) and 
more in general by the mechanisms of global capitalism and information technologies. 
Such considerations have drawn authors to suggest that the categories of state and non-
state actors are “increasingly uninformative”  (Hocking 1999, 17), that the distinction 
between the  diplomatic  activities  of  small  states  and sub-state  entities  is  “blurring” 
(Criekemans and Duran 2010, 39) and more in general that contemporary “boundary-
transgressing  processes  and  tendencies  [...]  are  undermining  the  state-centric 
assumptions of conventional geopolitics” (Ó Tuathail 2000, 166). 
In this context, how much does international recognition still matter in practical terms? 
This  research aims at  answering this  question by analysing the external relations  of 
territories that inhabit the grey zone that exists around the concept of internationally 
recognised,  sovereign  independence.  They  are  de  facto  states,  entities  that  have 
achieved and maintained for an extended period internal sovereignty over an area, with 
a degree of internal legitimacy but only limited formal recognition at the international 
level, or none at all.
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Most  political  maps  of  the  world  ignore  them.  The  United  Nations  and  other 
international  organizations  officially  support  the  territorial  integrity  of  their  parent 
states, thus negating their legitimacy and, in a sense, their very existence. Yet, evidently, 
they do exist, regardless of the fact that their borders are not marked with a solid line on 
political atlases, that international organizations dismiss the political processes taking 
place there, and that local athletes cannot compete in the Olympics under the flag they 
consider their own. 
In  spite  of  the  unaccommodating  approach  demonstrated  by  the  international 
community,  de  facto  states  managed  to  survive  and  to  develop  a  wide  array  of 
interactions at  the international level.  However,  their  contested status has influenced 
their external relations in multiple ways. On the one hand, for example, it limits their 
possibilities to join international organizations, interact through traditional diplomatic 
channels and receive official development assistance for state building. On the other, 
exactly  because  of  the  refusal  of  the  international  community  to  fully  accept  their 
existence  paired  by  a  perceived  need  to  regulate  their  status,  de  facto  states  often 
interact with international institutions more than would be normal for similarly sized 
territories, either in the context of conflict negotiations or through efforts to further their 
cause. Finally, their contested nature puts them at the centre of geopolitical conflicts, 
thus creating the conditions for a patron-client relationship that enables additional forms 
of support, beyond those stemming from ethnic kins in neighbouring countries or from 
diaspora organisations.
Considering this peculiar condition, what is the effect of non-recognition on the external 
relations of de facto states? This research approaches this question by analysing the 
external relations of post-Soviet de facto states, and comparing them with those of both 
sovereign and non-sovereign territories that share with them a set of key features. As 
debated in more detail in section 1.1 below, Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and 
Nagorno Karabakh serve as the main case studies in this research. In order to further 
delimit the field of inquiry, this research focuses on those external relations that require 
interaction with actors located outside of the territory of a given de facto state and are 
aimed at  providing public services and a  degree of welfare to residents of de facto 
states. Foreign policy as such, or private cross-border relations of individual actors, are 
not  object  of  investigation.  This  narrow  focus  allows  to  highlight  the  practical 
consequences of non-recognition on state building as well as on the availability of key 
services to residents of these territories. It is clear that international recognition bears 
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with it high symbolic value and is likely to have great influence, for example, in terms 
of identity or perceived security. The fact that being an independent state is held in high 
esteem in the contemporary world is  clear,  if  for  no other  reason,  because it  is  the 
declared goal of considerable parts of society in a variety of territories across the globe, 
including  in  democratic  western  societies  (e.g.  Quebec,  Scotland,  and  Catalonia). 
However, given the intrinsic complexity of comparing such ‘symbolic value’ in different 
circumstances, in its exploration of the boundaries and meaning of sovereignty in the 
contemporary international system, this study focuses on more pragmatic aspects.
This research presents original empirical evidence that is relevant to studies that deal 
with the nature of post-Soviet de facto states, on the dynamics that contribute to their 
continued existence,  on their  external relations, and on the mechanisms of domestic 
legitimacy that ensure a degree of support for the local authorities. At the same time, it 
explicitly  deals  with  an  often  overlooked  yet  important  underlying  question  –  how 
should we study de facto states? - by introducing novel theoretical and methodological 
approaches. Theoretically, it argues in favour of conceptualising post-Soviet de facto 
states  primarily  as  small  dependent  jurisdictions,  and only  secondarily  as  contested 
territories.  Methodologically,  it  introduces  structured  content  analysis  of  textual 
contents generated in these territories and available on-line as an additional method to 
understand, describe and compare de facto states and their institutions. 
1.1. Case selection  
Among the 21 de facto states identified by Caspersen and Stansfield  (2011) since the 
second World War, only nine are currently existing. They are substantially dissimilar 
cases, that came into being and developed in very different circumstances. Indeed, non-
recognition is one of the few significant features that allows to put in one category 
territories as strikingly different as Taiwan, Iraqi Kurdistan, and South Ossetia. Among 
currently existing de facto states, the four de facto states situated in the post-Soviet 
space – Transnistria,  Abkhazia,  South Ossetia, and Nagorno Karabakh – are the group 
of territories that share most similarities, besides non-recognition. Similarities include 
previous  belonging  to  the  same  political  entity,  approximate  date  of  declared 
independence,  dependency  on  an  external  patron,  level  of  economic  development 
(estimated GDP per  capita  of  less  than  5 000 USD),  and population  size  (less  than 
500 000). Because of their common features, previous studies have separately dealt with 
what  has  been  called  the  ‘Eurasian  quartet’  (Lynch  2004;  Geldenhuys  2009; 
Markedonov 2012): they will be the entities at the centre of this research. 
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In spite of the similarities, selected case studies differ in key aspects that are expected to 
have an impact on their external relations. Some of them have been recognised by their 
patron state, others have not. Some of them have a relatively open border with their 
parent state, others have it sealed and highly militarised. Most of them share a border 
with their patron, but Transnistria does not. Diaspora assistance is crucial for Nagorno 
Karabakh,  but  not  for  the  other  cases.  Finally,  they have  rather  dissimilar  domestic 
economic  capabilities  and  potential,  and  thus  uneven  claims  to  realistic  self-
sustainability.
Along  the  time  dimension,  this  research  focuses  on  the  post-2008  period.  Russian 
recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August 2008 marked 
an important change in terms of external relations for these territories. As will be argued 
in  the  following  chapters,  this  development  had  a  significant  impact  on  the  state 
capacity  and  the  political  economy  of  these  entities,  as  well  as  on  the  livelihood 
opportunities for their residents. It is only in 2007 that Transnistria started to formalise 
its practice of ensuring incomes to its budget by not paying for the gas it imported from 
Gazprom; in the lapse of a few years,  Russian assistance has grown to cover most of 
Transnistria’s budget, and has thus become a key enabler of the local welfare state.1 
Even  in  Nagorno  Karabakh,  where  relations  with  Armenia and  the  diaspora  have 
remained overall stable, the state budget has approximately doubled between 2007 and 
2008, thus signalling an important growth in state capacity.
Finally,  it  is  perhaps  only  after  2008 that  many among scholars  and policy-makers 
started to realise more fully that these entities were not ephemeral. As of 2006, one of 
the main experts on these territories would still argue that a “federal settlement […] 
must be regarded as the most likely end to most unrecognized quasi-states”  (Kolstø 
2006, 738), which was the established wisdom in most previous publications on the 
subject (e.g. Coppieters, Darchiashvili, and Akaba 2000; Potier 2001).2 In his 2009 book 
on de facto states, Geldenhuys (2009) would still matter-of-factly write that “although 
all of today’s contested states have been in existence for well over ten years and many 
could survive several more years, they are all ultimately transient phenomena expected 
to disappear.” Even more recent publications have focused on “alternative destinations” 
1 See Chapter 5 for more details.
2 As of 2000, even Vyacheslav Chirikba, who would later become minister of foreign affairs 
of  Abkhazia,  was  still  openly  reasoning  on  constitutional  arrangements  that  would  see 
Abkhazia and Georgia within a common state (Chirikba 2000). 
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for  de  facto  states,  seemingly  assuming  that  these  entities  must  be  short-lived  (L. 
Anderson 2011, 195).3
The  present  research  is  based  on  the  assumption  that,  on  the  contrary,  current 
arrangements  will  last  for  the  foreseeable  future.  Since  neither  widespread 
internationally  recognised  independence  or  reintegration  with  the  parent  is  in  sight, 
analysis should be focused on the current configuration of these territories. Even if the 
situation is far from static – they are “Not frozen!” as the title of a recent publication 
emphatically  highlighted  (Fischer  2016) –  dynamics  have  somewhat  stabilised  in 
comparison to the early post-war years. Fundamentally, residents, de facto authorities, 
and their patron, have started to think for the long-term, thus marking a change from 
strictly conflict related dynamics that largely characterised the 1990s.4
At least in part for this reason, the self-proclaimed “people’s republics” of Donetsk and 
Lugansk (DNR and  LNR) have not been included in this  study. At the time of this 
writing (mid 2017), they may well be already past the two years of continued existence 
that is part of established definitions of de facto states, but their process of state building 
has just started to take shape. In brief, they have not been included in the present study 
not because they should not be considered de facto states, but rather because as long as 
the dust of war has not settled, it is difficult to study prevalent long-term dynamics that 
are at the centre of the present study: external relations and their impact on building 
state capacity.
1.2. Alternative terms of comparison  
This research approaches its main research question on the impact of non-recognition by 
analysing the external relations of post-Soviet de facto states that contribute to their 
state-building efforts, and by comparing them with those of both sovereign and non-
sovereign territories that share with them a set of key features, both in the region and in 
other parts of the world. As will be seen, this work is clearly rooted in area studies, and 
benefits of scholarly work on post-Soviet de facto states mostly authored by area studies 
experts. At the same time, the approach that is outlined in the next paragraphs aims at 
3 Anderson  (2011) was  also  confidently  dismissive  of  the  possibility  of  de  facto  state 
incorporation  with  the  patron  state,  an  option  that  seems  certainly  less  unlikely  after  
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. 
4 In the case of Nagorno Karabakh, the possibility of full-scale war looms large. However, the 
process of state building, as well as the external relations that enable it, continue unabated.
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overcoming  one  of  the  shortcomings  frequently  found  in  area  studies:  the  implicit 
conviction that the phenomena being observed are unique, and root causes for events 
and prevalent dynamics are  to  be found almost exclusively in local  peculiarities,  or 
specific legacies.
Scholars who have published research on post-Soviet de facto states, while often with a 
discernible  area  studies  background,  have  ventured  with  comparisons  including 
unrecognised states in other world regions in order to gain new insights and favour 
theory development. Caspersen’s  (2012) volume is a case in point, and at the time of 
this writing clearly represents an essential point of reference for students of de facto 
states. Other works on de facto states have dealt also with cases from different world 
regions  (Bahcheli,  Bartmann,  and  Srebrnik  2004;  Kingston  and  Spears  2004; 
Geldenhuys 2009), or have included other terms of comparison from Europe such as 
North Cyprus (Isachenko 2012), Kosovo (Berg 2009), or Bosnia (Berg 2013b). Kolstø, 
who has  an extensive record  of  publications  on post-Soviet  de facto  states  (Kolstø, 
Edemsky, and Kalashnikova 1993; Kolstø and Malgin 1998; Kolstø 2006; Kolstø and 
Blakkisrud 2008; Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2011, 2012; Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2013), has 
ventured  outside  the  region,  exploring  Somaliland’s  original  road to  non-recognised 
statehood (Pegg and Kolstø 2015), as well as the fate of Republika Srpska Krajina, i.e. 
an instance where a potential de facto state in the making eventually failed (Kolstø and 
Paukovic 2014). From their side, scholars who worked on de facto states in other world 
regions,  such as  Somaliland  (Richards  and Smith 2015) and  Iraqi  Kurdistan  (Voller 
2012,  2015),  often  made  reference  to  research  on  the  post-Soviet  cases,  since  the 
existence of a cluster of cases favoured a fruitful scholarly debate on key concepts.
However, even when the focus of research was not limited to a specific area, terms of 
comparison have mostly been conflict  regions  and separatist  territories,  including in 
large-scale longitudinal comparisons such as the one proposed by Florea (2014). While 
approaching the study of post-Soviet de facto states, to the traditional question ‘what is 
it  a  case  of?’,  most  scholars  have  (implicitly  or  explicitly)  answered  that  they  are 
primarily contested territories, either in a class of their own with other unrecognised 
states, or to be compared with (post-)conflict regions.5
5 Berg and Kuusk’s (2010) article on degrees of sovereignty is a partial exception, since they 
include in their index, along de facto states, also dependent territories, autonomous regions, 
governments in exile and de jure states. Isachenko and Schilichte’s  (2007) working paper 
comparing dynamics in Transnistria and Uganda focusing in particular on tax collection is 
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Post-Soviet de facto states are by all accounts contested territories, by definition lacking 
widespread international recognition. They are also post-Soviet, largely dependent on a 
patron, as well as of very small in size: all of them would fall under the most established 
definition of micro-states, if they were recognised.  Their being post-Soviet has been 
structurally kept in consideration in most analyses, in particular those by area studies 
specialists. Dependence has also been variously debated, even if mostly as a proxy to 
establish to what extent these should be considered de facto independent states, rather 
than puppets (Caspersen 2008; Berg and Kamilova 2012), or to highlight a situation that 
has  been  characterised  as  paradoxical,  i.e.  the  observation  that  “in  their  fight  for 
independence, the secessionist entities are quickly ‘outsourcing’ this independence to 
another state” (Popescu 2006b, 8).6 But is this situation so unusual? As will be debated 
at  length  in  Chapter  4,  not  at  all:  it  is  on  the  contrary  very  common  for  small  
jurisdictions to be dependent on external support from a patron,  and to seek further 
integration with it rather than struggle to achieve more independence. So what seems 
paradoxical at first sight, becomes unsurprising as soon as post-Soviet de facto states are 
conceptualised as small dependent jurisdictions, rather than secessionist entities. In line 
with this argument, developed further in Chapter 4, within the scope of this research 
post-Soviet de facto states are conceptualised primarily as small dependent jurisdictions. 
As  a  consequence,  literature  on  small  dependent  jurisdictions  is  largely  taken  as  a 
starting point for looking at de facto states through a new set of analytical tools and 
concepts in order to analyse external assistance coming from a patron and aimed at state 
building. 
To summarise,  there  will  not  be  a  closed  set  of  territories  used  as  a  fixed  term of 
comparison; instead, different internationally recognised countries, sub-state entities and 
other jurisdictions will be referred to when relevant.
1.3. De facto states: a minimalist definition  
De  facto  states  have  been  defined  as  territories  that  have  achieved  de  facto 
independence  and  maintained  it  for  a  substantial  period  of  time,  have  not  gained 
widespread  international  recognition  (or  are  “not  full  members  of  the  international 
by all accounts an exception, even if limited in scope.
6 Caspersen  (2009,  49) also  made  reference  to  “the  paradoxical  situation  that  external 
dependence is necessary for de facto independence (from the de jure parent state) to be  
maintained.”
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system of sovereign states”),  and “have demonstrated an aspiration for full,  de jure 
independence”  (Caspersen  and Stansfield  2011,  3).  Other  definitions  provided since 
Pegg's (1998) original formal elaboration of the concept follow a similar template, and 
generally include a requirement that a de facto state must be aiming at full international 
recognition de jure as an independent state.7
Within the scope of this research, de facto states are to be understood, in line with the 
minimalistic definition proposed by Ó Beacháin, Comai, and Tsurtsumia-Zurabashvili 
(2016, 442), as “entities that have achieved and maintained internal sovereignty over an 
area for an extended period, with a degree of internal legitimacy but only limited formal 
recognition  at  the  international  level,  or  none  at  all.”  This  definition  differs  from 
established elaborations of the concepts mainly in two aspects.
First, it does not include a requirement that de facto authorities must “control most of 
the territory they lay claim to,  including ‘capital’ and key regions”,  as proposed by 
Caspersen and Stansfield  (2011, 3).  At first,  this  condition seems pertinent,  and has 
probably been introduced to limit the number of cases at the global level. However, 
events may be proving that this criteria is inadequate to capture all relevant cases in the 
post-Soviet space. As the de facto border between government-controlled territories in 
Ukraine and the self-proclaimed “people’s republics” of Donetsk (DNR) and Lugansk 
(LRN) becomes more stable, and the de facto authorities start to deliver services to the 
resident population,  DNR and LNR are effectively becoming de facto states. Yet, they 
would  not  satisfy  the  above-mentioned  requirement  that  they  control  “most  of  the 
territory they lay claim to.” Even accepting that the territorial extension to which DNR 
and  LNR  aspire  does  not  coincide  with  the  expansive  project  of  Novorossiya 
(O’Loughlin, Toal, and Kolosov 2016; Suslov 2017), it is still likely to include at least 
the areas that belong to Donetsk and Lugansk regions, of which DNR and LNR control 
substantially less than 50 per cent.8 It is argued here that this fact alone would not make 
7 For an extended debate of alternative definitions of the concept, see Toomla (2014, 33–58). 
8 It  is  anyway  clear  that  DNR  and  LNR  are  not  satisfied  with  their  current  territorial 
extensions, as evidently appears from initiatives such as the “Humanitarian programme for 
the  unification  of  the  people  of  Donbas”  (Zakharchenko and Plotnitski  2017) launched 
jointly by the leadership of DNR and LNR, and the reference there as in other contexts – for 
example,  in  the  criteria  for  determining  which  students  are  entitled  to  study  in  DNR 
universities  (dnr-online.ru 2017) – to people “living in the areas of Donbas temporarily 
occupied by Ukraine”, apparently coinciding with the the Donestsk and Lugansk regions. 
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DNR and LNR any less of a de facto state, and, by extension, that a requirement that de 
facto authorities must “control most of the territory they lay claim to” should not be 
included among the criteria for a de facto state to be considered such.
Secondly, the proposed definition does not include a requirement that a de facto states 
must  have  “declared  formal  independence  or  demonstrated  clear  aspirations  for 
independence” (Caspersen 2012, 11), which is included in most established definitions. 
It  is true that all post-Soviet cases satisfy this requirement, so at least in this world 
region the inclusion of this criteria would not impact the universe of cases captured by 
the definition. However, this criteria is fundamentally misleading since – as debated 
more extensively in Chapter 4 – many of the cases that scholars routinely consider de 
facto states, effectively perceive independence as a second best option, and would rather 
prefer union with their patron, with neighbouring ethnic kins, or even their parent state 
(it is the case of North Cyprus). In other words, many of these cases are de facto states 
in spite of themselves: they may have aspired to control a larger territory, or they may 
be willing to give up their independence if they had the chance, but this does not make 
them less of a de facto state. Toomla (2014, 56) is thus right in suggesting that “entities 
that do not want to be sovereign states, but have a functioning government can also be 
classified as de facto states.”
1.4. De facto states: what we have learned  
The debate on the definition of de facto state, and more broadly on what their continued 
existence  means  for  the  contemporary  understanding  of  sovereignty,  has  been  an 
important component part of the scholarship on these entities. However, it is probably 
the strand of literature that in her review of Western academic discourse on post-Soviet 
de facto states Yemelianova (2015, 227) includes under the label of ‘inter-disciplinary 
area  studies  perspectives’  that  has  offered  most  insights  on  the  dynamics  that 
characterise and determine the continued existence of these entities, as well as on the 
domestic developments within them.9
Early writings  on post-Soviet de facto states understandably focused on the conflict 
dynamics that led to their formation. In the case of Transnistria, such studies highlighted 
how the conflict that emerged in Moldova in the early 1990s could hardly be classified 
under the label of ‘ethno-territorial conflict’ that was applied by default to civil wars 
9 For a bibliography of scholarly publications on de facto states, see this list of references 
compiled by Berg (2013a) and updated to 2013. 
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that exploded in South-East Europe and in both the North and the South Caucasus in the 
same period  (Kolstø,  Edemsky,  and Kalashnikova 1993;  O’Loughlin,  Kolossov,  and 
Tchepalyga 1998; King 2000; Kolossov 2001). As argued by King (1994, 360) “in 1989 
the  Transnistrians’ grievances  were  almost  exclusively  associated  with  the  language 
laws and the threat of union with Romania”, and accordingly language laws and policies 
have been the subject of dedicated studies that dealt either more broadly with Moldova 
(Bruchis  1982;  King 1994;  Jeffrey Chinn 1994; Jeff  Chinn and Roper  1995;  Ciscel 
2006) or  more  specifically  with  Transnistria  (Comai  and  Venturi  2015).10 The 
peculiarities of Transnistrian nation-building, which could not be based on either ethnic 
identity or previous administrative boundaries, have also been object of inquiry (Roper 
2005; Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2011; Dembinska and Danero Iglesias 2013; Şveţ 2013). 
Finally, researchers working on Transnistria dealt with domestic political developments 
(Korobov  and  Byanov  2006;  Protsyk  2009,  2012),  Transnistria’s  political  economy 
(Isachenko 2009, 2012), and its flexible foreign policy  (Kosienkowski 2012a; Istomin 
and Bolgova 2016). The role of external actors such as  Russia  (Devyatkov 2012) and 
the  EU  (Dias  2013) has  also  been  analysed.  Other  studies,  in  particular  by 
Kosienkowski  (2010),  and  Chamberlain-Creangă  and  Allin  (2010) provide  detailed 
accounts of the internal and external dynamics that allow for the continued existence of 
Transnistria.
In the last decade, scholarship on Abkhazia has grown considerably, well beyond early 
publications focusing on the conflict (e.g. Coppieters 2004; Lakoba 2004). More recent 
research focused on different  aspects  of  the contemporary situation,  including inter-
ethnic relations (Clogg 2008; Trier, Lohm, and Szakonyi 2010; Matsuzato 2011; Comai 
2013), domestic politics  (Ó Beacháin 2012; Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2013; Ó Beacháin 
2016; Kopeček and Hoch 2016), civil society  (Hoch, Kopeček, and Baar 2016), and 
language laws  (Comai and Venturi  2015).  Reports  by the International Crisis  Group 
(International  Crisis  Group  2006,  2007a,  2010a,  2013) provide  useful  context  at 
different  points  in  time,  while  reports  by  human  rights  organisations  contribute  to 
understand the difficulties of Georgians living across the de facto border (Human Rights 
Watch 2011; SaferWorld and Institute for Democracy 2011).11 Abkhazia’s  Georgians, 
10 Even  a  study  that  deals  with  an  apparently  unrelated  issue,  i.e.  “workers’ reactions  to 
transnational market reform in a Soviet-era factory”, effectively rotates around the issue of 
language (R. A. Chamberlain-Creangă 2011).
11 For an academic account of cross-border dynamics, see in particular (Lundgren 2017a).
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people living across the de facto border, and IDPs from  Abkhazia and  South Ossetia 
have also received scholarly attention (Toal and Grono 2011; Kabachnik, Regulska, and 
Mitchneck  2012;  Kabachnik  et  al.  2013;  Prelz  Oltramonti  2016;  Lundgren  2016b, 
2017a). PhD dissertations published as books (Francis 2011; Smolnik 2016), or that led 
to the publications of a series of independent articles  (Prelz Oltramonti  2015, 2016, 
2017, Lundgren 2016a, 2016b, 2017a) provide useful context and different angles.
South Ossetia  has  attracted comparatively less dedicated scholarly attention.  Among 
publications  related  to  the  2008  war  over  South  Ossetia,  the  Tagliavini  report 
(Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 2009) and 
Gerard Toal’s writings  (Ó Tuathail 2008; Toal 2017, chaps. 3–5) remain key points of 
reference. Also in the case of  South Ossetia reports by the International Crisis Group 
provide useful context (International Crisis Group 2007b, 2010b).
As for the war in  Nagorno Karabakh, De Waal’s account has deservedly become the 
most frequently quoted book on the subject (De Waal 2004). At least in part due to the 
particularly  tense  nature  of  the  confrontation  over  Nagorno  Karabakh  and  the 
impending  risk  of  war,  conflict  related  issues  have  been at  the  centre  of  dedicated 
analysis  (Broers  2015a,  2016;  Ayunts,  Zolyan,  and  Zakaryan  2016;  Cornell  2017), 
including works that specifically focus on the role of civil society  (Ghaplanyan 2010; 
Simão  2010;  Kopeček,  Hoch,  and  Baar  2016).  Other  aspects  that  have  received 
scholarly  attention  include  domestic  political  dynamics  (Smolnik  2012;  Kolstø  and 
Blakkisrud 2012; Beacháin 2015), and local cartographic imaginaries (Broers and Toal 
2013).
A few articles have provided an overview of key aspects of all four cases; most recently, 
Ó Beacháin, Comai, and Tsurtsumia-Zurabashvili (2016) offered a succinct overview of 
internal dynamics, external relations as well as counter-recognition strategies enacted by 
the  parent  states.  At  different  points  in  time,  other  authors  offered  broad 
characterisations of prevalent dynamics across cases (Lynch 2004; Kolstø 2006; Kolstø 
and Blakkisrud 2008; Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2011, 2012) and thus remain fundamental 
readings  for  scholars  approaching  the  study  of  post-Soviet  de  facto  states.  Broers’ 
(2013,  2015b;  Broers,  Iskandaryan,  and  Minasyan  2015) contributions  aimed  at 
presenting  the  state  of  the  art  on  the  studies  on  de  facto  states,  and  at  theory 
development, should be similarly considered required reading.
Finally, credit is due to John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov and Gerard Toal for the 
series of articles they published based on an original set of surveys they conducted in all 
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post-Soviet de facto states in the period 2010-2011  (O’Loughlin, Kolossov, and Toal 
2011; Toal and O’Loughlin 2013a, 2013b; O’Loughlin, Toal, and Chamberlain-Creangă 
2013;  Bakke et  al.  2014),  and then again in  December 2014,  with key results  later 
summarised or used for new analyses in separate occasions (O’Loughlin, Kolossov, and 
Toal  2014;  Toal  and O’Loughlin 2014, 2016,  2017;  O’Loughlin,  Toal,  and Kolosov 
2017). Their work provides a wealth of data on local perceptions in these territories, that 
would otherwise have to based exclusively on expert opinions and impressions gathered 
by scholars during their fieldwork.
As a scholarly community with an interest on de facto states, what have we learned 
through  our  collective  research  endeavour?12 First,  that  in  spite  of  the  interminable 
debate on how to call them, there is a broad agreement on what a de facto state is. Even 
the terminological debate is eventually coming to an end, with only ‘de facto state’ and 
‘unrecognised state’ effectively in  widespread use.  Second,  that  through nation- and 
state-building,  all  of  these  entities  have  achieved  a  significant  degree  of  domestic 
legitimacy among the resident population.13 Third, that unlike in many other places of 
the region, the results of elections are not predetermined; elections are competitive and 
effectively serve their intrinsic goal of choosing the leadership of a polity. Fourth, that 
in spite of being highly dependent on a patron, they are not pawns in the hands of their 
respective  patron;  electoral  victories  by candidates  others  than  the  one  favoured  by 
Moscow has often been presented as an example of their defiance, but their agency is 
constantly  reaffirmed  well  beyond  elections  through  their  constant  negotiations  and 
interactions with the patron and other international actors. 
These observations are supported by a wealth of details and opinions gathered by a 
relatively  small  number  of  researchers  in  years  of  research,  surveys,  analysis  of 
documents  and  media,  as  well  as  interviews  with  local  policy  makers  and  NGO 
representatives. The present study feeds into this scholarly tradition by focusing on two 
aspects  that  have  been  previously  approached  by  other  scholars:  state-building  and 
external relations. In spite of the relative prominence dedicated to both topics, there is 
still a dearth of information on the practicalities involved in the process of capacity- and 
12 It is worth highlighting that in many ways this is indeed a collective endeavour. A significant 
number of scholars who have worked on de facto states know each other well, discuss their 
research experience at conferences, and co-author articles and books.
13 This of course does not  take in account the opinion of all  those who had to leave as a  
consequence of ethnic cleansing during the wars in the early 1990s. 
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institution-building, on how access to public goods and services is made possible by the 
de facto authorities, and more broadly on how, in practice, de facto authorities interact 
with their patron and other international actors.
Besides,  the  dramatic  impact  on  the  livelihood of  residents  determined  by  Russia’s 
increased  involvement  in  Transnistria,  Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia  after  2008  has 
perhaps  not  been  fully  appreciated.  As  will  be  presented  through  relevant  data  in 
Chapter 5, in the lapse of a few years, the salary of public workers and the level of 
pension payments have increased substantially in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and 
in some cases they doubled, or grew manifold. Russia is not only a distant protector of 
these territories (or a puppeteer involved in local political intrigues, as some would have 
it), but has become the main provider of financial and technical assistance for capacity-
building in these territories, enabling and enhancing service delivery in key sectors such 
as health and education. At the same time, due to explicit protection by Russia, Georgia 
stopped being a credible threat. Such developments, among others, necessarily impact 
not only the political economy of these entities, but also dynamics of legitimacy.
In brief, as will be described in Chapter 6, residents and authorities of de facto states 
interact with other international actors and even with their patron state more than meets 
the eyes. Hundreds of (ethnic Abkhaz and Ossetian) residents from Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia go to Tbilisi every year to receive healthcare. Representatives of the European 
Union  and  international  organisations  in  both  Transnistria  and  Abkhazia  routinely 
coordinate their activities with official representatives of the unrecognised authorities. 
These  and other  details  are  determinant  for  shaping a  more  accurate  picture  of  the 
processes that are taking place in these territories. In the absence of such detail, even 
informed readers must make assumptions, and as established daily practices often do 
not conform with predominant narratives and are not reported in local and international 
news media, such assumptions may be misleading. Indeed, providing data and details on 
how external  assistance  reaches  these  territories  through  interactions  with  the  local 
leadership  represents  the  main  empirical  contribution  of  the  present  study  to  the 
scholarship on de facto states.
1.5. Structure of the research  
The next part of this introductory chapter presents brief summary of the main research 
findings, accompanied by a few words of caution and a note on terminology.
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Chapter 2 introduces issues of research design and methodology, and presents how they 
are rooted in the author’s own experience. 
Chapter 3 points at some of the ways in which micro-states in other parts of the world, 
as  well  as  sub-state  entities  in  the  region,  can  be  considered  relevant  terms  of 
comparison  for  post-Soviet  de  facto  states.  It  then  outlines  dynamics  of  external 
assistance to state building in territories whose status is not contested, including post-
conflict countries and neighbouring post-Soviet states. This debate allows to give an 
overview of how non-recognition impacts externally-led state building in post-Soviet de 
facto states.
The fourth chapter introduces a conceptualisation of post-Soviet de facto states as small 
dependent jurisdictions. As will be argued, this approach offers new analytical inputs 
from an apparently distant scholarly literature and contributes to reset expectations on 
the external relations that allow for the sustained existence of such diminutive polities. 
This chapter also highlights how the debate on the criteria included in the definition of 
de facto states is not purely academic: it shapes the expectations that both analysts and 
policy-makers have on the long-term path of development of de facto states, and thus it 
contributes  to  the  (mis)interpretation  of  prevalent  dynamics  observed  around  these 
territories. 
Chapter  5  focuses  on direct  budget  assistance  to  authorities  in  post-Soviet  de  facto 
states, and presents a wealth of data and details on how these jurisdictions have access 
to the financial resources they need to conduct state activities. Available data on external 
assistance and other key features of the local political economy (in particular, the share 
of residents whose incomes depend directly on the state) are compared across multiple 
sets of potential terms of comparison, thus testing some of the hypotheses generated in 
Chapter 4 on similarities with small dependent jurisdictions in other contexts.
Chapter 6 deals with non non-budget support to post-Soviet de facto states, including 
both technical assistance from the patron and interaction with other actors, including 
international  governmental  and  non-governmental  organisations.  As  will  be  seen, 
external  assistance  significantly  contributes  to  develop  state  capacities  and  interacts 
with legitimisation dynamics found in these territories.
Finally, Chapter 7 focuses on the ministries of foreign affairs of post-Soviet de facto 
states. A comparative analysis based on word frequency in the press-releases published 
on-line  by  MFAs  in  these  territories  and  in  neighbouring  countries  is  employed  to 
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highlight some of the ways in which MFAs in de facto states differ from their peers in 
uncontested  countries.  A thorough  analysis  of  the  role  of  the  MFA in  coordinating 
external  relations  –  particularly  those  that  involve  international  organisations  – 
concludes this chapter,  again pointing at  the impact of non-recognition on prevalent 
dynamics.
1.6. A few words of caution  
By comparing the external relations of post-Soviet de facto states with a set of other 
territories that share with them a significant number of features, this research aims to 
answer qualitatively the main research question on the impact of non-recognition. To do 
so,  it  implicitly  turns  it  into  the  following counter-factual:  how would  the  external 
relations of these territories be if their status was not contested, and instead they were, 
for  example,  autonomous  regions  in  their  patron  state,  in  some form of  associated 
statehood with a  patron,  or internationally  recognized as independent  states? It  then 
approaches these questions through pattern-matching comparing the external relations 
of de facto states with territories belonging to the other above-mentioned categories that 
are  as  similar  to  them as  possible.  This  process  reflects  the logic  presented  by Yin 
(2009) in his book on case study research design:
“For case study analysis, one of the most desirable techniques is to use a pattern 
matching  logic.  Such  a  logic  (Trochim  1989) compares  an  empirically  based 
pattern with a predicted one (or with several alternative predictions). If the patterns 
coincide, the results can help a case study to strengthen its internal validity.”
This research does not aim at quantifying the effect of non-recognition. For example, it 
does  not  aim at  calculating exact  figures  of  the economic  costs  of  non-recognition. 
Rather, it  highlights how the network of external relations that these territories have 
developed after more than two decades of continued existence contributes to their state 
capacity, and how non-recognition may have influenced the process.
Many intervening factors make it admittedly difficult to argue beyond doubt that non-
recognition is responsible for a given feature of external relations. Indeed, disentangling 
the  consequences  of  conflict  from  those  of  non-recognition  per  se  is  not  always 
possible,  as  it  is  obviously  conflict  that  led  to  non-recognition  and  fundamentally 
shaped ensuing dynamics. Non-recognition led to some forms of international isolation 
(Berg and Toomla 2009),  but it  also opened the way for a special  relation with the 
patron  that  would  otherwise  be  difficult  to  conceive.  Conflict  also  led  to  increased 
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international  attention  towards  territories  that  may  have  otherwise  remained  largely 
under the radar of international organisations and diplomatic circles. 
Given the structure of this work, and the geographic concentration of cases under study, 
generalisation of research outcomes is problematic.  Yet,  if a certain type of external 
activity is found among the de facto states included in this study, this automatically 
implies that lack of international recognition is not, by itself, an impediment to that kind 
of activity. On the other hand, if a feature of external relations recorded in de facto 
states is found also in internationally recognised sovereign states, or sub-state entities, it 
means that lack of recognition is not necessarily the cause of that feature. To this extent, 
observations  on  the  impact  of  non-recognition  found  in  this  research  are  indeed 
generalisable.
Insights  stemming  from  this  work  may  be  particularly  valuable  in  enhancing  our 
understanding of post-Soviet de facto states, as well as in the analysis of the processes 
taking  place  in  Donetsk  and  Lugansk  starting  with  2014.  However,  the 
conceptualisations  and  analytical  tools  introduced  in  this  research  can  certainly  be 
applied well beyond the post-Soviet space to other jurisdictions whose status may or 
may not be contested.
1.7. The admonitions of critical geopolitics  
By conceptualising post-Soviet de facto states as small dependent jurisdictions and by 
comparing  their  external  relations  with  those  of  sub-state  entities  and  recognised 
(micro-)states,  this  research  takes  distance  from  conventional  assumptions  of 
international relations that traditionally have as their basic unit of analysis sovereign 
states. By looking across an often artificial divide between sovereign and non-sovereign 
territories, this research aims at breaking out of what John Agnew (2003, 53) defined as 
the “territorial trap”, i.e. “thinking and acting as if the world were made up entirely of 
states exercising power over blocks of space that between them exhaust the politico-
geographical form of world politics.” 
Besides, this research keeps in consideration key warnings brought forward by scholars 
of critical geopolitics that are particularly relevant to the student of de facto states.14 
14 This  section  points  at  some of  the  key  warnings  that  emerge  from writings  of  critical  
geopolitics that are relevant for the study of post-Soviet de facto states. This is not meant,  
however,  to  present  critical  geopolitics  as  such,  or  propose  a  structured approach for  a 
critical geopolitical analysis of the cases at the centre of this study. For a critical geopolitical  
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Firstly,  critical  geopolitics  cautions  against  “the  scripting  of  global  space  by  state-
society intellectuals and institutions” (Ó Tuathail 1996, 51), which have “the power to 
define and delimit that which is taken as ‘real’” (Ó Tuathail 2000, 171). Indeed, de facto 
states have been depicted in the media and even by academics as ‘places that do not 
exist’ or as ‘black holes.’15 De facto states do exist and negating their existence (even if 
only rhetorically)  or referring to them with terms that  imply some kind of  inherent 
difference (e.g. by obsessively repeating the qualifier ‘de facto’) is part of a process of 
“’othering’, [...] essentializing, exocitizing and totalizing of places”  (Ó Tuathail 2008, 
672) that leaves little space for a critical analysis of the processes taking place in these 
territories. 
In other words, there is nothing “magic” about de facto states. They are, to put it simply, 
places that exist, just as much as any other place. All of them have at least one open 
border that allows for easy access to the territory. If they ever were, they certainly are 
not  “informational black holes”  (King 2001, 550) today.  Each of them has multiple 
online news outlets that report daily from the region, providing a stream of news that is 
much  more  substantial  compared  with  that  usually  available  for  similarly  sized, 
uncontested territories located in the same region. Both private and public figures in de 
facto states are active on social  media and frequently debate local issues. Local TV 
stations stream their broadcasts in high definition or put news reels on YouTube. The 
spreading of the Internet to these territories has vastly facilitated communication and the 
free flow of information.
Secondly, as highlighted by Ó Tuathail (2008, 672), “critical geopolitics is sensitive to 
the importance of localized context and agency in world affairs”. De facto states are 
often characterised as pawns in the hand of their patron, or simply passive elements in 
analysis of  dynamics in and around conflict  areas in the post-Soviet  space that  offers a  
complex understanding of the context in which many of the mechanisms described in this 
research take place, see in particular Toal (2017).
15 The most notable example on the media is probably the BBC documentary series “Places 
that don't exist” broadcast in 2005. Among academics, Isachenko (2012, 1) started her book 
focused on North Cyprus and Transnistria with the sentence: “This work presents a story of 
two informal states, two places which officially do not exist”. In the introduction to their  
book on de facto states, Caspersen and Stansfield (2011, 2) argue that they are “in more 
ways than one, the 'places that don't exist'”. For a debate on the “black hole” rhetoric, in  
particular on Transnistria, see Bobick (2011, 241–43). 
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geopolitical  power struggles, but recent literature on de facto states has increasingly 
focused on local dynamics in order to understand and explain the processes that take 
place in and around them. Characterising them as dependent on external assistance from 
a patron should not be construed as implying that de facto states are pliant servants of 
their  master’s  biddings,  but  rather  contribute  to  define  the  complex  network  of 
relationships  that  they  have  built  around  themselves.  In  other  words,  this  research 
thoroughly acknowledges and highlights the agency of local actors.
Finally,  authors  of  critical  geopolitics  recognize  the  need  of  contextualising  and 
problematising  narratives  and  competing  interpretations  of  events.  This  focus  is 
particularly  important  for  a  research  involving  territories  that  became  de  facto 
independent  after  violent  conflicts  and whose  claims to  independence  are  based  on 
disputed understandings of both recent and ancient history.
1.8. Main findings  
External relations of de facto states have their patron state at their centre. In this context, 
non-internationalised,  externally-led  state-  and  institution-building  efforts  effectively 
coincide  with  further  integration  with  the  patron  state.  This  process  of  thorough 
integration  with  the  patron,  perhaps  accompanied  by  maintenance  of  the  symbolic 
attributes of sovereignty, may effectively represent the trajectory of post-Soviet de facto 
states. The drive towards further integration with the patron, however, should not be 
understood as a consequence of non-recognition, or as evidence of the fact that residents 
of  these territories  have no desire  for  self-determination.  In  this  respect,  as  will  be 
discussed, post-Soviet de facto state behave similarly to small, dependent jurisdictions 
elsewhere  in  the  world,  that  out  of  necessity  or  pragmatic  considerations  choose to 
strengthen ties with their patron.
As will be highlighted in Chapter 5, similarly to what is seen in other small dependent 
jurisdictions, external assistance accounts for most of budget incomes of authorities in 
post-Soviet de facto states. Given the unusually high share of residents whose income is 
directly  dependent  on the  state  (in  the  form of  wages  and pensions),  such external 
support has a particularly substantial impact on the incomes and livelihood of the local 
population. Well beyond a mere sponsor, as highlighted in Chapter 6, the patron remains 
however the main point of reference for state building also in terms of technical and 
practical assistance.
34
As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the current situation gives to authorities of de facto 
states a significant say on the kind of activity that international organisations conduct in 
their  territory.  Since  promoting  democracy,  strengthening  governance,  running 
advocacy programmes, and the very principle of conditionality are largely off the table, 
international organisations finance relatively more socially-oriented activities in these 
territories than in their parent states or other post-conflict territories. Finally, Chapter 7 
highlights how the ministry of foreign affairs in post-Soviet de facto states are in many 
ways unlike  similar  structures  found elsewhere,  as  appears  from both their  external 
communication strategy and their everyday activities.
In  terms  of  methods,  this  work  introduces  structured  content  analysis  of  textual 
materials extracted from the web as a new approach to gain insights on post-Soviet de 
facto states, as well as to compare them with other entities in circumstances when direct 
comparisons would otherwise seem infeasible.  Perhaps the main contribution of this 
research  is  however  not  that  of  offering  a  definitive  answer  to  the  main  research 
question,  but  rather  to  provide  a  better  analytical  framework  for  understanding  the 
external relations of de facto states, and how they contribute to shape societal, economic 
and political dynamics within these territories.
1.9. On context and terminology  
This work assumes that the reader is broadly familiar with post-Soviet de facto states 
and  the  context  in  which  they  appeared.  It  does  not  include  lengthy  historical 
introductions, as has sometimes been the case for PhD theses that dealt with the subject 
(Potier 2001; Cornell 2002a; Francis 2011). There is a rich literature on conflicts in the 
post-Soviet space, and how they led to the formation of de facto states, and this work 
could hardly provide original inputs to those debates.
It has by now become a cliché of publications on de facto states to list alternative terms 
used to  describe the concept.  In  recent  years,  as  acknowledged by various  scholars 
(Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2011, 179, note 4; O’Loughlin, Kolossov, and Toal 2014, 494), 
there has been a growing consensus on the expression ‘de facto state’, which has also 
the benefit of shifting the focus to “the agency of the de facto state” (Voller 2012, 12) 
and to the political project that lies at its basis  (Lynch 2007, 486), instead than on its 
deficiencies (e.g. quasi state, almost state, non-recognized, etc.). Broers (2013, 11 note 
1) also “opted for ‘de facto state’ as the term that is simultaneously the least inaccurate 
and least offensive,” but in a more recent article he preferred the expression ‘de facto 
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jurisdiction’  (Broers  2015b),  apparently  in  order  to  escape  the  set  of  misleading 
expectations that may be related to the concept of ‘state.’ In this work, which partially 
aims at adjusting such expectations, the more established expression ‘de facto state’ is 
still  preferred.  As  discussed  in  particular  by  Lynch  (2007,  485–87),  there  are  good 
reasons to prefer ‘de facto state’ to other forms. Broadly speaking, however, unless an 
expression  that  has  attracted  some  consensus  in  an  academic  debate  is  utterly 
inappropriate, it  is generally wise to stick to the most established version.16 For this 
reason,  a  conscious  attempt  at  resisting  the  temptation  to  find  “more  appropriate” 
definitions for established concepts characterises the following chapters. For example, 
the expression ‘parent state’ is used throughout this work, even if, as highlighted by Ó 
Beacháin,  Comai,  and  Tsurtsumia-Zurabashvili  (2016,  442),  ‘base  state’ would  be 
“more neutral and accurate.”17 Following a similarly established practice, the qualifier 
‘de facto’ is  not repeated each time authorities or institutions in these territories are 
mentioned.18 
The four de facto states at the centre of this analysis share many features, but are also 
substantially different. This makes it more difficult to use generic sentences that have 
‘post-Soviet de facto states’ as a subject, for example, when referring to Russia’s role in 
the region. To avoid heavy phrasing and compulsive repetition of the names of each of 
these territories, the generic expression ‘post-Soviet de facto states’ (rather than, e.g., 
‘post-Soviet  de  facto  states,  not  including  Nagorno  Karabakh’)  is  used  also  in 
circumstances  when  it  does  not  apply  to  all  four  cases,  if  the  context  makes  it 
abundantly clear to which cases it is effectively making reference to.
Clarity and brevity are given priority over nuance also in terms of transliterations and 
geographic terms, and the most established forms routinely found in journalistic reports 
are  used  throughout  this  work.  While  acknowledging  that  such  choices  are  often 
influenced  by  pre-Soviet  or  Soviet  practices,  the  result  of  more  recent  conflict 
dynamics, or some unusual combinations of the above, this pragmatic choice aims at 
removing needless distractions from the main arguments  at  the centre  of this  work, 
leaving  such  debates  to  contexts  where  they  are  directly  relevant  to  the  object  of 
16 I thank Pål Kolstø for making this point clear to me.
17 The expression ‘base state’ was initially introduced by Byman and King (2012).
18 See also Blakkisrud and Kolstø (2012, n. 4).
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analysis.19 In  practice,  this  mostly  translates  to  using  the  Russian/Soviet  version  of 
names in contested territories (e.g. Sukhumi), and the national version for uncontested 
cities  in  post-Soviet  independent  states  (e.g.  Chișinău,  and  Kyiv).20 This  choice  is 
warranted by the understanding that readers of this work will be familiar with many of 
the terminological subtleties associated with conflict and post-conflict dynamics in the 
region, and should not be understood as dismissive of the importance of alternative 
name choices in particular for local actors. Indeed, the fact that two out of the four cases 
under  study  had  a  referendum  in  2017  to  change  their  official  name  clearly 
demonstrates that such issues are still object of debate, including among residents of 
these territories.21
Even good prose will take its toll on precision: in order to prevent excessive repetition 
and heavy phrasing, de facto states are sometimes referred to as ‘entities’ or ‘territories’. 
Both expressions are misleading, as references are mostly do the institutions that have 
control on a territory and authority over the people that live there, rather than to some 
abstract entity or to pure physical land. For lack of better solutions, the reader is asked 
to overlook indulgently at such terminological inaccuracy. 
1.10. Conclusions  
This research aims at analysing post-Soviet de facto states primarily as small dependent 
jurisdictions, looking into the relevant literature in order to gain new analytical insights 
on post-Soviet de facto states through a so far unexplored angle. Cross-regional studies 
are not completely unexplored in the scholarship on post-Soviet developments, yet such 
comparisons are always made under the assumption that they will raise eyebrows in 
some quarters. It is certainly with this expectation that parallels between post-Soviet de 
facto states and Pacific island micro-states such as Palau are introduced in the present 
19 Toal and O’Loughlin (2013b), for example, debate at length different understandings among 
local residents of various identifiers used in reference to Nagorno Karabakh.
20 For a more extended debate of issues related to place names in this context, see in particular 
Toal (2017, 11–13).
21 After  a  constitutional  referendum held  on 20  February 2017 in  Nagorno Karabakh,  the 
official  name of  the  entity  was  changed to ‘Artsakh Republic’.  A referendum in  South 
Ossetia held on 9 April 2017 on the same date as the presidential elections determined the 
addition of ‘state of Alania’ to the official name of the republic. 
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study, but also in the conviction that this approach brings with it useful analytical tools 
and interesting angles to the study of post-Soviet de facto states. 
In  their  introduction  to  a  book  comparing  state  crisis  in  Africa  and  in  post-Soviet 
countries, Beissinger and Young (2002, 5), candidly admitted that they “anticipate that 
for  some  readers  the  Africa-Eurasia  juxtaposition  […]  will  seem  odd  given  the 
enormous differences in the histories and cultures of the two regions.” Aware of the 
suspicion that such comparisons may raise, they made a plea to scholars approaching 
their work, which is extended to readers of the present study:
“the utility of any comparison can be measured only by the degree to which it  
generates new and meaningful ideas. It is by this criterion as well that we invite our  
readers to judge the chapters that follow” (Beissinger and Young 2002, 12).
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Chapter 2. 
Methodology, and the 
journey that defined it
This  chapter  discusses  openly some contextual  aspects  that  determined the  research 
question that gives the title to this study. It also introduces details on data collection 
methods: how they have become component parts of the research project, and why some 
methods may appear more visibly than others in the following chapters. It then outlines 
some of the practicalities and difficulties related to fieldwork as well as to structured 
analysis of web contents, which represent the two main data collection methods used for 
the empirical parts of this research.
The first  sections  of  this  chapter  will  have  a  reflexive,  auto-biographic  component. 
Their purpose it to situate the research within the lived experience of its author, and 
outline how the researcher’s experience has borne an impact on key research design 
choices that defined this study. The following parts discuss in more details the use of 
structured analysis of web contents in qualitative research; they outline the benefits, the 
limitations, as well as some of the technicalities involved.1 In brief, as will be argued, 
applying a structured approach to the analysis of selected online resources allows both 
1 An extended version of this section has been published in the journal Studies of Transition 
States and Societies (Comai 2017).
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to  “find  the  needle”  and  “characterise  the  haystack”,  and  should  accordingly  be 
embraced by scholars in area studies and beyond.2 
2.1. Shifting  attention  away  from  the  issue  of   
international recognition
The development of a viable research question is part of an iterative journey, whereby 
preliminary analyses and a review of literature fundamentally contribute to defining a 
research project. This ideal pattern is often subject to constraints related to the funding 
of the research endeavour, and this is the case also of the present study. Indeed, this 
research  has  been  conducted  within  the  scope  of  a  programme  sponsored  by  the 
European Union  under  a  Marie  Skłodowska-Curie  action,  which  provided generous 
funding and numerous opportunities for fruitful academic exchange with peers. It also 
bore with it one limitation: I had to fit my research into a broadly pre-defined research 
topic which made reference to post-Soviet de facto states, foreign policy, and the issue 
of international recognition. As a consequence of project regulations, I did not have the 
luxury to change some of the premises at the basis of the research, or formally shift 
away from the main research  question  of  this  research  (“what  is  the  effect  of  non-
recognition?”). Partly as a result, as will be seen, the conclusions effectively challenge 
the research question, rather than answering it. 
The initial focus on the issue of recognition has been inherited from the scholarship on 
de facto states as it has evolved since Scott Pegg first formalised the concept  (Pegg 
1998). Indeed, international recognition (or rather, lack thereof) has structurally been 
the main criteria for case selection in research on de facto states. This criteria has clear 
benefits  for  scholars  specifically  interested  in  issues  related  to  the  status  issue  and 
international diplomacy, but as the focus of the research shifts to other aspects, its limits 
become  more  apparent.  Indeed,  as  the  volume  of  scholarship  on  de  facto  states 
increased,  Pegg  (2017,  21–22) argued  that  “the  problem  today  is  not  a  dearth  of 
comparative work on the post-Soviet cases but rather a dearth of comparative work 
involving other cases.” In this context, he was not only referring to other de facto states 
but also to “other adjacent phenomena” (Pegg 2017, 22). Pointing out that entities such 
as Taiwan and Nagorno Karabakh may not really be comparable, Seymour (Closson et 
2 This metaphor has been previously used in the context of content analysis by Hopkins and 
King (2010, 230). 
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al.  2013, 679–80) similarly argued that “the study of de facto states needs to move 
beyond the narrow focus on a heterogeneous set of unrecognised states”, since
such territories share the absence of external recognition, but their dissimilarities in 
most  every  other  respect  make  it  difficult  to  parse  out  the  effects  that  non-
recognition  has  on  processes  such  as  democratization,  state  building,  and 
legitimation. The absence of international legal sovereignty affects these processes, 
to be sure, but other factors often have far greater effects.
As will be seen, this study answers this call by suggesting that small size and external 
dependence may indeed be such factors. This analytical framework shifts attention away 
from the issue of international recognition, and as a consequence the research question 
that initiated this research inevitably moves to the background. 
2.2. Data  collection  methods:  personal  experience,   
differing academic perspectives, and ethics
The object of research, as well as the methodological approach used to study it,  are 
often determined by personal experience. Indeed, this study is the result of long-held 
interest towards these territories, that at least in part may stem from my own origins in 
Trentino-Alto Adige/South Tyrol, a pacific and relatively wealthy border region with a 
contested past that is now part of Italy. Dominant local narratives depict Trentino-Alto 
Adige/South Tyrol as a clear success story: extensive autonomy agreements are credited 
with  having  prevented  conflict  and  limited  tensions  among  various  ethno-linguistic 
groups of residents. A treaty-based autonomy agreement that gives highly formalised 
rights and guarantees to different ethno-linguistic groups has been the received wisdom 
and commonsensical solution to potential ethno-territorial conflicts I inherited from my 
early education. As a young student, the fact that autonomy did not always work and in 
some instances may have even been a factor leading to conflict (Cornell 2002b) was in 
itself puzzling. Even the view I had from my childhood’s home in the southern Alps 
mattered: as I started reading about war and ethnic cleansing in post-Soviet mountain 
territories,  accustomed  to  see  a  valley  scattered  with  villages  from  a  privileged 
mountainside position, I could visually picture too well the human suffering related to 
these conflicts and the pain of being forced to leave one’s family’s ancestral home. 
I started studying  Russian by chance in high school in the late 1990s, and since year 
2000 I regularly visited for lengthy periods  Russia and other countries of the former 
Soviet Union. As a graduate student based at RGGU in Moscow in 2005, I wrote (in 
Russian) for a course on conflict  studies my first  paper on the  Georgian-Abkhazian 
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conflict: while not technically “pre-internet”, that paper was largely based on materials I 
found in the local library. It was not until 2009 that I first visited Transnistria, and until 
2010 when I first visited Abkhazia. As a researcher and editor at Osservatorio Balcani e  
Caucaso,  when  visiting  the  region,  I  was  combining  research  with  journalism.  For 
example, while working on a book chapter eventually published in 2013 under the title 
“Sovereignty Conflicts and Minority Protection: the Case of Abkhazia” (Comai 2013), I 
also produced lengthy feature stories  (Comai 2012b) and published edited interviews 
with key respondents  (e.g.  Comai 2011).  At the time,  my approach to research was 
largely based on fieldwork and left little room for theorising: a research project on youth 
policies in Russia and the northern Caucasus I was conducting at the time resulted in an 
article published by Anthropology of East Europe Review (Comai 2012a) that was based 
almost exclusively on ethnographic observations and featured pictures from my visits to 
pro-government youth camps in Russia’s northern Caucasus. Another journal rejected a 
previous version of the same article exactly because it was too much focused on direct 
observation, and did not include a substantive theoretical section.
Work on the present study, which I started in 2013, has been heavily influenced by 
previous experience. On the one hand, I wished to continue and expand my research on 
post-Soviet de facto states. On the other, I desired to take it as a chance for marking a 
change with the way I previously did research: a four-year research project would have 
given me the chance to spend more time reading, theorising, and reflecting more on 
methodological  aspects.  As  I  moved  to  Ireland  to  start  my  studies  at  Dublin  City 
University,  I  became  increasingly  aware  of  different  epistemological  and 
methodological  debates,  as  well  as  the  high  importance  given  to  issues  such  as 
replicability in important parts of the scholarly community that surrounded me.
This experience strengthened my desire to develop this research in a way that would be 
a clear break from my previous research,  and would make it  acceptable,  or at  least 
defensible,  in  front  of  scholars  coming  from  different  academic  traditions.  As  a 
consequence,  I  aimed  at  developing  a  research  with  a  substantive  and  ambitious 
theoretical  component,  and  where  fieldwork  and  evidence  gathered  through 
unstructured  interviews  would  be  complemented  by  other  fully  formalised  and 
replicable data collection methods. Last but not least, my becoming a parent in the early 
stages of this research endeavour pushed me to reduce the time I initially envisioned for 
lengthy periods of fieldwork, further reinforcing the feeling that I should give more 
prominence to theory and fully formalised and replicable data collection methods.
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The information  I  gathered  during fieldwork for  this  project,  as  well  as  during  my 
previous  visits  to  these  territories,  has  been  fundamental  in  developing  my  overall 
thinking on these places, in shaping the research design, as well as in providing insights 
on specific aspects to an extent that likely does not fully emerge from the following 
chapters. This is partly because whenever an information I obtained through interviews 
was equally available in an online source, I consciously chose to refer to the online 
source rather than my personal interview, in line with the principle of replicability as 
well  as out of ethical  considerations (as will  be discussed in the next section,  even 
representatives  of  major  international  organisations  find  themselves  in  a  relatively 
fragile situation in the context of post-Soviet de facto states).
These considerations are aimed at clarifying that the author does not sympathise with 
the positions of fieldwork sceptics who “argue that fieldwork inevitably produces biased 
and questionable valid  data”  (Kapiszewski,  MacLean,  and Read 2015, 11).  In other 
words,  the relatively high visibility given to other data  collection methods does not 
imply that they are considered in any way “superior”. Well beyond personal, pragmatic, 
or ethical choices - as will be argued - using complementary and equally valid data 
collection methods is a good practice that should be encouraged both because of its 
inherent  merits  and  because  it  contributes  to  reduce  the  distance  between  different 
scholarly traditions.
2.3. Fieldwork  
The  empirical  part  of  the  research  has  largely  been  conducted  using  established 
methods, combining primary and secondary sources with both formal interviews and 
informal conversations with government representatives in Tiraspol and Sukhumi,  as 
well as with officers working for international organisations or NGOs active in these 
territories.
Interviews and meetings have been held in Chișinău and Tiraspol in February 2016; in 
Sukhumi, Gali and Tbilisi in May 2016. A full list is presented in Appendix A, including 
full names of government representatives, and only the name of the organisation in all 
other cases. All interviewees have been preliminarily informed of the structure of the 
research, the purpose of the meeting, and their rights as participants to the research, and 
have offered informed consent to their participation either in writing by email or on 
record at the beginning of each meeting. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to visit 
either South Ossetia or Nagorno Karabakh, as visiting them without breaching national 
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legislation  of  the  respective  parent  states  would  not  have  been possible.3 However, 
Transnistria  and  Abkhazia  are  the  two cases  which  present  the  highest  diversity  in 
external relations, and accordingly are the most relevant case studies for a research that 
aims at understanding the impact of non-recognition (if a given type of external relation 
is  found  in  one  of  these  territory,  it  means  that  lack  of  recognition  is  not  an 
insurmountable obstacle to it). 
Chapter 6 has particularly benefited of the insights gained during fieldwork, as given the 
sensibility of the context even large organisations in some cases prefer not to publicise 
details on their activities in de facto states. Interestingly, de facto authorities have been 
open to meet, provide data, and were happy to have interviews on record, while other 
actors have mostly preferred to have less formal meetings, or asked to be contacted to 
receive confirmation on specific quotes. This aspect reflects a condition on the ground: 
de facto authorities feel relatively strong, and can publicly reproduce a narrative that 
sees  their  active involvement  in  interactions  with  the  patron  and other  international 
actors. On the contrary, international organisations and NGOs working in these places 
often feel that their position is fragile, as a misplaced word could effectively lead to 
their activities being banned or severely limited, either by the de facto authorities, by the 
government  in  the parent  state,  or  external  donors.  Officers  working on the  ground 
sometimes  struggle  to  express  a  coherent  public  narrative  that  is  acceptable  to  all 
parties. 
For example, it is acceptable for the government of Georgia that an EU representative 
meets with the leadership of de facto authorities in Sukhumi or Tskhinvali.  It  is  an 
indisputable fact that the people who represent the de facto authorities in such occasions 
have been chosen through local elections, and meeting with those specific individuals 
inevitably represents an implicit acknowledgement of the electoral process that brought 
them to  that  table.  However,  explicitly  recognising  the  electoral  process  would  be 
completely unacceptable, and would spark a wave of outrage and condemnation through 
political elites in the parent state.4
3 In the past, exceptions have been granted in rare circumstances, but the framework of this 
research made it unlikely that such favour would have been conceded in this case. Ethics 
guidelines  issued  by  the  European  Commission  on  EU  funded  research  highlight  the 
importance  of  complying  with  “applicable  international,  EU  and  national  law”  (EC 
Directorate General for Research & Innovation 2016).
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In practice, international organisations operating in de facto states must seek approval 
for  their  activities  both  from the  government  in  the  parent  state  and from de  facto 
authorities (as well as, in some cases, from their respective donors). However, publicly 
acknowledging the existence of such a vetting procedure is politically inconvenient for 
all actors involved. Labelling as ‘confidence-building’ or as ‘humanitarian assistance’ 
activities  that  in  other  circumstances  would  be  referred  to  as  ‘state  building’  or 
‘development aid’ reflects a pragmatic choice. In particular in the  Abkhazian context, 
international organisations active on the ground have little interest in seeking visibility 
for their activities in the local media.
Acknowledging  the  sensitivity  of  the  issues  as  the  centre  of  this  research,  when 
describing  dynamics  and  trends  taking  place  in  these  territories,  details  on  specific 
projects, initiatives, or individuals have mostly been left out of this writing, or described 
only in  generic  terms and to  the extent  needed to present  a  given aspect.  In  a few 
instances, some observations and details have not been included in the final version of 
this  research  due  to  ethical  considerations;  they  may  have  added  more  nuance  and 
additional evidence, but their exclusion does not bear an impact on the conclusions to 
this research. While informal conversations and direct observations by the researcher 
have greatly contributed to the understanding of ongoing dynamics that underpins this 
research, quotes mostly refer to materials publicly available online.
Interviews have been organised and conducted personally by the author,  without the 
involvement of assistants or interpreters, mostly in Russian and English (but in one case 
in Romanian, and in one case in Italian) allowing the interviewees to express themselves 
in the language of their choice.
2.4. Structured analysis of web content  
This research is largely based on a combination of fieldwork and analysis of primary 
and secondary sources, which represent the methods most commonly found in research 
on de facto states. In addition, this research introduces a new method to the toolbox of 
4 A case in point is the reaction to a statement by Herbert Salber, EU special representative for 
South  Caucasus  and  Geneva  talks  co-chair,  who  in  May  2017  congratulated  during  a 
meeting in Tskhinvali Anatoly Bibilov for his victory in the presidential elections held in 
South Ossetia the previous month: meeting Bibilov (who was there because he won the 
election) was not contentious, but explicitly acknowledging the fact that he won the election 
was totally unacceptable (Civil.ge 2017a).
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researchers working on de facto states: structured analysis of textual contents published 
on the web.
The process involves the creation of textual datasets generated by extracting contents 
and relevant metadata (date and title) from websites of institutions and relevant media 
organisations in de facto states and their parent states. 
At its most basic, it allows to order all contents of a specific website by date, filter them 
by keyword, and sift through them quickly in order to find a specific information. This 
approach  has  been  used,  for  example,  in  order  to  find  background  information  in 
preparation of interviews as well as to find some of the statistics included in Chapter 5. 
In Chapter 6, a subset with all items published by news agencies in  Transnistria and 
Abkhazia making reference to training programmes has been manually coded by the 
author  and  used  as  a  starting  point  for  the  analysis  of  external  assistance  to  these 
territories: as will be highlighted, this approach allows to offer a systematic overview of 
training programmes found in these territories, and minimizes researcher’s bias.
Once a dataset has been created, it becomes straightforward to conduct word-frequency 
analyses,  and  present  the  results  in  time-series  graphs  or  barcharts.  Examples  of 
potential  use  cases  have  been extensively  debated  by this  author  elsewhere  (Comai 
2017). Within the scope of this study, word frequency analysis has been mostly used in 
Chapter 7, as a means to compare directly MFAs of de facto states among themselves, 
as  well  as  with  their  counterparts  in  selected  internationally  recognised  countries 
(countries bordering with de facto states, as well as micro-states and countries in Europe 
which  achieved  independence  only  recently).  This  approach  allows  to  show  in  a 
straightforward way how certain issues or external partners feature more prominently in 
the  public  communication  efforts  issued  by  de  facto  MFAs,  when  compared  with 
recognised  country,  and  thus  serves  as  an  indirect  indicator  of  the  impact  of  non-
recognition.
The relative ease with which new datasets can be created, including from sources such 
as those originating in de facto states that are not available in established databases such 
as Lexis Nexis, is a fundamental component of this approach. The fact that such datasets 
can  be  re-created  and verified  independently  by  other  researchers  without  licensing 
constraints  is  also  noteworthy  in  an  academic  context  that  values  open  access  and 
reproducibility of research.
46
Finally,  once  the  intrinsic  limitations  and  assumptions  of  this  approach  are  kept  in 
consideration, word-frequency analysis allows to analyse trends and make comparison 
meaningfully  in  cases  when this  would  not  otherwise  be  possible.  In  particular  for 
scholars working on de facto states who are accustomed to conduct research in a context 
where trustworthy, independently verifiable data are a rare commodity, this new tool can 
be particularly useful. In integrating established qualitative methods with a quantitative 
technique  such as  word  frequency  analysis,  this  research  follows  the  approach  that 
Moran-Ellis et al.  (2006, 54) called “following a thread”, which consists in “pick[ing] 
an analytic question or theme in one dataset and follow[ing] it across the others (the 
thread) to create  a constellation of findings which can be used to  generate a multi-
faceted picture of the phenomenon.”
Why this method has been rarely used in area studies, 
and why it should be welcomed
In recent  years,  the internet  has become a key source of information for academics 
working in social sciences and humanities. Even if often not explicitly included among 
data  collection  methods,  it  is  considered  standard  practice  to  look  for  relevant 
information online through search engines before doing fieldwork or proceeding with 
other aspects of research. Such preliminary work, however, is highly dependent on the 
so-called  ‘Google  skills’  of  the  individual  researcher  and  mostly  takes  place 
unsystematically. By its nature, this approach treats the internet as an inordinate mass of 
contents, that can be superficially explored thanks to search engines and meaningful 
keywords.
However,  in  practice,  websites  are  often  highly  structured.  A  research  question 
involving a well-defined territory, institution or community may benefit of a structured 
analysis of the textual contents of a specific website, a section of a website, or a limited 
number of websites. Once extracted from the Internet, textual contents accompanied by 
metadata  (most  importantly,  date  of  publication)  can  be  quickly  converted  into  a 
carefully tailored dataset (or corpus, as it is frequently called in content analysis)5. This 
opens the way for quantitative content analysis techniques, as well as the possibility to 
analyse qualitatively a well-defined subset of materials. As highlighted by Baker and 
5 According to Krippendorf (2004, 18), “content analysis is a research technique for making 
replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of  
their use.” For an overview of the development of the concept in recent decades, see in  
particular Franzosi (2008, xxi–xlx). 
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McEnery  (2005,  198),  this  allows  “researchers  to  objectively  identify  widespread 
patterns of naturally occurring language and rare but telling examples, both of which 
may be over-looked by a small-scale analysis.”
It  is  argued  here  that  a  structured  approach  to  analysing  web  contents  could,  and 
perhaps  should,  become  a  common  component  part  of  the  research  process  in 
qualitative research, both in area studies and beyond. Qualitative studies may benefit of 
a more structured and explicit approach towards analysing on-line contents, an activity 
that  is  implicitly  included  in  many  studies  on  current  events,  recent  history  or 
contemporary debates about historical  events or figures.  Such an approach does not 
necessarily imply using quantitative methods, and can be used simply to formalize a key 
component of the research process. Beyond that, basic quantitative analysis of contents 
based on word frequency can be usefully integrated into qualitative studies, in order to 
provide additional background information, fine-tune interview guides, or corroborate 
evidence.6
One of the reasons why quantitative content analysis is still  relatively uncommon in 
area studies is that it is considered a technically complex and extremely time-consuming 
endeavour. As Franzosi (2008, xxxv) put it, decades after the technique was established, 
and  in  spite  of  technological  advancements  “content  analysis  is  still  an  expensive 
research  tool.  […]  And  it  is  so  even  in  computer-assisted  content  analysis.  […] 
Computer-aided  content  analysis  is  still  time  consuming.”  Indeed,  while  qualitative 
content analysis is often based on complex coding procedures and is troubled by issues 
of inter-coder reliability, quantitative content analysis increasingly involves advanced 
statistical  methods and complex analytical techniques.  However,  if  elaborate content 
analysis techniques require time, resources and skills that are usually not available to 
individual  researchers,  the response must not  necessarily  be to disregard completely 
these  methods.  Instead,  a  “back  to  the  basics”  approach  could  be  applied,  limiting 
quantitative content analysis to its most basic application: word frequency. 
Once the limitations of this method are kept in consideration, and a properly structured 
dataset has been built, content analysis based on word frequency can still do at a basic 
level what Albig, one of the forefathers of content analysis, considered to be the “most 
valuable use” of the method: “noting trends and changes in content” (Albig 1938, 349). 
6 The quantitative and qualitative component of the research may interact in different phases  
of the research, for example, by “following a thread”, as suggested by Moran-Ellis et al.  
(2006, 54).
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An additional benefit of this minimalistic approach is that it produces straightforward 
descriptive statistics and graphs that are meaningful and clear also to informed readers 
and  researchers  that  have  no  specific  competence  in  content  analysis  techniques  or 
statistical analysis. This allows data gathered with this method to be smoothly integrated 
with qualitative research and to be widely accepted by an audience – that of area studies 
scholars – largely unaccustomed to advanced content analysis techniques.
A second reason why content analysis is still uncommon in area studies is that relevant 
dataset  are  usually  not  readily  available.  De  facto  states  serve  as  a  particularly 
illustrative example, since they have long been considered “informational black holes” 
(King 2001, 550), local sources are not included in established media databases, and the 
limited quantitative data available related to them are highly contested.
In order to overcome these difficulties as well as to systematise the process, within the 
scope of this research, the author created a package for the R programming language: 
‘castarter - Content analysis starter toolkit for R’ (Comai 2016b). ‘castarter’ facilitates 
the creation of textual datasets and enables a number of operations on the datasets thus 
created. Without entering into technicalities,7 the next sections debate the reasons for 
creating new datasets, and then outlines some important limitations of this approach.
Creating targeted datasets
Books dedicated to content analysis typically  (e.g. Krippendorff 2004; Schreier 2012) 
do  not  debate  in  detail  how the  dataset  is  created.  They  often  include  sections  on 
sampling (Krippendorff 2004; Riffe, Lacy, and Fico 2005), but they still assume that the 
researcher has already created, has access or may buy access to a structured dataset.8 
Indeed, a significant part of published research applying this method either explicitly 
makes reference to on-line databases, or includes a relatively small amount of contents 
that  have  presumably  been  acquired  manually  (e.g.  by  copy/pasting  individual 
documents).9 Commercial databases such as Lexis-Nexis include a number of sources 
that  are  relevant  for  students  of  area  studies,  including  summaries  of  local  media 
translated in English by the BBC monitoring service. However, as research questions 
7 Readers interested in some of the technicalities involved are invited to refer to Appendix B, 
or directly to the software’s source code (https://github.com/giocomai/castarter). 
8 Riffe, Lacy and Fico (2005, 209–10) suggest a number of existing databases accessible for a 
fee, such as Lexis-Nexis (http://www.lexis.com/). 
9 Kutter and Kantner (2012, 6) mention a few such studies.
49
become more specific, the geographical limits more strictly defined, or the languages 
involved more exotic, established databases are bound to be a disappointment. Besides, 
their  focus  on  media,  business,  or  legal  contents,  disregards,  among  other  things, 
contents published by local institutions, civil society organizations, or political parties, 
that may be of interest to the researcher. 
Until a few years ago, independent collection and analysis of a vast number of textual 
materials  from previously  uncatalogued  official  or  media  sources  would  have  been 
seriously  constrained  by  the  human  capacity  of  the  researcher  as  well  as  by  the 
difficulty of securing physical access to those materials. The spreading of the internet in 
much of  the world has  fundamentally  altered this  condition.  Starting with the early 
2000s, and more evidently in the 2010s, the Internet has become commonplace also in 
previously isolated territories; local authorities at all levels throughout the post-Soviet 
space (including in de facto states) have created own websites where they regularly 
publish new contents. 
An overview of websites related to government authorities in post-Soviet de facto states 
conducted by this  author  in  the  summer  of  2014,  found over  100 websites  directly 
related to government authorities based in these territories, including official websites of 
local  authorities,  state  departments,  customs offices,  courts  and inspectorates,  along 
with those of key state institutions such as the president, government, parliament and 
key ministers.10 Most of them are regularly updated. 
Contents published on these websites are quoted as sources in academic articles related 
to de facto states, and the websites themselves have been object of scholarly analysis. 
The ‘Laboratory for the analysis of the Transnistrian conflict’ at the University of Sibiu 
(Romania), has created a database detailing the main features of a few dozens websites 
related  to  Transnistrian  organizations  and  institutions  (Laboratorul  Pentru  Analiza 
Conflictului Transnistran 2013). Comai (2015) provided a brief overview of how post-
10 All  of  these  websites  are  in  line  with  Fursich  and  Robins's  (2002,  195) definition  of 
'government  website'  -  “internet  sites  produced or  initiated  by  a  national  governmental 
institution  (such  as  a  ministry  of  information),  which  are  sanctioned  by  the  political  
leadership of the given country” - as well as the criteria brought forward by Mohammed 
(2004, 475), “to be included in the final data set, sites had to meet three criteria. They had to 
be: evidently official by statement or content; national in scope; and hosted, sanctioned and 
or produced by a native government or government agency.”
50
Soviet de facto states manifest themselves on-line. However, no previously published 
research has looked at these websites or their contents in a structured way.
Previous  studies  dealing  with  other  cases  have  drawn  inferences  by  categorizing 
websites according to features such as the languages in which they are available and the 
name of the web domain  (Mohammed 2004), content categories  (McMillan 2000), or 
others.  However,  within  the  scope  of  this  research,  websites  have  been  treated 
instrumentally simply as repositories of textual information, that at another point in time 
may have been published on local bulletin boards, transmitted directly to newsrooms, 
read on the radio, or printed on paper. Frequency, features and perhaps even contents of 
publications  may  be  influenced  by  the  medium of  transmission  –  in  this  case,  the 
internet – but this is not the focus of this study. Besides, looking exclusively at textual 
contents  has  a  number  of  advantages,  facilitating  analysis  of  mass  contents  and 
comparison among cases.
Limitations: availability of contents
The approach,  which may be useful  in  a  wide set  of  circumstances,  has substantial 
limitations  that  should  be  fully  considered.  Availability  of  contents  from  relevant 
sources and for relevant periods of time are a fundamental restriction. However, the 
most important limitation is substantive: researchers should not demand of basic word 
frequency analysis more than it can really say.
Analysis of word frequency based on time series is at  its most useful when lengthy 
periods of time are included. For example, a dataset should ideally include a substantial 
amount of data related to the periods both before and after key events. Without a doubt, 
an ever increasing amount of textual contents is available on-line. However, the relative 
novelty of the internet leads to the fact that very rarely materials published before 2000 
are  readily  available.  Moreover,  it  has  been  common for  websites  to  discard  older 
contents when moving the website to a new platform or content management system. As 
a consequence, the currently available version of a website often includes only contents 
published starting with 2010 or later. This is a substantial limitation, even for research 
focused  on  contemporary  events.  For  example,  it  is  difficult  to  find  relevant  local 
sources with contents published both before and after a relatively recent event such as 
the August 2008 war in South Ossetia.
With the spreading of modern content-management systems, it is increasingly common 
for new versions of a website to maintain availability of its whole archive. Generally 
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speaking,  institutional  websites  tend  to  have  long  life-spans.  However,  sometimes 
political rather than technical considerations limit the availability of older contents. For 
example, when a new president has been elected in countries such as Georgia (in 2013) 
and  Ukraine (in 2014), all  the contents published under the previous president have 
been deleted, thus highlighting a moment of discontinuity with the previous leadership 
of  the  country.11 Such  political  choices  pose  important  limitations,  for  example,  to 
scholars  interested  in  the  presidential  rhetoric  of  Georgia’s  president  Mikheil 
Saakashvili;  they  will  have  to  resort  to  secondary  sources  or  offline  archives, 
significantly increasing the time investment needed to conduct a given study.12 They 
also  serve  as  a  reminder  of  the  volatility  of  online  resources,  as  even  institutional 
websites  are  often  not  fully  stored  by  initiatives  such  as  the  ‘Internet  Archive’ 
(https://archive.org/) aimed at ensuring long-term availability of online contents.
Besides, even when contents are still  available online, it  may be difficult to find all 
relevant  items,  and  to  extract  relevant  metadata,  even  if  most  modern  content 
management systems distribute contents using one of a few standard approaches. To test 
further the feasibility of creating datasets from multiple websites, in October 2015 this 
author has retrieved with his own 'castarter' package all press-releases of the websites of 
the  presidents  of  the  15  former  Soviet  republics,  and  none  of  them  posed 
insurmountable  challenges.  However,  things  may  not  go  so  smoothly  with  non-
institutional websites, and in particular extracting contents from older websites may be 
more complicated. For example, the website of Transnistria's state news agency offers 
free access to all of its contents in a format that can easily be extracted by 'castarter' for 
all news published since 2012. Previous contents all the way back to 1999 are available, 
but in a less accessible format. They have been successfully extracted by this author, but 
this required developing a customized parsing solution.
11 Or  rather,  it  may  be  argued,  shedding  light  on  what  seems  to  be  a  fundamental  
misunderstanding about the continuity of democratic institutions.
12 Confirming that removal of contents from the web can be an issue in research practice, Toal  
(2017,  281,  note  41) pointed  out  that  “the  press  releases  and  speeches  of  President 
Saakashvili  are  no  longer  available  online.”  Fortunately,  Toal  had  “compiled  a 
comprehensive collection before they were taken down after [Saakashvili] left office.” In 
perspective,  tools  such  as  ‘castarter’ facilitate  pre-emptive,  targeted  archiving  of  online 
contents generated by relevant actors. 
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Finally,  textual  contents  can  be  usefully  analysed  as  described  only  when they  are 
currently freely available on the internet and can be extracted in a reasonable amount of 
time. Extracting contents for recent years from modern, structured websites (such as 
most  institutional  websites  or  blogs)  is  usually  a  relatively  straightforward  process. 
However, if relevant data is not currently available online, or it is overtly complex to 
extract, the approach outlined in this section becomes infeasible. 
Limitations: substantive issues and assumptions
Finally, the most important limitations regard substantive issues. The approach outlined 
in  this  section  relies  heavily  on  word  frequency,  which  is  the  most  basic  tool  of 
quantitative content  analysis.  The rudimentary nature of the process of counting the 
number of occurrences of a given term requires that the researcher is fully aware of the 
context in which that term has been used, the existence of alternative expressions to 
refer to the same concept, and the polysemantic nature of some words.
Accordingly, as has been highlighted, this approach may be useful in the preliminary 
phase of the research and as a tool to provide additional evidence or information on 
specific  issues.  However,  the  researcher  should use such data  with caution,  without 
overestimating their explanatory power, and mostly in combination with other methods.
2.5. Conclusions  
The  author’s  own  experience,  the  regulations  of  the  programme  that  funded  this 
research, as well as ethical considerations have all influenced to different extents the 
choice of data collection methods, the locations of fieldwork, and the relative visibility 
of each method in the final version of this research.
This  chapter  has  outlined  some of  the  ways  in  which  fieldwork and desk  research 
complement each others in this study. In terms of fieldwork, this research has followed 
an established pattern found in many studies focused on post-Soviet de facto states, 
whereby interviews and observations  in loco substantially contribute to the analysis. 
While  desk  research  based  on  content  available  online  has  arguably  been  no  less 
important, it has rarely been explicitly discussed in the literature on de facto states. This 
chapter presented some of the ways in which this important part of the research can be 
formalised, and become a full-fledged component of the research. 
Increased availability of large amounts of structured textual contents freely available 
on-line and of  software packages  that  allow for their  analysis  has  drawn increasing 
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attention  towards  quantitative  content  analysis.  Often,  studies  based  on quantitative 
content analysis make use of complex models that are overtly difficult to understand for 
the  uninitiated.  This  leads  to  a  situation  in  which  scholars  with  an  interest  in  the 
substantive issues analysed are not able to judge independently the reliability and the 
actual meaning of the results presented. At the same time, scholars that are less tech-
savvy or not accustomed to use quantitative methods, tend to overlook altogether the 
vast amount of structured contents that has become available on-line in recent years, or 
to explore it serendipitously. 
This needs not be the case. “Noting trends and changes in content” (Albig 1938, 349) 
may still  be  considered  a  key element  of  content  analysis;  not  every  scholar  using 
quantitative content analysis should necessarily strive to use more advanced techniques 
or  complex  machine  learning  models.  Scholars  that  are  not  familiar  with  advanced 
content  analysis  techniques  may  intuitively  understand  analyses  based  on  word 
frequency and appreciate their inherent limitations.  But well beyond word-frequency 
analysis, as has been argued, a structured approach to web contents may well contribute 
to finding troves of information among all the materials produced in previously isolated 
territories such as post-Soviet de facto states. As emerges from the following chapters, 
data  gathered  through  desk  research  fruitfully  interacts  with  insights  gained  during 
fieldwork at different stages of the research, substantially strengthening the evidential 
base.
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Chapter 3. 
External assistance for 
security and state 
building in small 
jurisdictions and 
post-conflict 
environments
As  anticipated  in  the  introduction,  throughout  this  study  micro-states  and  small 
dependent jurisdictions are used as terms of comparison for post-Soviet de facto states 
along with more established points of reference such as post-conflict regions and post-
Soviet  countries.  Considering  the  unconventional  nature  of  this  juxtaposition,  this 
chapter  highlights  some  of  the  features  that  make  such  a  comparison  meaningful. 
Relevant concepts such as ‘micro-state’ and ‘sub-state diplomacy’ are presented in the 
process. In the second part of this chapter, the focus shifts more explicitly towards the 
issue of external assistance for state building, which is at the core of this research. By 
providing an overview of the role of external support across different contexts, and by 
consistently pointing at similarities and discrepancies with the experience of post-Soviet 
de facto states, this  chapter provides useful terms of reference to put in context the 
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external relations of de facto states that are described more in detail in the following 
chapters.
3.1. On  the  similarities  between  de  facto  states  and   
micro-states
Studies on micro-states mostly focus on developing countries and island states that at 
first sight seem to be quite dissimilar from the four de facto states at the centre of this 
research.  Yet,  they share some important similarities.  With a  population close to,  or 
lower than, half a million inhabitants, all of post-Soviet de facto states would qualify as 
micro-states according to most definitions.1
Lacking own capabilities,  micro-states often have to  rely more or  less  explicitly  on 
bigger countries for their own security, as well as to ensure a degree of state capacity. 
This is clearly the case for associated states such as Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall 
Islands, which have explicitly delegated in a formal agreement with the  United States 
“full authority and responsibility for security and defence matters” (Shuster 2009, 329). 
A combination  of  security  guarantees  and  development  aid  lie  at  the  base  of  the 
“‘Compact  of Free Association’ under which,  the  United States grant  large sums of 
money towards development  projects,  and in return assumes control over  the states' 
defence  and  security  policies”  (Ali  Naseer  2002,  8).  The  similarity  with  formal  or 
informal agreements that bound patron and post-Soviet de facto states, for example the 
‘strategic partnership’ agreements ratified in 2015 between  Russia and  Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, is striking.2
1 The definition of small and micro-states has been contentious. Size, economic development 
and population, sometimes in combination, have been among the most common criteria.  
Arguably,  the  choice  is  also  determined  by  the  goal  of  the  researcher.  In  his  work  on 
democracy  in  very  small  polities,  Veenendal  (2013a,  255) opts  for  a  very  restrictive 
definition: “a micro-state is defined as a UN member state with less than a quarter of a  
million (250,000) inhabitants, which results in a group of 21 countries”. Instead, Ali Naseer 
(Ali Naseer 2002, 1) sets the threshold at 1,5 million inhabitants, including a much wider 
group of countries. A review of the definitions of state size used in the literature between  
1957 and 1999 (Crowards 2002, 177), shows cutting points mostly based on population size 
ranging from 250 000 to one million. Within the scope of this research, the label of micro-
state is applied to countries with a population of less than 500 000 residents.
2 Such similarities are presented in more detail in section 4.4.
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Literature  on  micro-states  highlights  the  reliance  of  these  territories  on  official 
development  assistance,  which  consequently  becomes  a  foreign  policy  priority. 
According  to  the  World  Bank's  ‘World  Development  Indicators’,  micro-states  are 
clearly the largest recipient of official development assistance per capita at the global 
level.  For  the  period  2011-2015,  Tuvalu,  Nauru,  the  Marshall  Islands,  Palau, 
Micronesia, and Tonga topped the list.3 However,  South Ossetia would easily lead the 
ranking if it was included in the statistics.4
Most  micro-states  became  independent  relatively  recently,  and  had  to  build  their 
ministry  of  foreign  affairs  from  scratch,  since  there  was  no  comparable  office  in 
previous colonial governments (East 1973, 497). This was clearly the case also for post-
Soviet de facto states. Even if  Abkhazia,  South Ossetia and  Nagorno Karabakh could 
base  the  activities  of  many  of  their  newly  established  ministries  on  pre-existing 
structures of government, they had to start from zero in developing their foreign affairs. 
Micro-states have a very limited number of diplomatic missions abroad, mostly limited 
to their patron, regional powers or neighbours, possibly with honorary consuls in other 
countries. When they do have representations abroad, post-Soviet de facto states take a 
similar approach, with the significant exception that they do not have the possibility to 
take advantage of an own representative at the United Nations.
Small  size  is  usually  associated  with  personalistic  politics  (Veenendaal  2013a). 
Veenendaal (2013a, 248) stresses how, according to literature, smallness brings with it
“the tendency of people to know each other through multiple societal roles and 
functions. These overlapping roles can lead to the confusion of public and private  
interests, as many (part-time) public officeholders combine their function with a 
private business or the leadership of a non-governmental organisation or interest 
group.” 
Even if the personalistic nature of politics in post-Soviet de facto states has not been an 
object of specific study, this characterization seems to describe quite well the situation 
found in these entities. In spite of it, and in line with previous research suggesting that 
micro-states tend to be more democratic than bigger states (Anckar 2008), post-Soviet 
de  facto  states  show  significant  elements  of  political  competition  (Popescu  2006a; 
3 Observation based on the World Bank indicator “Net ODA received per capita (current  
US$)”, based on five-year average calculated for the period 2011-2015 for all countries for 
which data are available. 
4 See Chapter 4 for a detailed comparison based on relevant data.
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Matsuzato 2008; Protsyk 2009; Ó Beacháin 2012; Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2012; Smolnik 
2012; Beacháin 2015; Ó Beacháin 2016). 
Lack of specialized skills and of own training facilities  (East 1973, 803; Ali Naseer 
2002,  10) are  also  consequences  of  small  size  and  recent  independence:  these  are 
features  shared  by  many  micro-states  and  post-Soviet  de  facto  states  alike.  As  a 
consequence, they refer to the expertise and experience of their patron when needed. 
Consistent  and considerable out-migration is  another aspect  shared by at  least  some 
micro-states and post-Soviet de facto states (Shuster 2009, 332). 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that representatives of de facto states explicitly referred 
to micro-states around the world as models and, at least for a period, considered the 
formula of associated status as an ideal solution for their long term relation with their 
patron state. “The following stage in the development of our reciprocal relations [with 
Russia]  has  analogues,  and an example  of  such cooperation is  demonstrated  by the 
United  States and  the  small  independent  state  in  the  pacific  Ocean  –  the  Marshall 
islands”, declared in 2003 Sergei Shamba, then head of Abkhazia's ministry of foreign 
affairs  (Shamba  2003).5 “I  believe  that  the  relations  between  Russia  and  Abkhazia 
should be about the same as the ones between France and  Monaco”, stated Stanislav 
Lakoba, a well known Abkhaz historian and former head of Abkhazia's security council, 
in an interview with the author  (Comai 2010). The publication in Sukhumi of a book 
dedicated to micro-states (Badra 2006) is a further example of the interest towards these 
territories. 
3.2. Non-sovereign territories and sub-state diplomacy  
Sub-state  entities,  be  they  autonomous  regions,  cities,  or  dependent  territories  with 
substantial self-rule, are – by definition – not sovereign. However, many of them have 
developed  extended  external  relations,  including  of  types  usually  associated  with 
traditional diplomatic activities among states. Various terms have been used to refer to 
5 References to the Marshall Islands as a positive example can still be found in statements by 
both Shamba and former  Abkhazian prime minister Jergenia in 2006  (Apsnypress 2006a, 
2006b). However, at least in Abkhazia, what was presented in as an ideal solution became 
totally unacceptable less than a decade later, as emerged clearly when official statements  
issued by  Abkhazia's ministry of foreign affairs and parliament vehemently denounced an 
interview with Taras Shamba, head of the world congress of the Abkhaz-Abaz people, who 
had suggested that Abkhazia should become an associated state of Russia (Kusov 2014). 
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such activities. While ‘paradiplomacy’ has been particularly successful and has been 
widely employed, 'sub-state diplomacy' seems to be more neutral. Cornago (2010, 13) 
defines this phenomenon as:
“sub-state  governments’  involvement  in  international  relations,  through  the 
establishment of formal and informal contacts, either permanent or ad hoc, with 
foreign public or private entities, with the aim to promote socio-economic, cultural 
or  political  issues,  as  well  as  any  other  foreign  dimension  of  their  own 
constitutional competences.”
Sub-state  diplomacy is  a  phenomenon that  is  growing, both in  diffusion and scope. 
Indeed, some authors (Hocking 1999; Criekemans 2008; Criekemans and Duran 2010) 
have suggested that sub-state diplomacy, in its practice, is more and more difficult to 
distinguish from small state diplomacy. Hocking argues that the categories of state and 
non-state  actors  are  “increasingly  uninformative”  in  this  field,  and  that  “the  most 
significant aspect of non central governments’ actorness, linked closely to their status 
ambiguity,  is  represented  by  the  variety  of  networks  in  which  they  can  operate” 
(Hocking 1999, 29). A review of Faroese foreign affairs (Ólavsdóttir, Justinussen, and í 
Jákupsstovu 2009),  for  example,  shows how a small-sized non-sovereign entity  can 
develop significant foreign activities, even if limited both geographically and in scope, 
also thanks to a network of own representative offices. The fact that sub-state entities 
can freely operate in a number of international contexts exactly because of their status 
ambiguity hints at the considerable possibilities to interact at the international level that 
in practice are available to representatives of de facto states. Indeed, in a conversation 
with the author, former minister of foreign affairs of Abkhazia Maxim Gvinjia said that 
non-recognition  is  on many levels  a  “paper  curtain”,  rather  than  an insurmountable 
obstacle: one tends to assume that lack of recognition makes international interactions 
impossible, but often this is not the case.6
Unlike  micro-states  but  similarly  to  de  facto  states,  sub-state  entities  cannot  take 
advantage of established venues of international encounter like the United Nations or 
other inter-governmental regional organizations. As Criekmans and Duran  (2010, 40) 
put it, “in contrast to the situation with small states, international institutions are not 
always the ‘best friends’ of regions.” In a context where alternative forms of diplomacy 
are obtaining growing importance and where small non-sovereign territories can have 
6 Maxim Gvinjia, former Minister of foreign affairs of Abkhazia, Sukhumi, May 2016.
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an active foreign policy, de facto states may employ similar strategies to promote their 
interests.
Some sub-state governments are starting “to use culture and identity as a lever to place 
oneself  on  the  international  map”  (Duran,  Criekemans,  and  Melissen  2009,  9). 
Criekemans  (2010, 40) notices  in some sub-state entities “a strong focus on image-
building or sometimes even on public diplomacy, and a strategy to utilize culture and 
tourism as  instruments  to  place  one’s  own nation  on  the  map,”  and  adds  that  this 
approach is  mostly  chosen by “regions  with  a  strong identity  or  cultural  tradition.” 
Among post-Soviet facto states, this is particularly noticeable in the case of Abkhazia.
One  of  the  forms  of  international  cooperation  among  sub-state  entities  that  has  an 
established tradition, including in the post-Soviet space, is that of city twinnings. In his 
overview of  city  twinnings,  Zelinsky  (1991,  1) highlighted  that  in  some cases  they 
“promote  ideological  and humanitarian  programs  that  may  be  at  odds  with  official 
policy”, and in this context argued that “’citizen diplomacy’ may be one of a number of 
developments undermining the integrity of the nation-state system” (Zelinsky 1991, 27). 
Even in Soviet times, cities in the region stipulated friendship agreements and twinnings 
with other cities in western Europe and elsewhere. After the fall of the Soviet Union, 
cities  around  the  Black  Sea  continued  to  enter  into  such  relationships,  and 
municipalities in the de facto states of the region have actively been involved in such 
programmes  (Kuşku-Sönmez  2014).  Well  beyond  the  establishment  of  regional 
networks,  inter-city  agreements  have  become  a  precious  opportunity  for  local 
authorities  in  de facto  states  to  develop formal  international  contacts  and implicitly 
obtain  some  kind  of  recognition.  Gagra and  Tskhinvali,  for  example,  established  a 
twinning with Italian municipalities in Sardinia; Stepanakert is officially a sister city of 
Montebello in California; Tiraspol became twin city of Novosibirsk in 2016.7
In  the  post-Soviet  space,  the  inclination  of  sub-state  entities  to  engage  in  external 
relations has obtained attention in particular in reference to Russia in the 1990s. In her 
study  of  Tatarstan's  external  relations,  Sharafutdinova  (2003,  616) highlights  the 
importance of the “identity-constructing component” in the region's foreign activities. 
7 While some instances of such direct  interactions and agreements between municipalities 
have  clear  political  connotations,  they  mostly  do  not  involve  active  engagement  from 
residents or the relatively high level of financial assistance that, for example, sometimes  
accompanied the twinnings of American municipalities with Nicaraguan towns in the 1980s 
(Zelinsky 1991, 27–28).
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She argues that “Tatarstan has been ‘acting like a state’ in order to be recognised by 
international actors”  (Sharafutdinova 2003, 613) and that many of the agreements it 
signed “carry a merely declaratory character and are not actually being implemented” 
(Sharafutdinova 2003, 617). Similarly, some of the agreements signed by de facto states 
(e.g.  between  Abkhazia and  Tuvalu) are not signed in order to be implemented,  but 
rather in a purely symbolic fashion, in order to act like a state.
Many  Russian regions, however, develop direct international contacts even under the 
centralizing dynamics that took place since the early 2000s. For example, both of the 
Russian regions sharing a border with de facto states (Krasnodar Krai and North Ossetia 
–  Alania)  engage  directly  with  regional  administrations  and  other  actors  in  foreign 
countries.  Because  of  both  economic  and  geographic  reasons,  this  is  particularly 
noticeable in the case of Krasnodar Krai (GoKuban.ru n.d.), but even landlocked North 
Ossetia boasts on the official websites of its government agreements and meetings with 
countries both near and far (Ministry of economic development of North Ossetia 2013a, 
2013b). Besides, both of these regions have established formal and direct contacts with 
the de facto governments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia or with districts within them 
(e.g. Krasnodar Krai with Gagra district).8
Finally,  taking  the  perspective  of  federated  entities,  even  relations  with  the  federal 
centre can to some extent be considered “external.” For example, as will be seen in 
more detail in Chapter 5, it is mostly exogenous – rather than endogenous – resources 
that enable access to public goods, services, as well as the income of a considerable part 
of  the  resident  population  in  Russian  republics  of  the  Northern  Caucasus:  Moscow 
provides for most of the local budget to these regions through direct transfers, and – in 
comparison to other  Russian regions – an unusually large share of residents directly 
8 Krasnodar Krai established its own representation office in Gagra in 2009 (Governor of the 
Krasnodar krai 2009), and gave it a yearly budget of almost 100 000 USD in 2011, with the 
aim of “representing the interests of the  Krasnodar Krai in the  Gagra distric (Republic of 
Abkhazia)”, as well as “support in the establishment of direct contacts between economic 
subjects, institutions of culture, sport and education, of the  Krasnodar Krai and the  Gagra 
district (Republic of Abkhazia), establishment of mixed enterprises, holding of exhibitions, 
‘days of culture’, festivals, etc.” (Kachalov 2011). The representation office was eventually 
closed  in  2015:  “considering  the  establishment  of  good neighbourly  relations  and tight 
contacts, a large part of the initiatives between the organs of state power, economic actors,  
and their partners in the Republic of Abkhazia do not need coordination from the side of the 
government” (Administration of Krasnodar Krai 2015).
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depends for their incomes on the state. Similar mechanisms, i.e. exogenous resources 
covering for most of the budget and a large share of residents (state employees and 
pensioners) being directly dependent on the state for their incomes, are found also in de 
facto states.
3.3. Not ideal, yet relevant terms of comparisons  
Given the diminutive size of post-Soviet de facto states and the importance of size for 
foreign  policy and the extent  of  external  relations  among internationally  recognised 
states,9 within the scope of this research micro-states are recurrently used as a terms of 
comparison  for  post-Soviet  de  facto  states.  Ideal  terms  of  comparison  would  be 
countries of relatively recent independence, engaged in state and institution building, 
largely dependent on a patron, with a comparable level of economic development and 
located in a similar region. Unfortunately, there is not a single state that satisfies all of 
these criteria at the same time. Micro-states in Europe have mostly been established a 
very long time ago, have well  established institutions and a high level of economic 
development  (Eccardt  2005).  Yet,  in  some  circumstances,  and  in  spite  of  all  the 
differences,  reference  will  be  made  to  European  micro-states  (e.g.  Liechtenstein), 
European countries of recent independence (e.g.  Montenegro and  Kosovo) as well as 
relevant non-sovereign territories (e.g. Greenland).
Among micro-states in other areas of the world,  Palau is the only one which obtained 
internationally recognized independence after 1990. The fact that it has a clear patron 
(the  United  States),  and  their  relationship  is  formalized  with  a  Compact  of  Free 
Association, makes of it a useful term of comparison for some aspects. Given that the 
Marshall Islands and Micronesia have similar arrangements, they are discussed jointly 
in Chapter 4. Besides them, jurisdictions whose economic structure can be ascribed to 
the MIRAB model (migration, remittances, aid and bureaucracy) as originally defined 
by Bertram and Watters (1985) are used as terms of comparison in both Chapter 4 and 5.
However, while aiming to appreciate the impact of non-recognition, distant micro-states 
or dependent jurisdictions often bound to their former colonial master will not be the 
only term of comparison. In particular in reference to the economic structure of these 
territories  and  the  fundamental  importance  of  exogenous  financial  resources  in  this 
context,  sub-state  entities  inside  the  Russian  Federation,  in  particular  the  republics 
9 As debated by Neemia (1995, 14), there is a consensus in the literature that “size is the most 
potent variable on foreign policy behaviour.”
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located in the northern Caucasus, also serve as a term of comparison (Chapter 5). Parent 
states and other former Soviet countries are referred to when discussing the type of 
support  from  international  organisations  that  reaches  these  territories  (Chapter  6). 
Neighbouring states as well  as micro-states and countries of recent independence in 
Europe are used as terms of comparison while singling out the aspects in which the 
ministries  of foreign affairs  of  post-Soviet  de facto states differ  from those of their 
recognised peers (Chapter 7).
3.4. State building in the post  - Soviet space  
In an early and popular article on post-Soviet de facto states, King (2001) suggested that 
“the territorial separatists of the early 1990s have become the state builders of the early 
2000s.” This characterisation has been largely confirmed by scholars of de facto states: 
as  Blakkisrud  and  Kolstø  (2011,  180) put  it,  no  matter  the  reasons  behind  the 
secessionist  agenda  at  the  beginning  of  the  conflict,  time  eventually  transformed 
“secessionists into state-builders”. However, the dramatic change in the state-building 
trajectory of these territories determined by Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia in 2008, and its increased involvement in  Transnistria, has perhaps not been 
appreciated  enough;  to  put  it  succinctly,  domestically-led  “deficient  state  building” 
(Kolstø  2006,  727) of  the  early  2000s  has  turned  into  externally-sponsored 
comprehensive state building in the 2010s. After a brief characterisation based on the 
literature dealing with the earlier phases of state building in post-Soviet de facto states, 
the following sections point at practices of external assistance for state building found in 
other contexts, comparing them with those found in post-Soviet de facto states in the 
post-2008 environment.
To the question “to what extent are the authorities able to provide the populace with the 
services expected of contemporary states, such as internal and external security, basic 
infrastructure, and welfare?” (Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2008, 484), scholars have mostly 
argued  that  de  facto  states  “are  able  to  provide  many  of  the  basic  functions  of 
statehood”  (Caspersen 2015, 185),  and even that their  state capabilities are “as well 
developed as that of the recognised states of which they are still notionally a part” (King 
2001, 525). Such considerations, however, tell as much about de facto states as they do 
about their parent states, since the demise of the Soviet Union coincided with collapse 
of state institutions across the post-Soviet space (Ganev 2005). The lack of functioning 
63
institutions during the early 1990s has been particularly evident in Georgia,10 but even 
as state capacity increased dramatically after Saakashvili’s raise to power in 2004 and 
GDP grew considerably, poverty remained widespread and social spending relatively 
low  (Gugushvili 2017). Widespread poverty and malfunctioning state institutions still 
characterise Moldova more than twenty years after it achieved independence, with high 
levels of emigration serving as an implicit  judgement  on the failures  of post-Soviet 
developments. Caspian oil  and gas brought little welfare to  Azerbaijanis in the first 
decade of  independence  (Rasizade 2002),  and even in  later  years  poverty  remained 
widespread, and investments in sectors such as education and health low (Cornell 2011, 
256–57). 
In other words, stating that de facto states in the 1990s had a state capacity comparable 
with that of the parent was hardly a generous compliment, and rather meant that these 
entities were on the brink of being a failed state. Indeed, early writings on post-Soviet 
de facto states often highlighted low capacities of the de facto authorities. In his book on 
post-Soviet de facto states Lynch (Lynch 2004, 63) plainly stated that “de facto states 
are failing states.” Still in 2006, Kolstø was arguing that if de facto states were to be 
recognised internationally, “most of them will end up not as ‘normal’ or fully fledged 
states  but  instead  transmute  into  recognized  quasi-states  of  the  Jacksonian  variety” 
(Kolstø 2006, 725), or, in other words, failed states. He also argued that the “modal 
tendency of quasi-states is deficient state building” (Kolstø 2006, 727), and made clear 
that state strength is clearly not the main factor enabling the continued existence of 
these territories.
In  fact,  the  level  of  state  capacity  found  in  post-Soviet  de  facto  states  varied 
considerably among cases. In Transnistria, where infrastructures were not substantially 
damaged by conflict, ethnic cleansing did not take place, and a significant share of large 
Soviet enterprises continued functioning, decreased state capacity never led to a total 
collapse  of  state  institutions.  Among  the  South  Caucasus  cases,  before  war  and 
recognition in 2008, Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2008, 506) could matter-of-factly state that 
across  key  criteria  of  state  capacity,  from  defence  and  control  over  territory  to 
consolidation of state institutions, there was “a clear hierarchy:  Nagorno Karabakh on 
top,  Abkhazia  in  the  middle  and  South  Ossetia  at  the  bottom.”  At  the  time of  this 
writing, almost a decade has passed, which led to significant changes in both parent and 
10 “The disintegration of the state went further in  Georgia than anywhere else in the former 
Soviet Union with the sole exception of Tajikistan” (Nodia 2002, 413).
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de  facto  states.  In  the  case  of  Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia,  the  change  has  been 
particularly abrupt as a consequence of Russia’s recognition of independence and mass 
inflow of both financial and technical support.
Before focusing on the dynamics of external assistance found in post-Soviet de facto 
states, the next pages present how external support to state building took place in other 
relevant contexts. This overview first focuses on what is perhaps the main component of 
state capacity, i.e. the capability to offer a degree of security to a resident population, 
which must be a component of even the most minimalistic definitions of statehood, and 
then deals with state- and institution-building processes found in other contexts. While 
details  on  external  assistance  to  state  building  in  post-Soviet  de  facto  states  are 
presented  at  length  in  Chapter  4,  5,  and  6,  the  next  sections  anticipate  when 
discrepancies between post-Soviet de facto states and selected terms of comparisons 
emerge from the literature.
3.5. External support for security in selected contexts  
As  highlighted  by  Wesley  (2008,  377),  in  state  building  efforts  “security  is  given 
absolute priority, reflecting a Weberian understanding of the essence of stateness as the 
monopoly of the means of legitimate violence and a Hobbesian belief that a pervasive 
state of insecurity makes all other human activity impossible.” International efforts in 
post-conflict  settings  often  include  both  a  direct  intervention  through  a  temporary 
military mission, as well as programmes to establish and train local police and military 
forces.  In  the case of  Kosovo,  for  example,  in  the  first  instance a  military mission 
(KFOR) was established to provide security on the ground. Later, the UN, EU, OSCE 
and NATO became involved in police training activities, to the extent that coordination 
among  international  organisations  became  in  itself  a  complicated  matter  (Dursun-
Ozkanca and Crossley-Frolick 2012, 251). In Timor Leste, both the establishment of the 
army and Timorese Police Service have been “externally  designed security  building 
project[s]” (Buldanlioglu Sahin 2007, 202). Such efforts have been prominent after full 
scale military inventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, involving not only military forces on 
the ground, but also actors such as the European Union (Gross 2009). Even NGOs are 
often  involved  in  security  sector  reforms  in  post-conflict  contexts,  mostly  as  a 
component of larger humanitarian or development projects (Morrice 2014). 
International support to capacity-building in the security sector, however, is not limited 
to  post-conflict  international  missions,  but  in  different  forms  can  be  found  in  new 
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independent states that have not gone through extended conflicts. As highlighted by 
Goldsmith and Dinnen (2007, 1094) specifically referring to police building, “following 
independence, many developing countries of strategic importance to Western nations 
have received technical assistance, primarily through training.” Countries in South-East 
Europe  have  also  been  at  the  centre  of  international  police  reform  programmes, 
involving a plethora of international organisations as well as bilateral efforts (Schroeder 
2007). Such processes can be found also in post-Soviet countries: for example, NATO’s 
‘Partnership for Peace’ programme, which includes a security sector reform component, 
involves all three republic of the South Caucasus (Cornell et al. 2004; Hille 2010, 219). 
The  European  Union,  the  OSCE  and  USAID  all  contributed  to  police  reforms  in 
Georgia (Di  Puppo  2010,  2),11 and  the  United  States offered  direct  assistance  and 
training to Georgian military forces well beyond the structural cooperation that derived 
from Georgian participation to military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq (Toal 2017, 
chap. 3).
Finally, support to security sector reforms from either a patron or multi-lateral donors 
has been common also in small sovereign jurisdictions, not necessarily after a period of 
conflict, and not only in the early years after independence. A study commissioned by 
the British Commonwealth on the security of very small states highlighted that security 
and police forces in such countries are structurally in need of training and support from 
the outside.12 Australia, for example, has been providing support to police reforms in the 
Solomon  Islands,  Papua  New  Guinea,  Timor-Leste,  Vanuatu,  Samoa  and  Nauru 
(Goldsmith and Dinnen 2007, 1091); New Zealand contributed to police development in 
– among other places – Bougainville, Cook Islands and  Tonga (Law & Development 
Partnership 2013).
However, in some circumstances external vulnerabilities rather than domestic security 
are the principal worry of many micro-states,  and from this point of view enhanced 
capacities or even high levels of military spending are no guarantee of security from 
11 It  should be highlighted,  however,  that  police reforms in  Georgia after  2003 have been 
driven mostly by domestic political choices, rather than led by external actors  (Sholderer 
2013, 338–39).
12 “A considerable  amount  of  bilateral  military  and  police  training  is  conducted  in  the 
Commonwealth and we urge that this be continued and expanded as required”  (McLean 
1985, 53).
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belligerent neighbours.13 Ultimately, micro-states have no actual possibility to develop 
independently a substantial defence force able to resist attacks by bigger, more powerful 
neighbours.14 As  pointed  out  by  Bartmann  (2002,  368) “given  that  even  those  few 
micro-states with a high per capita level of military forces will not have the physical 
capacity to resist direct external threats, then larger states may have to come to their 
assistance directly to meet an immediate danger.”
In spite of the fact that foreign invasion is not an imminent threat for many (especially 
island) micro-states, they often have security agreements with bigger states.15 Many of 
them have completely disbanded military forces, and kept only a small police force for 
domestic  security.16 Ultimately,  micro-states  do  not  rely  on  their  own  strength  for 
keeping their safety and sovereignty, but rather on support from a powerful patron as 
well as “on international norms and particularly the principle of extantism which invests 
sanctity for the territorial integrity and independence of even the smallest members of 
the international system” (Bartmann 2002). This broad principle is often reaffirmed in 
formal or informal security arrangements with neighbouring states or powerful regional 
powers.17
13 Given the focus of this research, reference is made hear exclusively to external military  
threats, in spite of the fact that for Pacific islands states climate change and natural disasters 
often represent a more immediate security risk.
14 The  inability  of  Kuwait  to  defend  itself  against  the  Iraqi  invasion  serves  as  a  clear 
illustration of the case in point: “The expensive and sophisticated weaponry in the Kuwaiti  
arsenal and even the support of its allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council, itself largely a  
micro-state alliance, proved to be of no value in stalling, let alone resisting, the superior 
Iraqi forces.” (Bartmann 2002, 364).
15 European micro-states such as Liechtenstein and San Marino do not have a regular army nor 
have defence agreements of any sort, maintaining formal neutrality and non-alignment. 
16 Bartmann (2002, 369) lists 21 micro-states “with police and coast-guard units but no formal 
military establishment.”
17 Small states can reciprocate such assistance by lending their legitimacy as sovereign states 
by voting with the patron in UN bodies, or through their (at least formal) participation to 
international military missions such as the  United States’ ‘coalition of the willing’ against 
Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq (Wivel and Oest 2010).
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3.6. External  support  for  security  in  post-Soviet  de   
facto states
Quite clearly, the experience of de facto states in this respect is substantially different. 
For a start, to maintain their independence, de facto states cannot rely on the sympathy 
and support often conceded to micro-states in the international system. This is not to say 
that their security from external threats is guaranteed through domestic capacities; quite 
on the contrary, in spite of a proud and militaristic rhetoric of self-defence, post-Soviet 
de facto states have been and still are strongly dependent on external support for their 
defence.  As  highlighted  in  the  previous  section,  this  is  not  due  to  exceptional 
weaknesses of these territories, but should rather be seen as an inherent feature of small 
jurisdictions and micro-states: no matter their level of spending on the military, or the 
extent  of  militarization  of  their  societies,  they  remain  inevitably  vulnerable.  In  the 
context of post-Soviet de facto states, where the threat of external military actions is not 
negligible and there is no realistic possibility that broad coalitions of powerful countries 
would come to the rescue (as has happened in the case of sovereign Kuwait as well as  
non-sovereign Kosovo), this leads to increased reliance on a patron.
Even in the 1990s, at a time when a relatively weak Russia did not bankroll the budget 
of  these territories,  their  external  security  was to  some extent  guaranteed by peace-
keeping  contingents  manned  by  Russia.18 In  all  cases,  only  the  patron  has  been 
effectively perceived as a provider of security: while international actors have routinely 
called  for  a  peaceful  resolution  of  the  conflict,  they  have  almost  unanimously 
highlighted the lack of legitimacy of de facto authorities, and thus have not taken any 
commitment to protect their security.19
18 There has been a lively scholarly debated on the significance and peculiarities of  Russian 
peace-keeping in this context (Baev 1994; Allison 1994; Lynch 2000; Mackinlay and Cross 
2003). No peace-keeping force has been established on the line of conflict in the case of  
Nagorno Karabakh, but  Armenian military forces actively contributed (and contribute) to 
the territory’s defence. 
19 In  the  case  of  Abkhazia,  a  United  Nations  monitoring  mission  (UNOMIG)  has  been 
established in 1993 to provide an additional layer of scrutiny along the conflict line, which 
may have had some positive impact on the daily lives of local residents, but was not in the 
position to intervene at any level in case of renewed conflict or violence, as the events of  
1998 and 2008 clearly demonstrated.
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Also  considering  the  effectively  minor  security  threat  coming  from  Moldova,  the 
Russian peace-keeping contingent offered all the military protection that  Transnistria 
needed. In the case of  Abkhazia and  South Ossetia, a formal defence treaty has been 
signed  only  after  Russia’s  recognition  of  their  independence.  However,  Russia’s 
immediate intervention on 8 August 2008 in favour of South Ossetia demonstrated with 
deeds that Russia could be considered a source of protection for the de facto authorities 
even when the only formal guarantee was given by the mandate of the peace-keeping 
contingent.  Finally,  in the case of  Nagorno Karabakh,  Armenia’s military effectively 
works jointly with Armenian Karabakh forces, and there is a clear understanding that a 
military attack on  Nagorno Karabakh implies full  engagement  of  Armenian military 
forces.20
In de facto states, domestic security has been a particularly thorny issue for residents of 
marginalised groups, such as  Georgian residents in Gali  (Human Rights Watch 2011; 
SaferWorld and Institute for Democracy 2011). However, even beyond such situations, 
not only political will or conflict dynamics, but also low domestic capacity has had an 
impact on the capability of local institutions to run an effective police force, or to tackle 
the  allegedly  high  level  of  human rights  violations  taking place  in  the  penitentiary 
facilities  of  these  territories  (Racz 2016;  Hammarberg 2013,  14–23).  Hammarberg’s 
(2013) report on the human rights situation in Transnistria includes multiple references 
to  the  need  of  trainings  across  different  sectors,  including  in  the  judiciary  and 
penitentiary system. In such respects, inernationally-sponsored ‘security sector reforms’ 
programmes such as the ones mentioned above have not taken place in de facto states, 
apparently  with  minor  exceptions  related  to  child  rights21 or  border  management  in 
Transnistria through Eubam.22 In the years following 2008, Russia provided training to 
20 The military actions that erupted in April 2016 along certain areas of the line of contact 
between Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan offers a case in point: a significant number of 
the serviceman killed in battle were under the control of the Armenian (rather than Nagorno 
Karabakh’s)  Ministry  of  Defence.  Armenian  sources  –  including  the  Armenia’s  own 
Ministry of Defence (Armenia’s Ministry of Defence 2016) – provided figures on casualties 
without distinguishing among the two forces.
21 For example, in its yearly report Unicef (2016) makes reference to trainings involving “30 
militia/police inspectors” in Abkhazia. 
22 See Dias (2013) and Chapter 6 for more details on the interactions between Transnistria and 
the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM). 
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local  policy  and  security  forces,  took  charge  of  border  patrolling,  and  established 
different levels of integration with the local armies. In the case of South Ossetia, some 
military units  have been fully  incorporated into the  Russian  army  (Fuller  2017).  In 
Abkhazia,  a  joint  Russian-Abkhazian  ‘Information-Coordination  Centre  of  Internal 
Affairs  Agencies’ has  been  established  in  2017  in  order  to  strengthen  coordination 
among their respective law-enforcement agencies (Civil.ge 2017b).
3.7. External  support  for  state  building  in  selected   
contexts
Beyond  the  security  component,  small  jurisdictions,  micro-states  and  post-conflict 
territories  around  the  world  largely  receive  assistance  in  order  to  develop  state 
capacities and sustain their ability to deliver public goods and services to a resident 
population. In the case of micro-states, local institutions effectively require continued 
foreign interactions in order to be able to deliver the services expected from a state in a 
modern society, including consultancies, training and formal education, as well foreign 
citizens filling middle and high level technical or specialist posts for which local skilled 
human resources are missing.23 In very small states, dependence on external support is 
usually not limited to the constitutive years after newly obtained independence, but it is 
rather an inherent, structural feature, not only in terms of budget support, but also in 
terms of technical support.24 This is true not only for island states in the Pacific and 
Caribbean,  but  also  for  wealthy  micro-states  in  Europe  such  as  Liechtenstein and 
Monaco: in order to develop and maintain the capacities needed to provide services at 
the desired level, institutions of these territories need constant interactions with partners 
in other countries.25
23 For example, Kersell  (1987) recounts that in the the  Cayman Islands, at  the time of his 
writing, about 32 per cent of the 1300 civil servants working on the islands were expatriates. 
Also “one to two per cent of employees are sent overseas each year for various lengths of  
time, from a week to two years, for specialist or professional training. The government also 
supports 10-12 high school graduates each year to go to university in Britain, Canada or [...] 
the US.” (Kersell 1987, 100). As will be seen in Chapter 6, similar dynamics are to be found 
also in post-Soviet de facto states. 
24 For more details and statistics on external assistance to micro-states and small dependent  
jurisdictions, see Chapter 5.
25 See for example this characterisation of Liechtenstein’s education reforms in the 1970s: “the 
country's educational system has been further consolidated in the past decade in many ways,  
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In post-conflict territories, fragile states, “challenging contexts” (Barma, Huybens, and 
Viñuela  2014),  and  “areas  of  limited  statehood”  (Krasner  and  Risse  2014),  local 
institutions have often received support for state building and the provision of services 
to their resident population, well beyond security. Such initiatives can take place under 
international  trusteeships  (as  was  the  case  for  Kosovo and  Timor  Leste),  through 
governance  delegation  agreements  (Matanock  2014),  targeted  official  support  or 
international relief organizations. In some cases, services have been directly delivered 
by NGOs or even private companies (Hönke and Thauer 2014).
Such interventions are the result of a widely accepted understanding that state building 
should  be  considered  an  important  constituent  part  of  peace  building  efforts,  an 
approach known also as  ‘state  building for peace’ that  has  taken roots in  particular 
starting with the 1990s (Menocal 2011, 176; Call and Wyeth 2008). Remarkably, peace- 
and state-building initiatives have mostly been dissociated in the case of post-Soviet de 
facto states. International efforts addressed at conflict resolution and peace-building by 
and large did not aim to increase the capacity and legitimacy of local state institutions, 
which are usually  considered key aspects  of  sustainable post-conflict  peace.  On the 
contrary, international actors have almost unanimously chosen to highlight the primacy 
of territorial integrity (as clearly emerges from the wording of relevant UN resolutions), 
and thus the lack of legitimacy of the de facto authorities.
Largely  as  a  consequence,  no  concerted  internationalised  state-building  efforts  took 
place in these territories, such as those that have been established in other post-conflict 
settings  (e.g.  Kosovo or  Timor  Leste).  Excluding  assistance  from  the  patron, 
internationalised,  concerted,  and  explicit  efforts  at  capacity-building,  i.e.  “the 
development  of  administrative  and  institutional  competence  to  run  the  newly-
established institutions and meet  the basic  demands of society”  (Buldanlioglu Sahin 
2007, 109) are not to be found in post-Soviet de facto states. Similarly, no structured 
support  has  been  offered  to  de  facto  authorities  by  international  organisations,  for 
example,  to  build  more  inclusive  institutions,  to  increase  accountability,  to  develop 
minority  policies,  or enhance the electoral process,  as has happened in post-conflict 
territories and newly independent states, including in the post-Soviet space. Any sort of 
democracy promotion is noticeably absent, and is the logical consequence of the explicit 
and  links  have  been  created  or  strengthened  with  organisations  and  establishments  in 
neighbouring countries to help to fill the gaps which of necessity occur in the educational 
facilities provided by this miniature state” (Martin 1984, 469).
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lack  of  recognition  of  the  political  processes  taking  place  in  these  territories:26 the 
European Union, for example, through dedicated statements issued by the Council of 
the European Union or – more recently – the External Action Service, has consistently 
highlighted its non-recognition of elections in these territories.27
3.8. External  support for state building in post-Soviet   
de facto states
The issue of state building in post-Soviet de facto states has been object of inquiry, with 
research  focusing  on  specific  aspects,  such  as  the  nexus  between  state  and  nation 
building (Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2011) or between state building and legitimacy (Bakke 
et  al.  2014;  Caspersen  2015).  As  pointed  out  by  Isachenko  (Isachenko  2012,  3), 
however,  “research on these political  entities  has been preoccupied mainly with the 
question whether they fulfil the necessary criteria of de facto statehood, rather than how 
this is accomplished.” 
There has been also some debate on the driving forces behind state-building processes 
in  these  territories,  and what  determines  its  outcome.  In  their  early  years,  with  the 
partial  exception  of  Nagorno  Karabakh,  external  assistance  has  not  been  the  main 
determinant  of  state  building  in  post-Soviet  de  facto  states.  Among  the  territories 
analysed  in  this  research,  Transnistria  demonstrated  highest  capacities,  but  this  was 
largely due to its advantageous starting point, rather than to external assistance or to 
strong  domestic  motivation.  But  while  the  motivation  aspect  may  have  been 
substantially  irrelevant  in  the  case  of  Transnistria,28 lack  of  incentives  may  have 
26 As highlighted by Broers (2013, 72, note 14), governments in Tbilisi and Baku do not allow 
‘democratisation assistance’ activities to be organised in de facto states, even when it  is  
presented as a component of peace-building work. 
27 With time,  such statements  have become more standardised and succinct.  Here  is  –  for  
example  –  the  full  statement  issued  by  the  EEAS in  occasion  of  the  2014 presidential 
elections  in  Abkhazia:  “The  European  Union  supports  the  territorial  integrity  and 
sovereignty  of  Georgia,  as  recognised  by  international  law.  In  view  of  reports  about 
‘presidential elections’ in the  Georgian breakaway region of  Abkhazia on 24 August, we 
recall that the European Union does not recognise the constitutional and legal framework 
within which these elections have taken place” (European External Action Service 2014).
28 Especially in the case of  Transnistria, it has been suggested that the secession movement 
was born out of greed rather than grievances, and that the subsequent state building efforts  
were essentially the result of self-interested actions by a ruling group wishing to maintain 
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contributed to the limited engagement of authorities in South Ossetia to engage in state-
building efforts: according to Kolstø and Blakkisrud the relatively low tensions between 
South Ossetia and Georgia in the Shevardnadze years contributed Tskhinvali’s limited 
commitment to developing state capacities:  “a strong and uncompromising challenger 
state  facilitates  independent  state  building  in  the  breakaway  region,  while  a  more 
accommodating attitude might impede it” (Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2008, 507).29
In  the  long  term,  however, in  all  post-Soviet  de  facto  states  external  support  has 
ultimately  become  the  driving  force  providing  substance  to  often  wishful 
characterisations of their own capacities. In the case of  Transnistria,  Russia’s support 
came to the rescue as the state  budget  was struggling to  cope with the costs  of its 
relatively generous welfare state, and increasingly contributed to modernization efforts 
in sectors such as health and education that had remained largely unreformed, and were 
still relying on Soviet-time structures and practices twenty years after the demise of the 
USSR.  In  the  case  of  Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia,  international  organisations 
contributed to deliver at least the most basic services to residents through the 1990s and 
the early 2000s. As domestic fiscal and state capacity was slowly starting to pick up, the 
war in August 2008 and Russia’s subsequent recognition opened the way for Moscow’s 
comprehensive involvement in these territories, thus introducing an abrupt turn in the 
state-building trajectory of these territories.
Ultimately,  it  is  external  assistance  that  allowed  these  entities  to  enhance  state 
capacities,  and develop beyond the oxymoronic situation of being at  the same time 
‘failing  states’ and  ‘de  facto  states’.  This  characterisation  is  line  with  Caspersen’s 
argument  that  external  assistance  is  needed  to  develop  state  authorities  to  any 
meaningful extent:
control and privileged access to resources. But no matter if the goal was self-enrichment of 
an elite or self-determination of a people, underlying dynamics would still  lead to state-
building processes. Making reference to Olson’s  (2000) remark that “a bandit leader with 
sufficient strength to control and hold a territory has an incentive to settle down, to wear a 
crown, and to become a public good–providing autocrat”,  Blakkisrud and Kolstø  (2011) 
suggested that the same reasoning could well apply to Transnistria’s road to state building.
29 Applying  this  logic  to  the  post-2014  context  in  Ukraine,  it  would  appear  that  Kiev’s 
approach of progressively cutting ties and hindering interactions with the areas under the 
control  of  de  facto  authorities  in  Donetsk  and  Lugansk  effectively  pushes  de  facto 
authorities in these regions towards developing domestic capacities.
73
“creating this level of stateness in a context that frequently includes legacies of 
war, transition and international isolation is a tall order and attempting to do so 
without external assistance would be nearly impossible. In order for sustainable 
entities  to  be built,  external  assistance – in  one form of  another –  is  therefore  
needed.” (Caspersen 2009, 49) 
Indeed, as debated in Chapter 4, external support such as the one provided by Russia 
makes these territories effectively less self-sustainable, but not less sustainable, and has 
fundamentally contributed to enhancing state capacities in these territories. 
Scholars of de facto states are often reminded of a separate case where domestic-led 
state  building  and  lack  of  external  support  from  a  patron  or  from  international 
organisations may have actually contributed to building a more resilient and sustainable 
state-building process: Somaliland (Richards 2014; Richards and Smith 2015; Pegg and 
Kolstø 2015). Scholars have found “evidence that Somaliland’s ineligibility for foreign 
aid facilitated the development of accountable political institutions and contributed to 
the willingness of Somalilanders to engage constructively in the state-building process” 
(Eubank  2010,  1).30 Apparently,  within  Somaliland  itself,  “the  lack  of  external 
intervention is often seen as a strength”  (Pegg and Kolstø 2015, 199), which leads to 
bottom-up state building, favours a healthy sense of ownership of state institutions, and 
increases accountability of authorities towards their constituents. In other words, even if 
lack of recognition has costed Somaliland an amount of potential aid inflows estimated 
between 100 and 200 mln USD per year  (Eubank 2010, 28), it seems that absence of 
large scale assistance programmes has ultimately been a blessing in disguise: even if by 
world  standards  Somaliland  remains  extremely  poor  and  the  quality  of  services 
relatively low, it still compares favourably with internationally recognised Somalia and 
other countries of the region, offering to its  residents both political  pluralism and – 
fundamentally – security. 
International context and expectations on state capacity make it difficult to draw direct 
comparisons  between  Somaliland  and  unrecognised  states  in  the  post-Soviet  space. 
However,  considerations  on  the  impact  of  external  assistance  on  legitimacy  and 
ownership presented in relation to the African context may be relevant also in reference 
30 It  is worth highlighting that  in spite of non-recognition,  basic external  assistance in the 
health sector does reach Somaliland, as it did reach – for example – even Abkhazia in the 
years of the blockade, or conflict regions in other parts of the world, and such help involves 
active interaction and cooperation with de facto institutions (Schäferhoff 2014). 
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to post-Soviet de facto states. Ramachandran’s argument that “while donor money can 
help restore social services in a country, it may engender predation and decrease the 
government’s need to foster relationships with its constituents”  (Foreword to Eubank 
2010) resounds with debates by Broers (2015b) on the impact of external assistance on 
the political economy and, as a consequence, on the nature of the political regimes of 
post-Soviet  de  facto  states:  dynamics  related  to  external  aid  ultimately  shape  the 
political system, the political economy, and citizen-power relationship in these contexts.
3.9. Conclusions  
The state capacity of post-Soviet de facto states has greatly increased since the early 
post-war years.  With the partial  exception of  Nagorno Karabakh,  state  building has 
initially been domestic-led in the early years, but, in particular after 2008, support from 
the patron – in the form of direct financial  support (see Chapter 5) as well as non-
financial technical assistance (see Chapter 6) – has become a key determinant of state 
capacities.
This  brief  overview  of  literature  anticipates  and  contextualises  features  of  external 
assistance for state building found in post-Soviet de facto states that are presented in 
more details in the next chapters. It appears that many forms of assistance for security 
and state building that can be found in post-conflict territories and new independent 
states  have  remained  unavailable  to  authorities  in  post-Soviet  de  facto  states.  In 
particular,  internationalised  state-building  efforts  under  UN  missions  or  regional 
coalitions, as well as direct financial assistance through international organisations have 
not contributed to develop state capacities in these territories, at least in part due to their 
contested nature.
Lack of widespread international  recognition,  however,  does not  imply international 
isolation. In particular after 2008, Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have seen a 
substantial increase in external assistance aimed at  increasing their  capacities and in 
providing  better  access  to  services  such  as  health  and  education  to  their  resident 
population. Similarly to what happens in small dependent jurisdictions elsewhere in the 
world,  external  support  to  post-Soviet  de  facto  states  comes  largely  from a  single 
external  patron  and  is  understood  as  a  long-term  commitment.  In  these  contexts, 
external actors do not make plans for an ‘exit strategy’ and keep self-sustainability of 
the recipient largely as a nominal goal. Issues of ownership and legitimacy of external 
intervention are not explicitly discussed by  Russia, but, as frequently found in small 
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dependent  jurisdictions,  external  assistance  takes  place  in  coordination  with  local 
authorities, without using the language of explicit conditionality. The inevitably unequal 
patron-client  relationship  that  emerges  from this  situation  and  the  sheer  amount  of 
external assistance provided to these entities fundamentally contribute to shape the local 
political economy and have an impact on dynamics of domestic legitimacy. 
In line with these preliminary findings, in order to proceed in this exploration of the 
impact  of  non-recognition  on  external  assistance  aimed  at  state  building,  it  seems 
appropriate to delve further in the comparison between de facto states and jurisdictions 
whose status is not contested, but benefit of direct support for state building from a 
patron. Accordingly, the next chapter develops further the argument that conceptualising 
post-Soviet de facto states as small dependent jurisdictions offers a useful analytical 
framework that allows to capture dynamics of external assistance to post-Soviet de facto 
states, and can usefully complement established conceptualisations of these entities as 
primarily contested or post-conflict territories.
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Chapter 4. 
Conceptualising post-
Soviet de facto states as 
small dependent 
jurisdictions
“First of all, one has to decide, in any given work,  
whether one is mainly after similarities or differences.  
[…]
A second point is that, within the limits of plausible  
argument, the most instructive comparisons (whether of  
difference or similarity) are those that surprise.”
(B. Anderson 2016, 130)
De  facto  states,  according  to  the  most  established  elaborations  of  the  concept,  by 
definition strive towards full-fledged, internationally recognised independence. This is 
in line with conventional wisdom of international relations: “full independence is often 
seen as a peerless alternative for stateless, nationalistically distinct populations, if only 
they could achieve such an outcome” (2014, vii). Or, as Krasner (1999, 5) succinctly put 
it, “recognition provides benefits and does not impose costs.”
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Indeed, the entities that are unanimously considered de facto states1 by relevant authors 
who  debated  the  concept  have  declared  independence  and,  at  least  formally,  seek 
international recognition. However, as emerges from previous research, independence 
may actually be perceived as a second best option by the political leadership and the 
resident population of these territories. As highlighted by Broers  (2015b, 17), “a state 
creation impulse does not appear to be the driving political telos or even present in all 
cases.” In this chapter, it is argued that there is nothing surprising about this and that 
widespread expectations that every territory inhabited by a distinct population should 
strive for full independence, rather than seek closer relations with a strong patron or a 
former colonial  master, is a leftover of “a way of thinking in the days when nation 
building, independence, sovereignty and nationalism were self-evident categories of a 
people’s statehood” (de Jong and Kruijt 2005, 4). 
In  seeking  support,  security  guarantees  and  integration  with  a  strong  patron,  the 
authorities  of  de  facto  states  are  effectively  following  a  global  trend,  where  both 
uncontested  territories,  UN-member  states,  and  constitutionally  distinct  sub-state 
entities  are  developing  such  arrangements  as  the  best  option  for  their  long-term 
development (Rezvani 2014). There is a multitude of reasons behind the choice of each 
of  these  territories.  Pragmatism,  however,  probably  ranks  high  among  them:  non-
sovereign  jurisdictions  tend  to  perform  considerably  better  than  neighbouring 
independent  states  across  a  number  of  parameters,  including  wealth,  health  and 
education  (McElroy and Parry 2012; Rezvani 2016).2 Besides, such relationships also 
imply strong security guarantees. As highlighted by Baldacchino and Hepburn  (2012, 
561),  “there  are  clear  economic and security  advantages  in  being  associated with a 
larger,  richer,  metropolitan  patron,”  and  this  holds  true  not  only  for  the  island 
jurisdictions at the centre of their research, but also for post-Soviet de facto states. 
This  chapter  explores  the  affinities  between  post-Soviet  de  facto  states  and  small 
dependent  jurisdictions  around  the  globe,  with  explicit  references  to  Pacific  island 
1 Different  authors  have  often  included  a  different  set  of  territories  (should  Taiwan  be 
included?  Iraqi  Kurdistan?  Kosovo?),  but  there  is  a  clear  consensus on a  few of  them, 
including  the  current  four  post-Soviet  cases:  Transnistria,  Abkhazia,  South  Ossetia  and 
Nagorno Karabakh. 
2 Empirically, this trend is particularly noticeable in areas such as the Caribbean or South 
Pacific, where islands in some form of association with a patron are located in proximity  
(and in sharp contrast in terms of wealth and welfare) with independent sovereign states. 
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states, focusing in particular on their relationship with a patron; the all too apparent 
differences will not be object of discussion.3 The “insularity” of de facto states and their 
external  dependence  is  largely  a  consequence  of  the  conflict  that  led  to  their 
establishment, and the ensuing lack of international recognition. Since neither territorial 
reintegration  or  widespread  international  recognition  seem  to  be  forthcoming,  for 
analytical purposes such attributes are taken as an inherent feature of these territories. It 
is  argued  that  conceptualizing  post-Soviet  de  facto  states  as  small  dependent 
jurisdictions  allows for a  better  appreciation of  their  attitude towards  independence, 
their sustainability,  the political economy and state-building process underlying their 
continued existence,  as well  as their  relationship with a patron.  Introducing insights 
from the literature on small dependent jurisdictions to the study of post-Soviet de facto 
states offers new analytical frameworks, approaches and venues of research that may 
usefully feed into a growing literature on post-Soviet de facto states that is largely based 
on case study analysis (Caspersen and Stansfield 2011, 20).
In the first section of this chapter, independence as a long-term goal or as a second-best 
option is discussed both in theory and in reference to post-Soviet de facto states. The 
focus  then  shifts  towards  partially  independent  territories,  how  they  represent  a 
prevalent outcome for distinct populations that achieved self-determination in the post-
decolonization context, and why such arrangements based on sharing sovereignty have 
been perceived as a better option than full independence. Treaties of association that 
bound small states and non-sovereign territories to a patron are briefly described, and 
compared to existing agreements between post-Soviet de facto states and their patron. 
The applicability to post-Soviet de facto states of the MIRAB (migration, remittances, 
aid  and  bureaucracy)  model  of  economy initially  developed  in  reference  to  Pacific 
micro-states  (Bertram and Watters  1985) is  also briefly  discussed.  Finally,  the main 
findings are summed up (1. seeking independence should not be a criteria for a de facto 
state to be considered such; 2. external dependence does not imply unsustainability; 3. 
in  small  dependent  jurisdictions,  including  post-Soviet  de  facto  states,  domestic 
capabilities to deliver public goods and services are structurally related to long-term 
external support), and possible new approaches for analysing post-Soviet de facto states 
informed by their re-conceptualisation as small dependent jurisdictions are outlined.
3 While  introducing  his  comparison  between  post-Soviet  central  Asia  and  Francophone 
Africa, Gammer  (2000) made a point that applies also to the present study: “[this article]  
does not attempt to compare the states and societies of the two groups.  The differences 
between, and indeed within each of the two groups are too numerous and obvious.”
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4.1. Must de facto states seek independence?  
Most  definitions  of  de  facto  states  clearly  state,  or  imply,  that  full-fledged, 
internationally recognized independence is the goal of de facto states. This is the case, 
for example, with Scott Pegg's original definition of the concept, according to which a 
de  facto  state  “seeks  full  constitutional  independence  and  widespread  international 
recognition as a sovereign state”  (Pegg 1998, 26). In his definition of de facto states, 
Kolstø (2006, 726) includes among the criteria that a de facto state “must have sought 
but  not  achieved  international  recognition  as  an  independent  state.”  Caspersen  and 
Stansfield (2011, 17) claim that de facto states “have demonstrated an aspiration for full, 
de jure, independence,” while Caspersen  (2012, 11) makes clear that to be considered 
such, a de facto state must have “declared formal independence or demonstrated clear 
aspirations for independence.” 
Strictly  speaking,  the  above-mentioned  definitions  do  not  state  that  internationally 
recognized independence must be the final goal of de facto states. Kolstø (2006, 726) 
writes that de facto states “must have sought” international recognition, which at one 
point  or  another,  all  of  the  currently  existing  post-Soviet  cases  did.  Similarly, 
Caspersen's  definition  states  that  de  facto  states  must  have  “declared  formal 
independence  or demonstrated clear  aspirations  for  independence”  (Caspersen 2012, 
11), and all of the post-Soviet de facto states did at some point declare independence. 
But such wordings without further elaborations are in line with a broad expectation that 
seeking internationally recognised independence should be the final expression of self-
determination  of  a  territory  that  fought  a  war  and accepted  to  live  in  international 
isolation to achieve self-rule. As highlighted by Broers (2013, 62), however, post-Soviet 
de facto states “seem to have transgressed international expectations that de facto states 
should  indeed  be  resolutely  ‘self-determinist’;  self-determination  as  a  ‘choice  for  a 
different master’ is not accepted.”4
Various authors have pointed at inadequacies of this criteria in available definitions of 
de facto states.  Isachenko,  for  example,  highlighted that  the requirement  of seeking 
“widespread international recognition as a sovereign state” for a de facto state to be 
considered such, “would be problematic for northern Cyprus, which in 2004 officially 
4 Or rather, many observers assume that self-determination is only instrumentally invoked in 
order to legitimize Russian imperialism. For an extensive debate on how self-determination 
norms have  been  utilized  to  justify  Great  Power  territorial  expansion,  see  in  particular 
Beissinger (2015).
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renounced this goal, yet did not stop being a ‘de facto state’”  (Isachenko 2012, 18). 
Kosienkowski (2013, 63) highlighted that in the case of Transnistria the nominal goal of 
seeking internationally recognised independence is not necessarily a real one; however, 
this does not make  Transnistria any less of a de facto state. Toomla  (2014, 56) also 
pointed out the problematic nature of that part of the definition of de facto states, and 
suggested that “if an entity functions as a state even against its own will then it can be 
considered a de facto state.”
4.2. Independence as  a  second best  option for  post-  
Soviet de facto states
As debated in detail by Kosienkowski (2012a, 2013), Transnistria's leadership favoured 
different  options  at  different  times.  The  current  leadership  of  Transnistria  formally 
proclaims internationally  recognized independence as  a  key foreign policy objective 
(Transnistria’s MFA 2012b), while at the same time maintaining that it is following its 
people's will as expressed in the 2006 independence referendum. The wording of the 
referendum explicitly referred to independence as an intermediate step towards ensuing 
“free  union  with  the  Russian  Federation.”5 Transnistria's  president  claimed  he  was 
acting  upon  the  result  of  the  referendum  when  he  proposed  to  parliament  a 
constitutional  amendment  that  introduced  in  the  territory's  legal  system  the  direct 
applicability of  Russian legislation in December 2013  (Shevchuk 2013b), as well as 
when he issued a decree aimed at facilitating ”free union” with  Russia in September 
2016  (Shevchuk  2016).  References  to  integration  with  Russia  are  common  in 
Transnistria's public rhetoric.
An understanding of Abkhazia as the homeland of the Abkhaz, apparently accepted also 
by non-ethnic Abkhaz residents (Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2013), accompanied by worries 
for Abkhaz cultural and linguistic survival, is among the reasons that makes joining the 
Russian  Federation  an  unacceptable  option  for  large  segments  of  Abkhazia’s  local 
population.  Internationally  recognised  independence  seems indeed to  be the  goal  of 
current political elites in Abkhazia, even if this does not preclude developing strong ties 
with  Russia.  While  it  is  true  that  “for  Abkhazia  the  long-term  goal  is  genuine 
sovereignty, and ongoing integration processes with Russia are an unavoidable tactical 
concession”  (Broers 2015b),  it  should also be clarified that  given the circumstances 
5 It  should be mentioned that  Crimea,  for  example,  had to  formally declare its  sovereign  
independence in order to become a constituent part of the Russian Federation in March 2014 
(Walter, Ungern-Sternberg, and Abushov 2014, 297–98).
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even staunch supporters of Abkhazia's independence favour very close ties with Russia, 
including sovereignty sharing agreements on fundamental matters such as defence.
In South Ossetia, the desire to join ethnic kins in North Ossetia by becoming part of the 
Russian  Federation  seems  to  enjoy  a  widespread  social  consensus  and  has  been 
frequently aired by local politicians. Joining the Russian Federation was one of the key 
elements  of  the  electoral  platform  of  ‘United  Ossetia’,  the  party  which  won 
parliamentary elections in the territory in June 2014.
Scientific surveys conducted in these territories (O’Loughlin, Kolossov, and Toal 2011; 
Toal and O’Loughlin 2013a; O’Loughlin, Toal, and Chamberlain-Creangă 2013; Toal 
and O’Loughlin 2014), confirm the above characterization: in  Transnistria significant 
support for independence was found, but joining  Russia was the preferred option for 
over  50  per  cent  of  both  ethnic  Russian  and  Ukrainian  respondents;  in  Abkhazia, 
independence was the preferred option, with only ethnic  Armenians showing a slight 
preference for integration with Russia; finally, over 80 per cent of respondents in South 
Ossetia declared themselves in favour of joining Russia. 
In the case of Nagorno Karabakh unification with ethnic-kins in Armenia was the main 
demand of the Karabakh movement since its beginnings in late Soviet times.6 After the 
war,  Nagorno  Karabakh  has  engaged  in  state  building  and  developed  own  state 
structures, but as argued by de Waal (2008, 7–8, 2010, 159) and highlighted by Broers 
(2013, 62),  “Karabakh is  seen to all  intents and purposes as a de facto province of 
Armenia.”
All post-Soviet de facto states are currently strongly dependent on their  patron,  and 
prevalent integration dynamics have been often reported as proof that these territories 
are nothing but “pawns of Russian policy” (Asmus 2010, 4; Smith 2009, 126), or puppet 
states,  a  characterization  common  also  in  media  reporting  about  the  region.  An 
understanding that post-Soviet de facto states survive only thanks to the support they 
receive from their patron has become a key element of a number of judgements by the 
European  Court  for  Human  Rights  (ECHR),  which  made  the  patron  states  legally 
responsible for actions taken by the de facto authorities. For example, the ECHR argued 
that  “the  ‘NKR’ and  its  administration  survives  by  virtue  of  the  military,  political, 
financial  and  other  support  given  to  it  by  Armenia which,  consequently,  exercises 
6 As Broers  (2015b,  12) put  it,  “[t]he secessionist  movement in NK was from the outset  
driven by an ethos of unification (the  Armenian word for which, miatsum, was its main 
slogan) and not individual sovereignty.”
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effective control over Nagorno Karabakh and the surrounding territories” (Chiragov and 
Others V. Armenia 2015, para. 186).7
The  logic  that  extensive  support  leads  necessarily  to  effective  control  is  however 
problematic, and  such characterization has been opposed by scholars whose work has 
focused on de facto states. In spite of the fundamental role played by the patron or kin 
state in granting their viability, “experience has time and again shown that most quasi-
states are not pliant clients doing their  master’s  bidding”  (Kolstø 2006, 733).8 Post-
Soviet de facto states cannot be considered puppet states, yet all of them are highly 
dependent on their patron, are strengthening integration with it and may not actually be 
striving to become full-fledged independent states. Does this make them stand apart 
from other small, dependent jurisdictions around the world, both sovereign and non-
sovereign? And does self-determination necessarily imply achieving full independence?
4.3. Is it worth it being sovereign?  
The process of decolonisation as initially  formalized in  UN documents and practice 
reinforced the  idea  that  self-determination  struggles  are  inextricably  connected  with 
independence movements,  that “all  potential  countries would become independent if 
they could” (Baldacchino and Hepburn 2012, 556). The wording of the ‘Declaration on 
the  Granting  of  Independence  to  Colonial  Countries  and  Peoples’  (UN  General 
Assembly 1960) highlights that all power must be transferred to the people of non-self-
governing  and  dependent  territories  “in  order  to  enable  them  to  enjoy  complete 
independence  and  freedom.”9 Later  UN  documents,  however,  made  clear  that 
independence is not the only legitimate option for such territories: “The establishment 
of  a  sovereign  and  independent  state,  the  free  association  or  integration  with  an 
independent state or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a 
people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people” 
(UN General Assembly 1970). 
7 For a similar reasoning applied to  Transnistria by the ECHR, see in particular Catan and 
others Vs Moldova and Russia (2012, paras. 121–122).
8 For a similar take by other scholars, see also Caspersen (2008, 368) and Broers (2013, 61).
9 For a further debate on self-determination and independence claims in this context, see in  
particular Fabry (2015).
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After the first wave of decolonization, many territories around the world that were given 
a chance to claim full independence and could in all fairness expect speedy international 
recognition declined to pursue this option. On the contrary, ‘most of these jurisdictions 
have decided that they would rather retain some aspects of autonomy while maintaining 
or  seeking  better  terms  of  integration  with  their  metropolitan/colonial  power’ 
(Baldacchino and Hepburn 2012, 557). For example, many referenda have been held in 
the  Caribbean  since  1967 (Bermuda,  US Virgin  Islands,  Puerto  Rico,  Bonaire,  Sint 
Maartin,  Saba,  Curaçao,  St.  Eustatius),  but  none  of  them  supported  independence 
(Clegg 2012). Island jurisdictions from the Pacific Ocean  (Levine 2012) to Northern 
Europe (Ackrén and Lindström 2012; Kuokkanen 2017), for one reason or another, have 
refused to take the path of full independence.10 Quite simply, to quote Rezvani (2016), 
“partial independence beats full independence.”11
As argued by Baldacchino and Hepburn (2012, 557–58), “the benefits of maintaining a 
form  of  association  with  a  larger  state  (be  it  ‘free  association’  or  ‘sovereignty-
association’)  often  outweigh  the  risks  associated  with  complete  separation,”  in 
particular if the patron state is “keen to maintain the smaller unit within its purview, 
would be disposed to support its wards with welfare, employment, security, investment 
and other benefits, perhaps even citizenship.” This has led to a pattern of behaviour 
known as “upside down decolonization” (Baldacchino 2010), i.e. dependent territories 
conspiring  to  maintain  and  extend  colonial  relationships  rather  than  seeking  full 
independence.
In some cases, island jurisdictions chose to give up some of their self-rule in exchange 
for becoming formally part of their patron and former colonial master in all respects. 
For example, in a 2009 referendum held on the island of Mayotte in the Indian Ocean 
voters overwhelmingly chose to become a French Department, rather than remaining an 
oversea collectivity.12 This choice implied direct applicability of French legislation on 
the territory, further limiting self-rule. This means, for example, that traditional Islamic 
10 Lack of  the  economic  resources  seems  to  be  a  major  factor,  even  in  wealthy  northern 
Europe: “The main stumbling block on the road to Faroese and Greenlandic statehood is that 
the islands would lose their financial support from Denmark. [...] Neither of the two islands, 
at  least in the near future, will be able to fully assume the financial responsibilities that 
statehood requires.” (Ackrén and Lindström 2012, 506). 
11 For a detailed discussion of the advantages of such arrangements, see in particular Rezvani 
(2014).
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law previously applied on the island is due to be phased out in favour of French civil 
code and that polygamy is to be outlawed, but it also paved the way for more direct 
transfers  and  financial  support  from  both  the  European  Union  and  the  French 
government, including social payments and unemployment benefits for local residents 
(Chrisafis 2009).
For many Pacific island states that have formally become sovereign independent states, 
formal  independence  has  only  further  highlighted  their  dependence  on  patrons  and 
donors. Is it possible to talk of sovereignty when “financial assistance […] is required 
simply for the governments […] to meet their budgetary needs (including paying the 
salaries  of  government  employees)?”  (Levine  2012,  448) Such  characterization 
resounds strikingly familiar to scholars of de facto states. In order to appreciate better 
further  similarities,  the  next  section  focuses  on  different  forms  of  external  support 
received by both formally sovereign and non-sovereign small dependent jurisdictions 
around the world. 
4.4. External  support  and  the  issue  of  economic   
sustainability
Forms of  external  support  for  small  dependent  territories vary widely.  They usually 
imply  some  form  of  security  guarantees,  capacity  building  for  local  institutions, 
technical and financial support, and may be offered as part of a comprehensive treaty, 
specific agreements or informal arrangements. Various forms of ‘shared sovereignty’ 
(Krasner 2004) and ‘governance delegation’ (Matanock 2014) have been advocated and 
introduced in multiple settings, often with the declared aim of strengthening domestic 
capabilities  and  state  institutions  in  order  to  achieve  self-sustainability  of  the 
jurisdiction that is recipient of support.
This section does not deal specifically with multilateral missions with a clear mandate 
and an understanding by all sides that international support is limited in time, such as 
those that took place in the Solomon Islands or in Timor Leste, but rather focus on a set 
of cases that in one way or another resemble more closely the situation found in post-
Soviet de facto states, i.e. cases where a single country (in most cases, a country which 
12 A somewhat  similar  development  took  place  with  the  dissolution  of  the  Netherlands 
Antilles, and with its smaller islands – Bonaire, St. Eustatius, and Saba – becoming “special 
municipalities of the Netherlands, and [...] hence politically and constitutionally integrated 
into the Dutch metropolis” (Veenendaal 2015). 
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previously had a key governing role on the territory as a former colonial master or as the 
administrator of a trust territory) established formal or informal ‘shared sovereignty’ 
agreements  that  do  not  have  a  termination  date  and provide  for  extended  financial 
support.  The  following  paragraphs  focus  in  particular  on  the  Compact  of  Free 
Association that the United States have established with three Pacific micro-states: the 
Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau. However, arrangements 
established between patrons  and both sovereign and non sovereign small  dependent 
jurisdictions from the Pacific to the Caribbean are based on similar key components 
(security guarantees, freedom of movement, technical assistance and financial support); 
adding examples from other cases would  add more nuances and show the variety of 
agreements  to  be  found  around  the  world,  but  would  not  add  substantially  to  the 
comparison at the basis of this chapter.13
In the case of Micronesia, Marshall Islands and Palau, ‘free association’ was eventually 
chosen over a number of alternative options, including that of becoming ‘territories’ of 
the United States (such as American Samoa) and that of obtaining commonwealth status 
(such as Puerto Rico or  Northern Mariana).14 Marshall  Islands and  Palau were also 
offered to merge with  Micronesia in 1978, but they refused. Unlike the other options 
outlined,  free  association  provides  for  full  constitutional  independence  and  the 
establishment of a separate  citizenship,  even if  it  still  implies a sovereignty sharing 
agreement.  Eventually,  Marshall  Islands,  Micronesia and  Palau have all  become UN 
member  states  between  1991  and  1994,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  initially  the  US 
government  believed  they  would  not  qualify  for  UN  membership  because  of  their 
effectively limited independence.15 
The  Marshall  Islands,  Micronesia and  Palau are required to consult  with the  United 
States on matters of security under both the Compact and the mutual security subsidiary 
agreement (Michal 1993, 320–21). They do not have an own army, as their security is 
guaranteed  from the  United  States,  but  local  residents  are  eligible  to  serve  in  the 
13 For a debate on shared sovereignty in French territories in the Pacific,  see in particular  
Mrgudovic (2012); for Dutch jurisdictions in the Caribbean see Oostindie (2006).
14 For an overview of the process, see in particular McKibben (1990).
15 In reply to a question by the Congress, the US government replied officially that ‘[i]n the 
view of the  United States, the Freely Associated States, while having sovereignty and full 
self-government, will not possess the attributes of independence called for in the eligibility 
criteria of the United Nations Charter’ (United States Congress 1984, 109).
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American armed forces. They also do not have an own currency; all of them use the US 
dollar as their official currency. Freedom of movement, i.e. the possibility to live and 
work in the  United States without visa requirements or other impediments, is another 
key component of the Compacts.
All  of  these  agreements  include  a  financial  component.  According  to  the  Compact 
between the  United  States and  the  Marshall  Islands,  for  example,  financial  support 
“shall be used for assistance in education, health care, the environment, public sector 
capacity building, and private sector development, or for other areas as mutually agreed, 
with priorities in the education and health care sectors” (US Department of State 2003, 
sec. 211a).16 Between 30 and 50 per cent of annual grant assistance from the US is 
allocated to build and maintain public infrastructure (US Department of State 2003, sec. 
211d). In theory, the Compacts state that the purpose of the grant funds is to assist the 
governments of these Pacific micro-states ‘in their efforts to promote the economic self-
sufficiency and budgetary self-reliance of their people’ (US Government Accountability 
Office  2013,  1);  financial  support  is  due  to  decrease  and  local  authorities  have  to 
produce a ‘Decrement Management Plan’ outlining how they are preparing for running 
their governance activities without external funding. However, substantial financing has 
been established for the long term (in 2003, the amended Compacts provided for 3.6 
billion USD in assistance to Micronesia and the Marshall Islands over 20 years, or about 
1,200 USD per year per person),17 and trust funds have been established in order to 
provide additional resources after the financial provisions of the Compacts expire. Even 
so, it seems likely that an additional extension of the funding will be required (as it has 
been extended after the original termination of the Compacts in 1999). Also, it should 
be highlighted that the non-financial parts of the Compacts do not have a termination 
date:  military  cooperation,  technical  assistance  and  overall  support  are  expected  to 
continue indefinitely.
16 Details about grant assistance change slightly among the Compacts, but the focus remain 
broadly similar. 
17 Substantive additional non-compact grants have also been offered: “For example, in fiscal  
years 2007 through 2011, the FSM spent about 197 million USD and the RMI spent about 
46 million USD in noncompact grants from agencies including Interior, Education, HHS, 
Labor, and the Department of Transportation” (US Government Accountability Office 2013, 
10), averaging to about additional 320 USD per year per resident.  The relationship is not 
always smooth, and issues of mismanagement and reporting have caused delays in funding 
allocations from the United States (Labriola 2016, 198).
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The pragmatic security and economic advantages for these jurisdictions of establishing 
a Compact with the United States are clear. However, the kind of relations established 
with the United States, rather than fostering structural economic development and self-
sustainability, effectively brought these countries closer to the so-called MIRAB model 
(migration,  remittances,  aid  and  bureaucracy),  initially  introduced  by  Bertram  and 
Watters (1985) in reference to island jurisdictions in the South Pacific. Territories that fit 
the model are characterised by strong out-bound migration, their economy is dependent 
on remittances and aid, and the government sector is the dominant cash employer. 
The original proponents of the model highlighted that the MIRAB economic order may 
be much more sustainable than largely expected. Domestic economic development is 
not the only possible way of achieving economic sustainability in the medium- to long-
term, thanks to what Bertram and Watters define as ‘aid entitlement’, based partly on 
donor's recognition of the special problems related to being small and isolated, as well 
as, more importantly, geopolitical calculations. Maintaining a sustained level of support 
is unavoidable unless donor countries “are prepared to see living standards slide in their 
former or actual dependencies; or unless they are prepared to be supplanted by other, 
competing, aid donors” (Bertram and Watters 1985, 513).18 In this context, aid can be 
assimilated to a rent such as oil revenues and is often not conducive to increased self-
sustainability, at least in part due to the fact that “returns on investments in some of 
these economies are low or negative” (Tisdell 2016, 12). 
Small  size  inevitably  leads  to  lack  of  specialized  skills  and own training  facilities; 
reference  to  the  patron  is  thus  required  for  a  number  of  issues,  including technical 
support,  law  drafting  and  standards  settings.  This  is  true  for  all small  dependent 
territories, not only those relatively poor and isolated that have been the main focus of 
this  section,  but  also  those  that  are  richer  than  their  patron  and located  in  Europe, 
including UN member states such as  Liechtenstein,  Monaco and  San Marino. On the 
one  hand,  geography  requires  them to  depend  on  their  neighbours  for  giving  their 
residents access to basic services such as electricity, phone lines and the internet. On the 
other, in order to function, modern societies demand a vast amount of technical skills 
that cannot possibly be developed locally, or even effectively acquired by the limited 
18 Bertram & Watters place their reasoning solidly in the de-colonization context; references to 
colonialism,  albeit  not  totally  out  of  place  in  the  post-Soviet  context,  are  intentionally 
omitted here in order to make the model they propose more adaptable to the cases at the  
centre of this article. 
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numbers of residents of such small societies, in particular considering the fact that such 
skills (from IT to medicine) need to be constantly updated. Law making and standards 
settings  is  structurally  burdensome;  financial,  trade  and  customs  regulations  are 
complex;  managing an own currency can be problematic:  even wealthy small  states 
depend on a patron or neighbour for most of these things (Eccardt 2005). 
Finally, the extensive focus on the patron given so far does not imply that no other 
external  actor  (such  as  neighbouring  countries,  international  governmental  or  non-
governmental  organizations,  or  other  countries  with  a  geopolitical  interest  in  the 
territory) is involved in providing assistance, or in enabling availability of public goods 
and  services  to  local  residents.  On  the  contrary,  such  interactions  may  be 
complementary to the support of the patron, in particular when local state capacity is 
very low or when geographical circumstances mandate interactions that do not involve 
the patron.
4.5. Post-Soviet  de  facto  states:  shared  sovereignty   
and MIRAB economies
In  spite  of  all  the  obvious  differences,  there  are  a  number  of  features  of  this  brief 
characterization of relations between a patron and the small, dependent jurisdictions it 
supports, and of the economic models that this relationship entices, that sound familiar 
to scholars of post-Soviet de facto states.
For  example,  Abkhazia  has  accepted in  December 2014 to  formalize  relations  with 
Russia with a treaty of ‘alliance and strategic partnership’ that in key aspects resembles 
the associated status of small island states. It should be highlighted that this is not in 
contrast  with  long-standing  claims  to  self-determination  by  Abkhazia’s  de  facto 
authorities or a last minute capitulation to Russian pressures. On the contrary, already in 
2003  Abkhazia's  minister  of  foreign  affairs  Sergei  Shamba  (2003) was  happy  to 
consider  Abkhazia  a  Russian  protectorate  and  mentioned  the  Marshall  Islands as  a 
positive example of how Abkhazia-Russia relations may develop. In 2003, Abkhazia's 
parliament formally proposed to  Russia's federal assembly to establish an associated 
relationship  (IA  Regnum  2003);  the  proposed  partnership  has  clear  elements  of 
commonality with the treaty eventually signed in December 2014. 
The treaty (Kremlin.ru 2014) establishes a coordinated foreign and security policy (art. 
4-5), and highlights that a common position is to be agreed in all important matters 
related  to  security.  A joint  military  force  is  to  be  established  (art.  5);  in  case  of 
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aggression,  the  Russian  Federation  is  to  head  this  joint  force  (art.  7).  In  order  to 
facilitate joint operations, the Abkhazian armed forces are to be modernized and adapt 
to  Russian standards of operation; all related expenses are to be paid by the  Russian 
Federation (art. 8). 
According to the treaty, public servants working for the ministry of interior (art. 10), as 
well as people working in a number of sectors (health, education, science, culture, sport 
and  social  services)  and  pensioners  with  Russian  citizenship  are  due  to  have  their 
incomes increased to the level found in  Russia's  southern federal  district  (art.  14).19 
Health  (art.  17)  and  education  (art.  20)  are  to  be  brought  in  line  with  the  quality 
standards set in the Russian Federation. Some benefits included in the treaty, such as an 
increase in the pensions and access to health care in Russia, are meant only for residents 
of  Abkhazia  with  Russian  citizenship;  however,  this  seems  to  be  based  on  the 
assumption  that  double  Abkhazian-Russian  citizenship  is  the  norm,  rather  than  the 
exception.  Besides,  Russia  is  to  facilitate  the  procedure  for  obtaining  Russian 
citizenship for citizens of  Abkhazia (art. 13). The treaty also includes provisions that 
address key goals of the local leadership in  Abkhazia, including support to efforts for 
strengthening Abkhaz language use (art. 21) and an obligation to take measures aimed at 
extending Abkhazia's international contacts, including by facilitating its membership in 
international organizations and its international recognition as a sovereign state (art. 4). 
A largely  similar  treaty  has  also  been  signed  between  Russia  and  South  Ossetia 
(Kremlin.ru 2015), even if its different title (treaty of ‘alliance and integration’, rather 
than ‘alliance and strategic partnership’) is a clear sign of its diverging long term goals. 
Even  in  the  case  of  Transnistria,  which  has  not  been  recognised  by  the  Russian 
Federation as an independent country, a number of both formal and informal agreements 
have in practice similar effects: security guarantees, financial contributions to increase 
the incomes of public servants and pensioners, as well as technical support in a number 
of fields. Formal agreements between ministries of the Russian Federation and relevant 
authorities  in  Transnistria  provide  for  technical  support  across  the  spectrum  of 
government  activities,  including  health,  education,  finance,  trade,  economic 
development, anti-monopoly legislation, transportation, culture, and others (President of 
Transnistria  2014).  Reconstruction  or  construction  of  social  infrastructure,  including 
kindergartens,  schools  and  hospitals  is  being  openly  financed  by  the  Russian 
19 For more details about  Russia's contribution to pensions in post-Soviet de facto states, see 
Chapter 5, as well as Comai (2016a).
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government in the form of humanitarian support through a dedicated non-commercial 
organization, ‘Eurasian integration.’
Frequent  references  to  Russian  standards  in  formal  agreements  stipulated  between 
Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the Russian Federation, raise the issue that in 
many respects these territories function effectively very similarly to  Russian regions. 
“Law shopping”, i.e. the practice of borrowing extensively from the legislative scheme 
of Russia, is found through various post-Soviet countries, but post-Soviet de facto states 
went one step further, introducing direct implementation of Russian legislation on their 
territory. In the case of Nagorno Karabakh, “virtually the entire legislative regime - both 
criminal and civil - is adopted from Armenia“ (Waters 2006, 409).
Can post-Soviet de facto states be considered MIRAB economies? While reliable data 
on migration and remittances are missing or not publicly available for all cases, both 
anecdotal  evidence  and  previous  research20 suggest  that  outbound  migration  is 
substantial in all  post-Soviet de facto states, with the partial  exception of  Abkhazia. 
Available information suggests that external aid and public workers' wages (the second 
component of the MIRAB model) are a fundamental, and even dominant part of the 
local economy also in other post-Soviet de facto states. According to official sources 
related to 2016, 92.2 per cent of the budget of South Ossetia (Res news agency 2015), 
and  about  58  per  cent  of  the  budget  of  Abkhazia  (President  of  Abkhazia  2015) is 
financed by Moscow.21 These data, however, do not include pensions paid directly by 
the Russian government to its citizens resident in these territories, which are distributed 
directly by the Russian side and accordingly do not figure in the local budgets. In the 
case of Nagorno Karabakh, as of 2014, ‘interstate credit’ (the formula officially used to 
refer  to transfers from the  Armenian government)  covers about  55 per cent  of total 
budget expenditures  (National statistical service of  Nagorno Karabakh 2015, 233). In 
spite of a global and regional economic crisis, starting with 2008, Russia's support has 
helped  maintaining  relatively  stable  living  standards  in  Transnistria,  and  increasing 
them in  Abkhazia and  South Ossetia. However, similarly to what happens in MIRAB 
economies,  “living  standards  have  been  driven  up  by  rent  incomes  rather  than  by 
expanding productive incomes, […] [and as a consequence] it is inescapably true that 
the real disposable incomes of the resident populations […] are sustainable only if their 
20 See  for  example  the  research  by  Volkova  and  Ostavnaya  (2015) on  migration  and 
remittances in Transnistria. 
21 Relevant figures are presented in detail in Chapter 5.
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current-account rent entitlements are in their  turn sustainable”  (Bertram and Watters 
1985, 510).
In  other  words,  this  does  not  mean  that  Abkhazia  for  example,  is  not  capable  in  
principle to be economically self-sustainable, but rather that the level of welfare, public 
salaries and development that has been achieved in recent years thanks to Russia's help 
is unlikely to be attainable without that support in the foreseeable future. It should be 
highlighted that, in a way,  Russia's support is making it more and more difficult for 
Abkhazia to be self-sustainable. Stability and opening of borders with Russia, combined 
with  increased  fiscal  capacity  by  authorities  in  Sukhumi,  may  have  allowed  to 
progressively improve on public services, pensions and salaries from their level pre-
Russian intervention, but the terms of the Abkhazia-Russia treaty set such payments at a 
level  that  authorities  in  Sukhumi  will  not  be  able  to  cover  independently  in  the 
foreseeable future.22
Similarly,  Transnistria  is  unlikely  to  be  able  to  maintain  its  current  level  of  public 
salaries and in particular its current level of pension payments (on average, twice as big 
as those of  Moldova or  Ukraine) without external support.  Nagorno Karabakh would 
not be able to maintain its current level of public services without financial support from 
Armenia and  the  wider  Armenian  diaspora.  In  line  with  the  MIRAB  model,  in 
post-Soviet de facto states “subsistence remains attainable, and resources available to 
the  village  mode  of  production  are  sufficient  to  guarantee  the  basic  needs  of  the 
population”  (Bertram and Watters 1985, 511), providing a baseline below which the 
local economy would not go even in absence of external support. However, a sudden 
decrease of external support from the patron would likely result in a new wave of (at 
least seasonal) outward migration, as recorded in some MIRAB economies  (Fraenkel 
2006, 18).
Such considerations, however, should not distract from the basic idea at the basis of the 
MIRAB model, i.e. that the sustainability of these jurisdictions is in practice related to 
the sustainability of their ‘aid entitlements’ rather than on domestic capacities. As long 
as Russia believes that supporting these entities is an important element for its overall 
22 For example, as of 2015, the median Abkhazian pension amounted lo less than 10 USD per 
month, while the average pensions paid by Russia in Abkhazia amounts to more than 100 
USD  per  month.  In  order  to  be  able  to  offer  a  comparable  level  of  disbursement  
autonomously, Abkhazia would need a very considerable increase in its capacity to finance 
its own budget as well as its social fund.
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strategy in its near abroad, it is unlikely that Russia will give up completely economic 
support to these territories, leaving them destitute and further depopulated. Similarly, it 
seems highly unlikely that Armenia or the Armenian diaspora would suddenly stop their 
support for Nagorno Karabakh. In brief, as established examples of MIRAB economies 
and post-Soviet de facto states both show, economic sustainability does not necessarily 
mean self-sustainability.
4.6. Outsourcing (de facto) statehood  
Already  in  2006,  Popescu  (2006b) referred  to  the  growing  Russian  involvement  in 
Transnistria,  Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia  as  a  process  of  “outsourcing”  de  facto 
statehood.  This  tendency  has  increased  over  the  years  even  for  the  most  pro-
independence of the post-Soviet  de facto states,  Abkhazia,  as highlighted in reports 
(International Crisis Group 2010a), and as clearly emerged from the December 2014 
treaty between Abkhazia and Russia discussed above. 
However,  as  highlighted  in  previous  sections,  it  is  common  for  small  dependent 
territories to similarly “outsource” governance functions and accept limits to their self-
rule in exchange for security guarantees, freedom of movement, financial support, and 
technical assistance. Current arrangements may have led these territories much closer to 
economies  based  on  migration,  remittances,  aid  and  bureaucracy  (in  line  with  the 
MIRAB model), yet they are almost certainly better off than they would have been if 
they actually insisted on “going alone.”  Cutting economic, political and security ties 
with the current patron would hardly enhance domestic capabilities, but rather leave 
them ‘in a status of being alone, poor and destitute in a harsh and unforgiving world’ 
(Baldacchino and Hepburn 2012, 558), much as Abkhazia has experienced in the 1990s. 
As pointed out by Brookfield (1972, 141–42) in the context of decolonization, 
“the  available  local  resources  in  these  countries  are  inevitably  insufficient  to 
support either the transformation or maintenance of welfare at present and desired 
levels, then there is no alternative to dependence but stagnation and retrogression. 
Independence may give a nation self-respect, [...] but it is a self-respect that must  
be severely constrained by awareness that the power of economic decision making 
is greatly limited. To maximise self-respect is not accordant with maximisation of 
either income or welfare.”
Territories that are given the possibility to obtain full independence and can expect to 
see their desire respected at the international level decline to pursue the path to full 
sovereignty for pragmatic reasons, and rather prefer to enjoy the economic and practical 
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benefits of keeping close ties with a wealthier patron. It is thus hardly surprising that 
post-Soviet de facto states strive to strengthen ties with their patron rather than opting 
for  some  idealistic  independence  with  no  patron  to  support  and  defend  them,  in 
particular considering the fact that they lack resources for financial self-sustainability 
and see their  security under constant threat.  Similarly to other small-sized territories 
highly dependent on a single patron, post-Soviet de facto states are pragmatically trying 
to have the best of both worlds, by keeping
“all (or most) of the ceremonial, symbolic, regulatory and operational trappings of 
sovereignty, plus a much stronger ally in the corner for those delicate occasions 
that warrant a display of force or influence, a source of economic largesse, a pool 
of  potential  tourists,  a  custodian  of  a  lucrative  and  diverse  labour  market,  an 
appealing  location  for  pursuing  higher  education,  and  purveyor  of  prized 
citizenship rights” (Baldacchino and Hepburn 2012, 561).23
Such  insistence  on  pragmatism  is  partially  at  odds  with  a  long-established 
characterisation by Lynch (2004, 63), according to which “de facto states are driven first 
and  foremost  by  political,  not  economic,  imperatives.”  It  may  be  true  that  indeed 
politics comes first, ruling out options such as integration with the parent state or a total 
dismantling of the structures of self-government that have been established after the 
conflict.  But  if  security  and  economic  benefits  can  be  coupled  by  a  politically 
acceptable association with a patron, self-reliant independence effectively stops being 
an attractive alternative.24
Thinking of  post-Soviet  de  facto  states  as  small,  dependent  jurisdictions  building  a 
relationship with their patron that may continue to exist in the current configuration for 
23 In fact, pragmatic considerations of this kind are not unique to small island states. The ‘devo 
max’ option that according to opinion polls  would have been the preferred option in an 
independence referendum in  Scotland if  it  was included on the referendum ballot  paper 
(Sharp et al. 2014, 37) shows that also the electorate of a developed democratic country 
would have been willing to take, in its own way, ‘the best of both worlds.’ 
24 This  line  of  reasoning has  some elements of  commonality  with the  argument originally 
brought forward by King  (2001), who highlighted that political and economic incentives 
benefiting multiple interest groups (all the way from elites to pensioners) are a key factor in 
determining  the  endurance  of  the  status  quo  in  post-Soviet  de  facto  states.  The  shady 
business schemes that were central to King’s characterisation fifteen years ago, however, for 
the most part gave way to a structure of benefits stemming from a largely formalised patron-
client relationship. 
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decades to come, rather than as transient phenomena due to be re-integrated with their 
parent state, may contribute to appreciate more effectively the dynamics that take place 
in these territories, as well as their international interactions. Especially in earlier years 
of studies on de facto states, scholars have focused on various avenues for surpassing 
the current status issue by looking at some form or another of integration with the parent 
state  (Chirikba 2000; Potier 2001; Coppieters et al. 2004; Geldenhuys 2009).25 Yet, at 
least  in  part  for  normative  reasons,  little  attention has  been dedicated to  how these 
territories may develop further their integration with their patron, even when this trend 
became more apparent. 
This  is  not unlike what  happened in the study of  island jurisdictions.  For  example, 
according  to  Jong  and  Kruijt  (2005,  4),  scholars  of  dependent  territories  in  the 
Caribbean have long “focused on how to move forward to ‘more sovereignty’, or how 
to advance constitutional development, meaning more autonomy, or how to arrive as 
close as possible to an almost independent nation-state status.” The long-term prospect 
most debated in academic literature is inverse to that about de facto states (i.e. a move 
towards full independence and sovereignty in the case of Caribbean island states versus 
integration with the parent state for de facto states), but the approaches outlined here 
share a common problem: a pre-conceived expectation about the long-term development 
path of territories whose status does not fit clearly the dualistic logic according to which 
“there are states and there is little else”  (Lynch 2004, xi) hinders focused research on 
currently prevalent dynamics on the ground.
Finally, the debate on the sustainability of de facto states has been centred around an 
idea of economic self-sufficiency that is rarely found in small dependent territories. In 
spite of the fact that both the patron and local authorities may find it convenient to 
maintain  rhetorically  self-sustainability  as  a  final  goal,  in  practice,  it  should  not  be 
excluded that,  as argued by Bertram  (1986, 809),  “’dependent development’ is  both 
sustainable and preferable to a drive for self-reliance.”
25 Even an edited book on the subject that aimed to allow “such entities to be viewed as, if not 
‘regular’ features of the international system, at least ones of a more perennial rather than 
anomalous  nature”  (Caspersen  and  Stansfield  2011,  20),  concludes  with  a  chapter  that 
focuses on options for reintegration with the parent state and explicitly refuses to take in 
consideration  prolonged existence  in  their  current  status  or  further  integration  with  the 
patron as plausible options (L. Anderson 2011, 195).
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Even if being small and dependent on a patron may sound less glorious than being self-
sufficient  and  fully  independent,  conceptualising  de  facto  states  as  dependent 
jurisdictions does not imply any judgement on their legitimacy, or their claims to self-
determination  and  statehood;  Rezvani’s  openly  positive  characterization  of  partially 
independent territories may well refer also to post-Soviet de facto states:
“far from diminishing them, the act of giving up some of their powers frees them to  
have greater wealth, security, and have a higher quality of self-rule than having to  
fend for themselves within the relative condition of anarchy in the inter-national  
system” (Rezvani 2016, 10).
4.7. Conclusions  
This chapter draws upon the comparison between post-Soviet de facto states and small 
dependent  jurisdictions  in  other  parts  of  the  world  in  order  to  propose  a  re-
conceptualization of these entities for analytical purposes. The main conclusion is that 
in order to understand the processes that take place in these territories, their economic 
structure, and their external relations, it may be useful to conceptualize these entities 
primarily  as small  dependent  jurisdictions.  Lack of recognition is  clearly a  defining 
feature  of  their  place  in  the  international  system,  but  this  should  not  obscure  other 
inherent  characteristics  of  these  entities.  Acknowledging  smallness  and  external 
dependence  as  key  features  of  post-Soviet  de  facto  states  allows  to  introduce  new 
instruments to the analytical toolbox of scholars working on the region, providing new 
venues for research and adjusting expectations about their path of development and long 
term objectives.
Firstly,  there  should  be  no  expectation  that  full-fledged,  internationally  recognised 
independence  must  be  the  final  goal  of  post-Soviet  de  facto  states.  In  the  post-
decolonization  period,  small  dependent  territories  inhabited  by  distinct  populations 
around the world have by and large preferred to keep close relations with a patron and 
establish  sovereignty  sharing  agreements  rather  than  seek  internationally  recognised 
independence.  Post-Soviet  de  facto  states  are  no  exception.  More  in  general,  a 
requirement of seeking independence should not be part of the criteria for defining a de 
facto state.
Secondly, it should be highlighted that sustainability, rather than self-sustainability, is 
key for the survival of these entities. The observation that they are not self-sufficient, or 
that  reliance  on  domestic  capabilities  would  drive  their  resident  population  to  an 
economy of subsistence,  is  ultimately not relevant  for understanding their  economic 
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sustainability.  Authorities  of small  dependent  jurisdictions with no realistic  hope for 
self-reliant  development  have  managed  to  provide  stability  as  well  as  a  degree  of 
welfare and public services to their resident population for decades in spite of almost 
total  lack  of  domestic  resources.  More  in  general,  research  on  the  economy  and 
sustainability of post-Soviet de facto states may benefit of observations developed by 
researchers working on small dependent jurisdictions elsewhere in the world and the 
concept of ‘aid entitlement’.26
Thirdly, this conceptualisation highlights the key long-term role of external financial 
and  technical  support  from a  patron  for  providing  public  services  and  a  degree  of 
welfare to a resident population. In post-Soviet de facto states, the patron is the main 
source of financial support and a key state-building actor, setting standards and building 
local capacities according to its own model. However, availability of services to the 
resident population is not necessarily achieved only through the patron, but possibly 
also thanks to external interactions that, beyond the patron state, include also the parent 
state, international organizations, international NGOs, and diaspora communities.
Finally, it should be highlighted that this conceptualization is not exclusive, but rather 
complementary to established characterizations of post-Soviet de facto states focused on 
their contested international status and (post-)conflict dimensions.27 Conceptualising de 
facto states as small dependent jurisdictions allows to appreciate the relative normalcy 
of their external dependence,28 of their key relations with a patron and the legitimacy of 
choosing close relations and further integration with a patron as an expression of self-
determination,29 be  it  determined  by  pragmatic  reasons  or  simply  lack  of  viable 
alternatives. Accordingly, it aims at reducing the impact of geopolitical assumptions and 
26 Indeed, Chapter 5 takes this route by presenting and analysing data related to two of the 
components of the MIRAB model (aid and bureaucracy) in the context of post-Soviet de  
facto states. 
27 For  example,  a  focus  on  post-Soviet  de  facto  states'  viability  in  terms  of  post-conflict 
violence (Bakke 2011), is complementary, rather than in contrast to, considerations on their 
viability based on aid entitlement.
28 This  “normalcy”  does  not  imply  that  external  dependence  and  growing  integration  are 
universally welcomed in these territories. On the contrary, ambivalent feelings towards the 
patron are common, for example, in  Abkhazia  (O’Loughlin, Kolossov, and Toal 2011), as 
they are in some small dependent territories around the world that are constantly trying to 
adjust their asymmetric relation with their patron.
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normative expectations about their  long-term path of development by re-shifting the 
focus on issue-based research that takes in consideration the inevitable inter-relation 
between internal and external dimensions.30
29 Claims  to  self-determination  within  a  given  territory,  however,  are  still  particularly 
problematic  in  those  cases  where  ethnic  cleansing  led  to  significant  changes  in  the 
demographic outlook of the territory object of self-determination claims. 
30 In other  words,  frequent  references to the importance of  external  actors  throughout this 
Chapter should not be understood as favouring a reductionist approach that ignores internal 
dynamics, which are fundamental in determining the outcome of state-building efforts. See 
also Caspersen (2012, 76).
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Chapter 5. 
Where does the money 
come from?
Financing the budget 
and the pension system 
in post-Soviet de facto 
states
“With our own resources, we cover for about 20-25 per  
cent of the state functions, which speaks for itself”
Evgeny Shevchuk (2013a), president of Transnistria
“In other words, with our own resources, we are able to  
maintain only half of the state apparatus – I am referring  
to the salary of employees”
Raul Khajimba (2016), president of Abkhazia
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Residents of post-Soviet de facto states have access to public goods and services to a 
large extent thanks to financial resources coming from outside of their territory. For the 
de  facto  authorities,  it  would  not  be  possible  to  pay  pensions,  salaries  of  state 
employees, and provide public services (including in the health and education sector) at 
the current level without financial support from abroad. This specific form of aid is the 
main focus of this chapter: direct transfers to the budget of authorities in de facto states, 
direct transfers to individuals (in particular, pensioners) residing in de facto states, or 
indirect support that can be converted into incomes for the budget.1 Other aspects of the 
complex blend of  external  relations  that  allows residents  of  de facto states  to  have 
access to public  services such as health and education,  and a degree of welfare are 
discussed in the next chapter.
Besides describing how – and how much – financial resources are transferred to de facto 
states,  this  section  develops  further  the  theoretical  arguments  brought  forward  in 
Chapter  4  by  putting  in  context  these  data,  and  in  particular  by  discussing  the 
applicability of the MIRAB model originally developed by Bertram and Watters (1985) 
in reference to Pacific island jurisdictions to describe an economic system based on four 
pillars:  migration,  remittances,  aid  and  bureaucracy  (i.e.  a  high  number  of  state 
employees).  The focus  here is  on the  latter  two components  of  the  model  (aid and 
bureaucracy)  that  capture structural forms of external support  aimed at  the de facto 
authorities and local residents, rather than on private relations that are at the centre of 
the other elements of the model (migration and remittances).
Following this approach, this chapter presents statistical data that broadly confirm the 
applicability  to  post-Soviet  de  facto  states  of  relevant  characterisations  of  MIRAB 
economies. Are external sources of support, rather than domestic sources of revenue, the 
main element shaping the budget? And accordingly, do budget expenditures adapt with 
1 This  definition  is  specifically  adapted  to  the  context  of  post-Soviet  de  facto  states,  as 
schemes  introduced  by  Russia  to  assist  these  territories  (through  direct  payments  of 
pensions, or by not demanding payment for gas in Transnistria) would be unusual in other 
contexts. As will be seen, however, a large part of patron’s assistance to post-Soviet de facto 
states would be captured by established understandings of budget support, which has been 
defined  “as  financial  assistance  that  supports  a  medium-term program and  is  provided 
directly to a recipient country’s budget on a regular basis, using the country’s own financial 
management systems and budget procedures” (Koeberle, Stavreski, and Walliser 2006, 5).
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aid incomes? Do state employees represent an unusually high share of the workforce? Is 
there an unusually high number of pensioners? Answers to these questions contribute to 
our understanding of the impact of non-recognition on the economic structure of post-
Soviet de facto states, as well as on the mechanisms that determine the availability of 
public goods and services to residents of these territories.
The analysis  presented in  this  chapter  relies on data  coming from multiple  sources, 
including  data  published  by  authorities  in  de  facto  states,  by  the  patron  state,  by 
international organisations, national statistical offices, as well as figures collated from 
media reports. As will be discussed, issues related to data availability and data reliability 
substantially  limit  the  accuracy and the  comprehensiveness  of  the  figures  provided. 
However,  it  is  argued,  available  data  still  offer  a  meaningful  characterisation of  the 
overall structure of the economy in these territories and account for the fundamental 
role played by external sources in providing monetary incomes for the budget of these 
entities  as  well  as  for  a  considerable  part  of  the  resident  population.  By putting  in 
context financial support to de facto states, this perspective offers a better picture of the 
overall economic structure of these territories, and highlights the importance of external 
relations for the livelihoods of local residents.
In three out of the four cases under analysis, the patron’s financial support to the budget 
takes place in fully formalised and official form. Russia has recognised  Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia as independent states in 2008, and, since then, there is a dedicated budget 
line for Moscow’s support to these territories that is recorded in both  Russia’s budget 
and in  that  of  the recipients.  In  the  case  of  Nagorno Karabakh,  in  spite  of  lack of 
recognition from Armenia’s side, there is a dedicated budget line known under the name 
of “inter-state loan”. In the case of Transnistria, however, there is not a similarly explicit 
formalised agreement.
After  a  brief  discussion  of  previous  research  dealing  with  how de  facto  states  find 
resources for their budget, this chapter presents how  Transnistria, in spite of lack of 
recognition and formal agreements, still effectively receives support from Russia to the 
tune of a few hundreds million dollars a year. The following sections briefly present 
data on the money transferred from the patron to the budget of Abkhazia, South Ossetia 
and  Nagorno  Karabakh,  as  well  as  on  the  amount  of  direct  monetary  transfers  to 
residents of post-Soviet de facto states that take place through payment of pensions. 
These  data  are  then  used  to  analyse  the economic  structure  of  post-Soviet  de facto 
states, and highlight the relevance of these sources of income for a large share of the 
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local population. Finally, these figures are compared with corresponding data available 
on the parent state, neighbouring countries, sub-state entities in the patron state, as well 
as MIRAB economies in other parts of the world.
The conclusions highlight how in post-Soviet de facto states the share of budget that 
depends  on  aid,  as  well  as  the  share  of  residents  depending  on  the  state  for  their 
incomes,  is  significantly  higher  than  in  internationally  recognised  countries  in  the 
region, but is comparable to that found in Russia’s most dependent regions as well as in 
small dependent jurisdictions in other parts of the world. The exceptionally high degree 
of dependence of post-Soviet de facto states on external support is thus anomalous only 
at first sight: it becomes “normal” as soon as they are conceptualized as small dependent 
jurisdictions.  As  will  be  seen,  similarly  to  what  happens  in  other  small  dependent 
jurisdictions elsewhere in the world, aid fundamentally enhances the state capacity as 
well as the availability of welfare and services to a resident population, but makes the 
territory less likely to become self-sustainable in the near future.
5.1. Resourcing small dependent jurisdictions  
The  political  economy  of  de  facto  states  has  evolved  significantly  since  they  first 
appeared, but few scholars have dealt with economic developments in the last decade. 
Earlier studies focused on the criminal nature of the local economy and the benefits of 
ethnic war  (King 2001; Kemp et al. 2005), but even more recent research has mostly 
dealt with the situation in these territories prior to 2008 (Prelz Oltramonti 2012, 2015; 
Broers  2015b).  Things  however  changed  substantially  in  the  last  decade,  and  an 
economic system more dependent on support from a patron has become the norm in 
Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.2
In the case of  Transnistria,  Russian aid became an increasingly important source of 
revenue for financing the local budget since the mid-2000s, as the scope for illicit trade 
decreased,3 late  Soviet  industries  became  increasingly  unprofitable,  and  the  the 
2 Nagorno  Karabakh  had  been  consistently  receiving  direct  support  from  Armenia even 
earlier.
3 The  establishment  of  a  EU border  assistance  mission  in  November  2005,  and  the  new 
customs agreements between Moldova and Ukraine introduced in March 2006 made large 
scale re-export or smuggling schemes more complicated. For example, EUBAM estimated 
that  re-export  of  chicken  meat  in  the  period  from  October  2005  to  May  2006  had 
contributed about 7 million USD to  Transnistria’s budget  (Isachenko and Schlichte 2007, 
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privatization  process  slowed  substantially.  About  one  third  of  Transnistria’s  budget 
came from privatizations in the period 2002-2005  (Isachenko 2012, 119), and only in 
2007 did Transnistria formalise its practice of financing its budget by not paying the gas 
it imported from Russia.4 Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 
has been a key turning point in the way these territories manage to finance their budget 
and, more broadly, for the structure of their economy. Abkhazia turned from a subsistent 
political economy in the period 1993–2008 (Broers 2015b, 276), to a political economy 
largely based on rents coming in the form of aid from  Russia.5 In the case of  South 
Ossetia, Russia quickly became the predominant source of incomes for the budget, as all 
other  sources  of  potential  incomes  (largely  based  on more  or  less  illicit  trade  with 
Georgia) became unavailable. Russia’s aid led to a manifold increase in the size of the 
budget of both of these territories (for example,  Abkhazia’s budget increased from a 
paltry 7 million USD in 2001 to over 300 million USD in 2012), but for a number of 
reasons all four post-Soviet de facto states saw a significant boost to their yearly budget 
in the period 2007-2009 (see Illustration 5.1). Since current arrangements are likely to 
remain  at  the  basis  of  the  political  economy of  these  territories  for  the  foreseeable 
future,  the  data  presented  in  this  chapter  focus  on this  latter  phase,  highlighting  in 
particular  the  key role  of  the  patron.  This  approach differs  substantially  from most 
analyses of the economic situation in these territories published by local experts, who 
mostly focus on the development of domestic capacities looking at possible options for 
achieving self-sustainable prosperity.6
In a valuable theoretical contribution, Broers  (2015b) presented alternative models of 
the political economy of de facto states in the South Caucasus, highlighting how sources 
of incomes for the budget (and the ruling elite) have important consequences on the 
26). 
4 See next section for more details.
5 According to the terminology proposed by Broers  (2015b,  7),  after  2008  Abkhazia’s de 
facto authorities effectively operate “as a ‘monopoly mediator’,  controlling the interface 
between exogenous resource opportunities and local society.” For a more detailed analysis 
of Abkhazia’s political economy in the period 1993-2008, see Prelz Oltramonti (2015).
6 Studies  taking  this  perspective  in  Abkhazia  include  a  detailed  “Strategy  for  the  socio-
economic  development  of  Abkhazia  until  2025”  sponsored  by  the  president  (Tsentr 
strategicheskikh issledovanij  pri  Prezidente  Respubliki  Abkhazii  2015),  as  well  as  other 
publications (Bgazhba, Tsushba, and Shatipa 2014; Ardzinba 2014).
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nature of the political system in these territories. In line with the approach at the basis of 
this research, he also highlights how “genuine economic self-sufficiency may not be the 
aspiration  of  de  facto  leaderships”  (Broers  2015b,  16),  and  laments  that  implicit 
understandings of the self-sufficient state as “normal” by Western academics contributes 
to misplaced expectations on their development.
Research  on  the  impact  of  aid,  and the  nexus  between  aid  and  development,  have 
traditionally been key elements at the centre of research on new independent states and 
small isolated territories. Not in the case of post-Soviet de facto states, where the issue 
of  aid  has  often  been  mentioned  as  an  argument  in  the  debate  on  their  de  facto 
independence”,7 sometimes  implying  a  false  dichotomy  between  sovereignty  and 
dependence. A set of assumptions have seemingly influenced both the research focus 
and  the  vocabulary  used  to  study  these  territories.  Expressions  such  as  ‘aid’ 
(‘humanitarian aid’/’development aid’) or ‘technical assistance for state building’ have 
been  rarely  used  to  describe  Russia’s  support  to  Transnistria,  Abkhazia  and  South 
Ossetia, even if similar initiatives would have been routinely labelled as such in other 
contexts. Effectively, no research has been conducted on the successes and failures of 
external  support  for  state  building,  on  the  impact  of  external  dependence  on 
sustainability, or on related issues such as the potential impact of aid volatility (e.g. Iulai 
2014), which have been a staple of research on post-conflict and post-colonial societies.
A number of studies have been conducted analysing separate aspects of the political 
economy  of  post-Soviet  de  facto  states,8 but  few  have  specifically  focused  on  the 
structure of  budget  revenues.  Exceptions  include Isachenko’s  (2009,  2012) work on 
Transnistria,  and  the  already  mentioned  article  by  Broers  (2015b) on  the  South 
Caucasus cases. This chapter feeds into this literature, by focusing on the patron’s role 
in financing the budget and pension system of these territories, and by comparing key 
data from post-Soviet de facto states with different sets of entities. Before presenting 
7 For example, the level of the patron’s support to these territories has been included, among 
other criteria, in research aimed at drawing a line between “puppet” and “de facto” state 
(Berg and Kamilova 2012).
8 For example, comparative research has looked at different levels of development on the two 
sides of the Dnestr  (Străuţiu and Tabără 2015), or the possibly related different levels of 
domestic legitimacy of the governments in Chișinău and Tiraspol  (O’Loughlin, Toal, and 
Chamberlain-Creangă  2013).  Prelz  Oltramonti  (2015) has  focused on  the  importance  of 
local stakeholders for Abkhazia’s political economy in the period 1993-2008.
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detailed statistics and introducing a structured comparison, the main sources of external 
support to the budget and the pension system are outlined for each of the four cases.
5.2. Transnistria, turning gas into cash  
In recent years, the main source of (quasi-)financial Russian support to Transnistria has 
come in the form of natural gas. Given the prominence of this source of incomes for 
Transnistria’s government, it is worth providing additional details on how, in practice, 
the Russian government sponsors de facto authorities in Tiraspol, without admitting as 
much, yet doing it in plain sight, through officially recorded exchanges.
Gas is sold to Transnistria on the base of formal contracts stipulated between Gazprom, 
a joint-stock company controlled by the Russian government,9 and the Chișinău-based 
MoldovaGaz, the main gas company in the Republic fo  Moldova, which in its turn is 
also  partly  owned –  and effectively  controlled  by – Gazprom.10 MoldovaGaz has  a 
number  of  subsidiaries,  among  them,  TiraspolTransGaz-Pridnestrov’e,11 which  deals 
with  gas  distribution  in  Transnistria  and  sells  gas  to  both  private  consumers  and 
industrial  enterprises.  Even  if  physically  the  gas  enters  Transnistria  directly  from 
Ukraine, gas consumed in Transnistria is officially recorded as imports in Moldova and 
included in the accounting books of  MoldovaGaz. However, while Gazprom demands 
the full payment of gas consumed in right-bank Moldova, it does not demand payment 
for the gas consumed in Transnistria.12
How does the gas sold by TiraspolTransGaz transform into incomes for  Transnistria’s 
budget? Back in 2007, as described by Isachenko (2009), “[t]o ensure timely payment 
of pensions and other social  benefits, local authorities decided to borrow 14 million 
9 According to Gazprom’s official website, the “Russian Government controls over 50 per 
cent of the Company’s shares” (Gazprom 2016).
10 As of 2016 (MoldovaGaz n.d.), 50 per cent of MoldovaGaz shares are owned by Gazprom 
itself,  35.33 per cent by the  Moldovan government, and 13.44 per cent by authorities in 
Tiraspol (whose shares, however, have also been managed by Gazprom since 2005).
11 For  additional  information  on  the  company’s  structure  and  its  origins,  see  also  the 
company’s official website, http://www.ttgpmr.com/.
12 Formally, “Gazprom sues  Moldovagaz every year to meet the requirements of the forex 
currency and customs control authorities of Russia in line with which missing the deadlines 
of  repatriation  of  financial  means  requires  legal  measures  to  be  taken”  (Infomarket.md 
2016), but does not effectively try to collect payments.
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USD from the special fund that had been created in 2006 to accumulate gas payments 
directed  to  Gazprom.”  This  was only  the  beginning of  a  new approach for  finding 
resources  for  supporting  Transnistria’s  budget,  and in  particular  social  expenditures. 
According to  Moldova’s ministry the economy, by 1 July 2015,  Transnistria’s unpaid 
debt towards Gazprom amounted to more than 4 billion USD (Moldova’s ministry of 
economy  2015),  corresponding  to  about  90  per  cent  of  the  total  debt  due  by 
MoldovaGaz to Gazprom,13 or about five times as much as Transnistria’s yearly GDP. 
Given the sheer size of the debt, and the overall condition of Transnistria’s economy, it 
appears that  Transnistria will never be able to pay back its share of the debt, and that 
Gazprom does not really expect that the debt will ever be settled by Tiraspol. Yet, the 
debts is kept on the books, at least in part to be used as a bargaining chip in conflict 
negotiations.14
In practice, simplifying the process, Gazprom continues to provide gas to  Transnistria 
without expectation of repayment; money paid for the gas by consumers and enterprises 
in  Transnistria  largely  goes  to  the  state  budget  and  is  used  to  support  public 
expenditures,  including  the  payment  of  pensions  and  other  social  subsidies.  This 
happens in line with  Transnistria’s legislation, albeit without a formal agreement with 
either Gazprom or the  Russian government. The original version of the law “On the 
peculiarities of payment for natural gas” approved by  Transnistria’s parliament on 27 
December 2006 (President of Transnistria 2007), stated clearly in its article 10 that all 
money collected for gas consumption should be paid to the company that provides gas; 
later amendments changed that article, and introduced the possibility to transfer those 
resources to  Transnistria’s state budget. Starting with 2009, all money of the gas fund 
have been transferred to the budget (Całus 2013, 4). This process is public and widely 
known  locally:  for  example,  during  a  public  ceremony  on  28  January  2016, 
Transnistria’s  president  Shevchuk  plainly  stated  that  “‘gas  money’ are  a  source  for 
dealing  with  the  deficit  of  the  republican  budget  and  the  pension  fund”  (“PBR: 
13 It should be highlighted that because of the above-described ownership structure, Moldova’s 
government is best placed to provide exact figures. 
14 Russia’s deputy prime minister Dmitri Rogozin argues that “’Transnistria’s debts for gas are 
Moldova’s debts and they must be repaid,’ as long as Chisinau insists that Transnistria is a 
part  of  Moldova”  (Socor  2012),  while  they  could  be  counted  separately  if  Chişinău 
recognised Tiraspol as an equal party to the negotiations.
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Denezhnye  Sredstva  s  Gazovogo  Scheta  Raskhoduyutsya  Tol’ko  Po  Tselevomu 
Naznacheniyu” 2016).
Authorities in Tiraspol do not publish exact figures on the amount of incomes they have 
through this source, but it is possible to extrapolate an approximate estimate of the value 
of gas received by the figures published by multiple media sources at different points in 
time on the amount of Transnistria’s gas debt. Illustration 5.2 presents the growth of the 
total  amount of  Transnistria’s gas debt through the decade 2006-2015. Based on the 
same data, Illustration 5.3 shows by how much the debt has increased on a yearly basis: 
that amount corresponds to the value of the gas Transnistria effectively receives for free 
each year. However, this does not automatically correspond to the actual incomes to the 
Transnistrian budget: gas still needs to be turned into money. From this point of view, 
the amount of money that MoldovaGaz should have paid for it according to its contracts 
with Gazprom is substantially irrelevant: what matters is how much is demanded for 
payment locally, and how much is actually possible to collect from both private and 
business customers in Transnistria.
In order to turn gas into hard currency that can be used for paying salaries and pensions, 
it is thus absolutely necessary that power-hungry enterprises in Transnistria are able to 
export their products. They will thus be able to pay for gas consumption (100 per cent 
of the money paid for gas will actually enter the budget through the gas fund) and will 
directly  or indirectly  contribute to  the budget  by paying taxes on incomes,  customs 
duties  and other  levies  related  to  workers’ salaries.  While  Russian  aid  makes  for  a 
substantial part of the Transnistrian economy, economic slowdowns are thus worrisome 
not only for the “usual” reasons (e.g. more unemployment, less taxes paid to the budget, 
etc.): if enterprises work less, it also means that they consume less gas, so they pay less 
into the gas fund, and as a consequence there are less money for the budget. Because of 
this mechanism, a decrease in gas prices is likely to have (at least in the short term) a 
detrimental effect on incomes to the Transnistrian budget. 
It should also be highlighted that while free gas comes from Russia, the actual money 
effectively  comes  from  exports,  i.e.  mostly  from  Chişinău  and  importers  in  EU 
countries  (as  of  2015,  only 8 per  cent  of  Transnistrian exports  went  to  Russia,  see 
Illustration 5.4).  Finally,  the process  can still  be profitable  for some of the  Russian 
companies  (privately  or  state-owned)  who  own  most  of  Transnistria’s  industrial 
complex.  The case  of  ‘Moldavskaya GRES’,  one  of  the  biggest  powerplants  in  the 
region,  is  a  particularly  telling  example.  ‘Moldavskaya  GRES’ -  which  belongs  to 
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Russia’s  state-owned  electricity  company  ‘Inter  RAO  EES’15 –  buys  gas  from 
TiraspolTransGaz  at  convenient  prices,  and  then  sells  the  electricity  it  produces  to 
Chişinău at  market  prices.  By paying for the electricity  it  buys from ‘Moldavskaya 
GRES’,  given  that  the  bill  for  the  gas  consumed  by  the  powerplant  is  effectively 
transferred to the Transnistrian budget, Chişinău provides an important part of the actual 
money that Tiraspol disburses to state employees and pensioners, while  Russia-owned 
‘Inter RAO EES’ still makes a profit.16
Paying for pensions in  Transnistria  
Traditionally, residents of  Transnistria (including  Russian citizens) received a pension 
only  from  the  Transnistrian  authorities,  and  not  from  the  Russian  pension  fund. 
However,  since  2008,  all  Transnistrian  pensioners  receive  an  additional  component 
sponsored  directly  by  the  Russian  Federation  (commonly  known  as  the  rossiskaya 
nadbavka) as humanitarian support. As of 2014, this component was of about 15 USD 
per  month,  but  due  to  the  devaluation  of  the  Russian  rouble  its  value  decreased 
significantly in 2015 once converted to the local currency. This form of humanitarian 
support from the Russian government has remained stable at around 1 billion RUB per 
year (about 16 million USD at the average 2015 exchange rate).
Since  late  2014,  pensioners  in  Transnistria  that  are  also  citizens  of  the  Russian 
Federation have been able to apply for a  Russian pension instead of the  Transnistrian 
one. According to official data released by the  Russian pension fund, and in line with 
data  issued by authorities  in  Tiraspol,  as  of  2015 about  15 000 did the switch  (see 
15 More details are available on the powerplant’s own official website, http://moldgres.com/. 
16 An  additional  complication  is  related  to  the  fact  that  Chișinău  pays  for  electricity  in  
Moldovan  Lei:  this  has  led  to  circumstances  when  Transnistria’s  National  Bank  had 
substantial amounts of  Moldovan Lei that it  was not immediately able to convert to US 
dollars or other currencies (Petrov 2016).
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Illustration 5.5).17 Assuming a pension on a par with the average Transnistrian pension,18 
as of 2015 this form of support amounts to about 22 million USD per year.
5.3. Money  for  the  budget  in   Abkhazia  and   South   
Ossetia
Since Russia officially recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent countries 
in 2008, the mechanisms for transferring resources to the budget of these de facto states 
are more straightforward, and are recorded as direct transfers in both the Russian budget 
as well as in that of the recipients. In both cases, there are officially two main categories 
of financial support: one formally aimed at socio-economic development that supports 
regular  activities  financed  by  the  state  budget,  and  the  other  that  finances  mostly 
infrastructural projects under an ‘Investment programme’ that is agreed jointly by the 
sides. Abkhazia’s 2015-2017 ‘Investment programme’, for example, includes resources 
for massive infrastructural  projects  (roads,  electricity network,  the water supply and 
sanitation  system),  public  buildings  (e.g.  a  new building  for  the  Supreme Court  in 
Abkhazia),  in  education  (kindergartens,  schools,  the  local  university),  in  the  health 
sector, as well as works aimed at improving the tourism infrastructure. Funds are also 
earmarked for improving state capacity, for example by creating a land registry or maps 
of the water-sanitation systems of the the main cities. 
The investment programmes are developed by ‘joint inter-governmental commissions 
for  social-economic  cooperation’  that  include  representatives  of  both  Russia  and 
Abkhazia/South Ossetia (the programmes for the two territories are agreed separately); 
even once resources have been transferred to the budget of  Abkhazia/South Ossetia, 
some of the activities  need to  be specifically  agreed with relevant  ministries  of  the 
17 Official figures have not been released, but according to news published on  Transnistria's 
state news agency on 12 January 2016 (“B 2015 Godu Raskhody EGFSS Prevysili Dokhody 
Pochti Na Milliard Rublei” 2016), quoting  Transnistria’s Minister for Social Defence and 
Work, the number of pensioners decreased of about 15 000 individuals between 2014 and 
2015; even if she did not  explain the reason for such a sudden drop,  this  must  broadly 
correspond to the number of people who decided to switch to the Russian pensions.
18 If people chose to switch, it would be fair to assume that they expected to receive more, yet 
media reports highlighted how the devaluation of the  Russian Rouble actually led to an 
economic loss for at least some pensioners. It is worth noticing that, as of 2015, the average  
pension in Transnistria is more than 50 per cent higher than in both neighbouring Moldova 
and Ukraine (see Illustration 5.6).
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Russian Federation before actual implementation. Recipients however are formally not 
required  to  negotiate  with  Russia  on  the  details  of  how  the  ‘socio-economic 
development’ component of assistance is spent, in line with one of the basic tenets of 
budget support in other contexts,  i.e.  the assumption that there is  an “agreement on 
general  budget  priorities  and  expenditures,  so  that  in  principle  there  is  no  need  to 
earmark funds for specific items” (Koeberle, Stavreski, and Walliser 2006, 7).19
A structured  analysis  of  bilateral  agreements  between  Russia,  Abkhazia,  and  South 
Ossetia  by Ambrosio and Lange  (2016) shows how both  Sukhumi and (to  a  lesser 
extent) Tskhinvali have a degree of agency in determining the outcome of negotiations 
with Moscow, in line with prior scholarly observations suggesting that weaker states 
have disproportionate power in negotiations with powerful states (Ambrosio and Lange 
2016,  676).  Leaked  documents  from  the  negotiations  show  that  the  opinions  of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are taken in consideration at multiple levels in the process 
of developing the aid package.20 For example, one document dated 21 October 2013 
(O.M. and #SurkovLeaks 2013) points out that the starting point for developing the 
investment  programme 2014-2016 in  South Ossetia  has  been a  list  prepared by the 
South Ossetian side, but it also highlights that the actual programme has been developed 
by the Russian ministry of regions.21 Leaked documents (Bashlykov and #SurkovLeaks 
2013) also  testify  of  Abkhazia’s  leadership’s  stubbornness  (diplomatically  called 
“principled position”) in negotiating aid allocation with Russia, but also of its structural 
weakness.  For  example,  in  July  2012  the  Abkhazian  side  refused  on  a  matter  of 
principle to provide documents requested by  Russia to motivate spending on specific 
19 Or, to be more precise, “there may be an understanding between donors and the government 
that funds may be directed to certain sectors, but there is typically no formal limitation on 
where they may actually be spent” (Koeberle, Stavreski, and Walliser 2006, 8).
20 The leak in October 2016 of a batch of emails sent and received by the office of Vladislav  
Surkov (often quoted in media reports with the hashtag #SurvokLeaks), give some insights 
as to how such negotiations take place. Vladislav Surkov has been Russia’s president aide 
on matters related to Abkhazia and South Ossetia since September 2013. O’Loughlin (2016) 
has previously argued in favour of using data resulting from leaks in scholarly research. 
Other  authors  have previously used Wikileaks as  a  source for scholarly publications on 
post-Soviet de facto states (Pegg and Berg 2016).
21 Apparently, most of the objects proposed by the South Ossetian side have not been included 
in the programme for lack of documentation.
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constructions sites; a few months later, they finally gave the requested documentation. 
Such dynamics show that while  Abkhazia and  South Ossetia are part of the decision 
making process on aid in their favour, it is clear at all stages of the process who holds  
the purse strings.
Indeed,  financial  contributions  from  Russia  determine  budget  expenditures  in  both 
Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia.  According  to  official  data  from  the  governments  in 
Sukhumi and Tskhinvali (see Illustration 5.7 and Illustration 5.8), Russian aid formally 
represents about two thirds of the budget in Abkhazia, and close to 90 per cent of South 
Ossetia’s budget, and indirectly accounts for a large part of the remaining part. 
Given  the  fact  that  these  territories  are  not  able  to  finance  a  budget  deficit,  their 
expenditures effectively adapt to the amount received in aid by Russia. When in 2015 a 
considerable part of the resources dedicated to ‘budget investments’ in  Abkhazia was 
withhold,  the total  size of the budget shrunk accordingly.  An internal document that 
emerged from leaked documents (Mamonov and #SurkovLeaks 2013) bluntly states that 
“the size,  structure,  dynamics and the actual implementation of the budget of  South 
Ossetia are defined by the relevant components of Russia’s financial support.”
An  argument  could  be  made  that  these  territories  could  easily  survive  even  if  the 
‘budget  investment’  component  were  to  be  withhold,  since  this  would  not  have 
noticeable changes on the capability to deliver services to the resident population in the 
short term.22 However, these resources have been fundamental in determining current 
capability levels of the local authorities, and, since the property of all new buildings is 
transferred  to  them,  contribute  to  increase  them.  Besides,  the  ‘socio-economic 
development’ component  serves  to  finance  regular  government  activities,  including 
paying for the salaries of state employees in the state bureaucracy, as well as in the 
education and health sector. To all effects and purposes, these sources of income are the 
main element determining the capacity of the de facto state to deliver core functions.
It should also be highlighted that, in particular in the case of  South Ossetia, taxation 
actually  provides  for  a  negligible  part  of  governments  incomes.  A  proposal  that 
appeared in local media to simply remove all forms of taxation for residents of  South 
Ossetia  (International  Crisis  Group  2010b,  4),  is  unacceptable  because  it  may  stir 
22 They would impact, however, on the economic situation, since constructions sites contribute 
to the overall  level of economic activity and provide employment that at least in part is  
taken up by the local population, or by migrant workers that to some extent contribute to the  
local economy.
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controversy in Russia and would run against ongoing efforts to uniform legislation with 
the  patron,  rather  than  for  its  practical  consequences.  But  even  in  Abkhazia,  once 
customs  duties  are  removed,  it  actually  emerges  that  incomes  from other  forms  of 
taxation  are  negligible,  which  is  one  of  the  main  reasons  why the  Abkhazian  side 
insisted on maintaining customs duties on goods imported from Russia (Ambrosio and 
Lange 2016, 681).
Pensions in  Abkhazia  
In  Abkhazia,  there  is  a  local  pension  fund  which  is  mostly  sustained  by  domestic 
contributions  (Abkhazia’s  office  of  state  statistic  2014),  but  pays  out  very  low 
pensions.23 As of October 2015, the majority of recipients receive a basic pension by 
age, corresponding to about 8 USD per month (AbkhaziaInform 2015). Even including 
the substantially higher pensions for selected categories (including war invalids and war 
heroes), the average pension offered by the Abkhaz pension fund corresponds to less 
than  20  USD  per  month  (at  2015  exchange  rates).  Starting  with  2016,  Abkhaz 
pensioners  who  do  not  receive  a  pension  from any  other  country  (be  it  Russia  or 
Georgia),  are  set  to  receive  an  additional  1 000  roubles  per  month,  bringing  their 
pensions  from 500 to  1 500 roubles,  or  from about  7  to  about  22 USD per  month 
(Zavodskaya 2016). This means that starting with 2016 also the Abkhazian pension is 
directly dependent on Russian aid.
In addition, Abkhaz residents who are Russian citizens receive also a Russian pension, 
which is substantially higher and set to increase in line with bilateral agreements. As of 
2015,  there  were  32 154 recipients  of  a  Russian  pension  in  Abkhazia,  receiving  an 
average pension of 6 262 roubles (about 100 USD), an amount due to increase to reach 
the levels of  Russia’s Southern Federal district by 2018 (10 179 roubles in 2015), or 
about 165 USD at the average 2015 exchange rate (Redichkina 2015).24
23 Given the high share of public employees, and the fact that their salary is largely covered by 
Russian aid, this does not mean however that the pension fund, even at current disbursement  
levels, would be sustainable without external support. 
24 Given the fall of the rouble’s exchange rate against the dollar in 2015, the increase seems 
less  spectacular  than  earlier  expected  once  figures  are  converted  to  USD.  However,  in 
Abkhazia the incomes from an average Russian pension may still be higher than active work 
in a number of sectors; according to official statistics,  as of 2015, the average salary in  
Abkhazia  was  9 056  RUB,  or  about  150  USD  per  month.  For  considerations  on  the 
importance  of  Russian  pensions  in  Abkhazia  pre-2008,  see  also  Kolstø  and  Blakkisrud 
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Overall, in 2015  Russia delivered about 40 million USD to  Abkhazia in the form of 
direct cash transfers to  pensioners,  and, given the large number of state employees, 
indirectly  provided a large share of the about  10 million USD of contributions that 
financed Abkhazia’s domestic pensions fund.
Pensions in  South Ossetia  
As of 2016, there are about 700 people who are officially receiving a Russian pension in 
South  Ossetia,  and about  4 000 who receive  a  South Ossetian  pension.25 Given the 
almost total dependence on Russian aid of the official economy in South Ossetia, both 
are ultimately covered almost exclusively by Russian aid, also considering the fact that 
private companies and employees working in South Ossetia do not pay contributions to 
the pension fund.26 The minimum pension in South Ossetia grew from about 9 USD in 
2010 to about 70 USD in 2015; as of 2015, the average pension in South Ossetia stood 
at about 100 USD per month (Res news agency 2015).
5.4. Money for the budget in  Nagorno Karabakh  
Also in the case of Nagorno Karabakh, direct transfers to the budget from the patron (in 
this  case,  Armenia)  regularly  cover  more  than  50  per  cent  of  overall  government 
incomes (see Illustration 5.9 and Illustration 5.10). The transfer is formally recorded as 
an  ‘inter-state  loan’,  and  there  is  some  debate  on  whether  there  is  any  repayment 
arrangement in place (Broers 2015b, 13). Given the circumstances, however, it is clear 
that the inter-state loan is to be understood to all effects and purposes as direct budget 
support. It formally comes with no strings attached, and it is officially used in full to 
support  regular  budget  expenditures,  including  for  financing  the  pension  system 
(expenditures on “social pensions and allowances” constitute about 25 per cent of the 
whole budget of Nagorno Karabakh).
(2008, 494), who highlighted how this source of income could make “all the difference in 
the world” for the livelihood of local residents.
25 Apparently,  a  significant  number  of  local  residents  receive  a  Russian  pension  in  South 
Ossetia, but are still registered in North Ossetia’s pension fund as was previously required, 
so they are not included in these statistics.
26 A new law on the pension fund introducing contributions by private companies and their  
employees was being discussed in 2016 (Kotaeva 2016). 
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These figures, however, do not capture the fundamental role of the Armenian diaspora 
as a key donor contributing – among other things - to health and education facilities. 
Since donations that come from diaspora organisations do not pass through the budget 
of authorities in Stepanakert, they are not included in these calculations.
5.5. Comparing small dependent jurisdictions  
Now that external funding mechanisms at the basis of budget formation in post-Soviet 
de facto states have been outlined, it is time to put in context some of the figures that 
have emerged. As debated at  length in Chapter  4,  the literature on small  dependent 
territories, and in particular island states with strong connections with a patron, provides 
inputs that are particularly useful for analysing the political economy of post-Soviet de 
facto states. This chapter proceeds in this direction by singling out two defining features 
of  the  political  economy  of  small  dependent  jurisdictions  as  characterised  by  the 
MIRAB model  (Bertram and Watters 1985), namely the high share of aid as part of 
budget incomes and the high proportion of state employees in the workforce.27
These two indicators are compared across different sets of jurisdictions. First, the data 
are compared with global or regional statistics, which shows that post-Soviet de facto 
states  would  indeed  look  anomalous  if  compared  along  these  parameters  with  the 
average  independent  state  or  with  its  post-Soviet  neighbours  (including  parent  and 
patron state). Then, the same figures are compared with a group of small dependent 
jurisdictions,  namely  the  five  island  jurisdictions  included  by  Bertram and  Watters 
(1985) in  their  first  study  on  MIRAB  economies  and  the  three  countries  that  are 
currently  under  Compact  of  Free  Association  with  the  United  States,  an  agreement 
which – as debated in Chapter 4 – has some similarities with the treaties that bound 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia with Russia.28
27 The first two components of the model, aid and migration, are determinant for the livelihood 
of  individuals  and  families,  but  are  less  relevant  in  terms  of  external  relations  that  go 
through the authorities of a jurisdiction. 
28 The five cases included in the original studies of the MIRAB model are the Cook Islands,  
Niue, Kiribati, Tokelau and Tuvalu; the three countries under a Compact of Free Association 
with the  United States are the  Marshall Islands,  Micronesia, and  Palau. These are only a 
subset of all the MIRAB economies later identified by Bertram (2006) and other scholars, 
but  they represent  some of the variety found within MIRAB model  (both U.N. member 
states and associated territories, some of them under United States’ patronage while others 
dependent on New Zealand’s support).
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These are all small jurisdictions in the Pacific Ocean, and those among them that are 
internationally recognised as independent have been accepted as members of the United 
Nations only after 1990. They obviously have very little in common with post-Soviet de 
facto  states,  but  in  spite  of  the  obvious  differences,  their  political  economy  share 
important  features.  The main goal  of  this  comparison is  to  highlight  that  some key 
features of the political economy of post-Soviet de facto states are not unique to them 
(or to unrecognised states),  but rather common among small  dependent jurisdictions 
around the world.29
Finally,  also considering the propensity expressed by at  least  Transnistria and  South 
Ossetia for joining their patron state, Russian regions are proposed as an alternative set 
of comparison. This allows to highlight how post-Soviet de facto states would be very 
different from the average federated entity of the Russian Federation, but very much in 
line with those found in the regions that are most isolated or dependent on transfers 
from Moscow (often, republics in Russia’s Northern Caucasus).
5.6. Aid as a key element of the budget and the local   
economy
Bertram (1999, 106) described island states in the Pacific Ocean as being in “a region 
where governments generally  balance their  budgets by letting spending change with 
revenues, where the balance of payments current account is seldom far from balance 
and external debt remains modest”, and highlighted that “external sources of financing 
that do not  leave a residue of debt  – current  account  transfers – are  the key to  the 
economic performance of small islands”  (Bertram 1999, 107). As the data presented 
above demonstrate, these characterisations largely apply to post-Soviet de facto states, 
once we accept that both Transnistria’s ‘gas debt’ and Nagorno Karabakh’s ‘inter-state 
loan’ are effectively to be understood as current account transfers. The fact that post-
Soviet de facto states receive more than 50 per cent of their budget incomes through 
financial support from the patron would be clearly unusual for larger countries, but is 
29 Also  post-conflict  territories  may  effectively  share  some  of  these  features  (a 
disproportionate amount of aid in the local budget, and an unusually high share of people 
with registered cash incomes receiving it  from the state).  However,  in the case of post-
conflict  interventions,  all  actors  involved  are  aware  that  this  support  will  not  last 
indeterminately,  while  in  the  case  of  small  dependent  jurisdictions  there  is  usually  an 
understanding that external support will continue for the foreseeable future.
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not unseen in independent micro-states in other parts of the world. It is also frequent for 
sub-state entities to depend heavily on transfers from the central to the local budget.
International comparisons are often complicated by different accounting mechanisms 
and underlying dynamics. The most established global dataset on official development 
assistance  (OECD 2014) includes in its data both general budget support as well as 
targeted aid that never enters the state budget of recipient countries. The data presented 
in Illustration 5.11, however, include only aid that goes through the budget of the central 
authorities  (and thus  not  including – among other  things  – support  paid directly  to 
pensioners). This choice is motivated by both availability of relevant data and the focus 
on the research. On the one hand, in the case of post-Soviet de facto states reliable data 
are  available  concerning  the  aid  flows  that  go  through  the  budget,  but  not  overall 
external support. On the other, the data presented aim to clarify to what extent external 
aid is determinant for supporting state capacity in de facto jurisdictions, and how much 
of the incomes of state employees are covered by external sources.  Illustration 5.11 
shows  that  –  in  line  with  the  definition  of  MIRAB  –  it  is  common  for  selected 
jurisdictions to have more than one third of their budget covered by external funding.30
Extending the comparison to federal entities of the Russian federation, it emerges that 
the level of subsidy received by de facto states is in line with that of some  Russian 
regions,  in  particular  those  located  in  the  northern  Caucasus  such  as  Ingushetia or 
Chechnya or those located in peripheral areas, such as Altai, Tuva and Kamchatka (see 
Illustration  5.12).31 On the  contrary,  the  share  of  international  aid  to  internationally 
recognised post-Soviet countries is significantly lower, and remains below 20 per cent 
30 OECD/World Bank data (World Bank 2016) including also aid that does not go through the 
state budget  actually show that  some of these jurisdictions receive much larger external 
support. For example, in 2014 official development assistance to Micronesia has been about 
twice  as  much as  budget  expenditures,  and  Kiribati’s  was  about  65 per  cent  of  budget 
expenditures, with only a small share of it passing through Kiribati’s budget. 
31 Incidentally, the history of Tuva may be particularly relevant to scholars with an interest in 
international recognition (and lack thereof) in the region: in 1921 the Soviet Union officially 
recognised the independence of Tannu-Tuva and even exchanged diplomatic representatives 
with it  (Friters 1937, 328–29). Mongolia was the only other country that followed suit. In 
1944, Tannu-Tuva was officially annexed by the Soviet Union, and became an autonomous 
oblast’ within Soviet Russia (Mongush 1993). 
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of budget expenditures for all countries for which data are available, even including in 
the calculations also non-budgetary assistance (see Illustration 5.13).
In brief, the data confirm the observation that in post-Soviet de facto states aid accounts 
for  a  significant  share of  budget  revenues,  to  an extent  that  is  common in  Russia’s 
regions in the Northern Caucasus and in small dependent jurisdictions in other world 
regions, but is very distant from what is found in internationally recognised countries, 
including in the post-Soviet space.
5.7. The key role of state employees and pensioners  
In MIRAB economies, the share of people whose income directly depends on the state 
budget is unusually high: “the relationship of most of these Pacific micro-economies to 
the metropolitan economies of the region is akin to that of a suburb, inhabited mainly by 
pensioners and bureaucrats, within one of those economies” (Bertram 1986, 810). Is this 
true also for post-Soviet de facto states? 
In comparison with the 91 countries and territories for which corresponding data are 
available in established datasets  (ILOSTAT 2016), post-Soviet de facto states have an 
extremely high share of state employees in the workforce, to an extent that – excluding 
socialist states such as Cuba – is only found in MIRAB economies such as the Marshall 
Islands and Réunion, or in petrol states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Illustration
5.14). The share of state employees found in de facto states would thus be unusual for 
independent countries in the post-Soviet context (see  Illustration 5.15), but would be 
comparable to that found in some regions of the Russian federation, in particular in the 
Northern Caucasus (see Illustration 5.16).32
Comparing the share of state-employees in MIRAB economies and post-Soviet de facto 
states may however be partially misleading, as authors who worked on Pacific islands 
seemingly took for granted that all state employees were working as civil servants or in 
public  sectors  such  as  education  and  health,  while  in  post-Soviet  de  facto  states 
productive state-owned enterprises are not uncommon. In order to confirm that the high 
share of state employees is not related, for example, to the fact that lack of international 
recognition  creates  a  difficult  environment  for  privatizations,  disaggregated  data 
32 Relevant  data  for  South  Ossetia  are  not  publicly  available;  however,  considering  the 
economic situation in the territory, in all likelihood the share of state employees is due to be 
even higher than in the other post-Soviet de facto states. 
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including only people working in the public administration have been extracted.  Do 
post-Soviet de facto states have bloated bureaucracies?
Illustration  5.18 presents  disaggregated  data  singling  out  “bureaucrats”  (i.e.  civil 
servants  working in  the public  administration,  and excluding people working in  the 
health and education sector) in post-Soviet de facto states and  Russian regions. Both 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia present a share of civil servants in the workforce unseen 
among  Russian  regions,  and  even  more  industrialised  Transnistria  has  a  share  of 
bureaucrats that is significantly higher than the average of the Russian Federation, and 
even of the average in the North Caucasus federal district.
Disaggregated data for MIRAB economies are not always readily available. However, 
data for  Tuvalu and  Palau highlight that in such territories public servants may be as 
much as 30 or even 40 per cent of the registered workforce, allowing once more to put 
in perspective the seemingly unusual data coming from post-Soviet de facto states (see 
Illustration 5.19).
Registered monetary incomes in post-Soviet de facto 
states
In order to account for all the people that directly depend on their incomes from the 
capacity of the authorities to support their budget and obtain external assistance, also 
pensioners  should  be  included  in  the  calculation.  Adding  pensioners  to  the  picture, 
makes it even more clear that in post-Soviet de facto states a very substantial share of 
people with a registered monetary income, receive it from the state: 88 per cent (for a 
total of 74 774 individuals) in the case of Abkhazia, 76 per cent (59 803) in the case of 
Nagorno Karabakh and 72 per cent (205 400 individuals) in the case of Transnistria (see 
Illustration 5.20 and Illustration 5.21) according to official statistics. This is a level that 
is significantly higher than the average in the Russian Federation (57 per cent): among 
Russian regions, only the republics of Ingushetia, Chechnya and Tuva have more than 
70 per cent of people receiving their incomes from the state (see  Illustration 5.22). It 
should also be highlighted that pensioners in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
mostly receive pension payments that are on average significantly higher than those 
received by residents of the parent states,  Moldova and  Georgia (see  Illustration 5.6), 
and that they benefit of an earlier retirement age: 55 in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia (but 63 in Moldova, and 60 for women and 65 for men in Georgia).
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5.8. Issues of data availability and reliability  
These data, of course, tell only part  of the picture and may be partially misleading: 
while the total number of pensioners and state employees is most probably accurate, not 
all private economic actors are registered, in particular outside of the main towns or in 
cross-border areas. Also, such figures do not account in any way of remittances, which 
represent a significant part  of monetary incomes for many households in the region 
under  analysis.  However,  considering  the  absolute  number  of  people  employed  in 
sectors for which reliable data exist  (state employees and pensioners), the relatively 
early pension age, as well as estimates of the total population of de facto states, it seems 
difficult to imagine that the number of private employees would be so much higher as to 
substantially change the overall picture. The informal economy is certainly significant, 
but assuming levels of people engaged in subsistence or informal economy comparable 
to  those found in  Russian  republics  in  the  Northern  Caucasus  –  for  example  – the 
characterisation  provided  would  remain  substantially  unchanged.33 Labour  data  on 
Transnistria and Nagorno Karabakh seem to be more complete, with a level of informal 
employment probably similar to that estimated in Moldova or Armenia.34
There are a few segments of the data that are evidently flawed. In Georgian-inhabited 
Gali,  according to official statistics, less than 6 per cent of residents are formally in 
employment, but clearly many more are working.35 In South Ossetia, the official figure 
on pensioners is impossibly low, and their number grows at an unrealistically quick 
rate.36 But the data about these territories are so much unlike those of most recognised 
states  that  even  artificially  skewing  the  figures  (e.g.  by  doubling  the  number  of 
33 According  to  estimates  produced  by  the  statistical  office  of  the  Russian  government 
(Russian statistical office 2015), employment in the informal sector is about 45 per cent of 
the registered workforce in the North Caucasus federal district (but as high as 63 per cent in  
Chechnya, 57 per cent in Daghestan and 51 per cent in Inguhsetia).
34 For  example,  estimates  on  the “Share  of  informal  employment  in  total  non-agricultural  
employment” for the period 2000-2007 put the figure at 21.5 per cent in Moldova (Jütting 
and Laiglesia 2009, 35). Other estimates referring to 2009 put it at 15.9 per cent in Moldova 
and at 19.8 per cent in Armenia (ILO Department of Statistics 2012, 4–5).
35 According to Oltramonti (Oltramonti 2016, 247), “around half of [Gali’s] residents’ income 
derived from cash transfers, whether IDP allowances or  Georgian pensions; the other half 
derived from activities such as small-scale cross-CFL trade or subsistence farming, with 
cash crops such as hazelnuts cultivated on the side and sold over the ceasefire line.” 
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pensioners in  South Ossetia, or by doubling the number of private-sector workers in 
Abkhazia) the overall picture would remain unchanged. 
On the other hand, figures related to pensions are due to be mostly accurate, since these 
are money that are actually dispensed to people and must be recorded in the budget of 
highly bureaucratised structures such as the Russian pension fund, pension funds of de 
facto states or local governments. Besides, starting with 2015, Russia has introduced a 
procedure that demands that Russian citizens residing abroad re-register once a year to 
demonstrate that they are still among the living in order to receive their pension. This 
process, aimed at preventing frauds to the Russian pension fund, not only contributes to 
the  fact  that  statistics  are  up  to  date,  but  also  serves  as  additional  evidence  to 
demonstrate that pension recipients actually do live in the de facto states, or at least 
have some meaningful connection to it. To the extent that they represent only a part of 
the picture (for example, they do not include military cooperation), also data on budget 
transfers between patron and de facto states are due to be mostly accurate, representing 
transfers of resources that actually take place. Finally, the data provided are in line with 
characterisations  of  the  local  economy  found  in  previous  research.  For  example, 
O’Loughlin, Kolossov, and Toal  (2014, 440) point out that “in the ruined subsistence 
economy of Abkhazia heavily reliant on external aid from Russia, incomes are strongly 
dependent on salaries in the state sector (public services including pensions, education, 
health care, and law enforcement).”
All things considered, even allowing for a degree of inaccuracy, it is safe to claim that in 
line with the MIRAB model, state employees and pensioners represent a larger share of 
people with a monetary income than usually found in the post-Soviet context (or in 
independent states elsewhere), but to an extent that is not uncommon in some dependent 
sub-state entities inside the Russian Federation or dependent territories elsewhere in the 
world. As a consequence, the capability to find resources for the state budget and the 
pension system is particularly important, and has direct consequences on the livelihood 
of a large share of the residents of post-Soviet de facto states.
5.9. Conclusions  
The data presented in this chapter show clearly that most of the resources needed to 
support the budget of post-Soviet de facto states come in the form of current account 
36 This is most probably due to a legacy of previous arrangements, when local residents used 
to register in North Ossetia’s office of the Russian pension fund.
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transfers  from the  patron.  In  the  case  of  Transnistria,  Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia, 
Russia additionally funds a significant part of the pension system. It also appears that 
state-employees  and  pensioners  make  up  for  about  two  thirds  or  more  of  the  total 
number of residents with registered monetary incomes. Based on the above observations 
and on the data presented through the chapter, it is possible to draw some conclusions. 
First, financial resources coming from the patron are the main determinant of budget 
expenditures, and thus of the actual capability of de facto authorities to maintain the 
current  level  of  state  capacity,  or  possibly  enhance  it,  in  the  medium to long term. 
External support is thus fundamental in determining availability of, and access to, public 
goods and services.
Second, in post-Soviet de facto states the share of people whose income depends on the 
state (state employees and pensioners) is significantly higher than in recognised states in 
the region and in most other countries elsewhere in the world. Authorities may not be 
widely  recognised  internationally,  but  at  least  in  this  respect  they  are  directly 
responsible for the livelihood of a larger share of local residents than is the case for the 
government in the respective parent  or patron state.  With the exception of  Nagorno 
Karabakh, the pension systems of post-Soviet de facto states are also more generous 
than those of their respective parent states, with an earlier retirement age and higher 
average  pension  payments.  Even  not  accounting  for  remittances,  direct  monetary 
transfers  from  outside  of  the  territory  are  substantially  more  determinant  to  the 
functioning of the state authorities and to the livelihood of its residents than in most 
internationally recognised states, both in the post-Soviet context and – on average – 
elsewhere. These data are only at first sight anomalous: once post-Soviet de facto states 
are  conceptualised  as  small  dependent  jurisdictions,  it  appears  that  they  share  such 
features with territories on both sides of the sovereignty divide, i.e. both internationally 
recognised states  in other  world regions and sub-state  entities closer  to  them (more 
specifically, in the Russian Federation) that depend on transfers from the federal centre. 
In other words, strong dependence on external assistance for financing the budget and a 
high  share  of  resident  whose  income depends  on  the  state  authorities  are  common 
features of small  dependent jurisdictions across the globe,  and in particular to those 
island economies that fit the MIRAB model. Accordingly, these are not an exclusive 
feature of unrecognised states.37
37 While this research has focused on the comparison with micro-states in the Pacific,  also 
dependent  jurisdictions  in  other  world  regions  share  such  features.  For  example,  until 
121
Third, such consistent financial support from an external patron, while increasing the 
capacity  of  local  authorities  and  having  a  positive  impact  on  the  welfare  of  the 
population, also makes these territories less and less self-sustainable. As expectations on 
service  delivery  and  direct  incomes  for  state  employees  and  pensioners  grow 
significantly faster than the capacity of local authorities to finance independently such 
outputs, their dependence on the patron’s support becomes stronger. Similarly to what 
happens in MIRAB economies, the development of profitable private enterprises that 
are not dependent on aid is difficult to achieve in post-Soviet de facto states, not only 
because of their insularity or post-conflict dynamics, but also because aid (and possibly 
remittances)  “crowd  out”  options  for  export-led  growth,  including  by  artificially 
increasing wages.38 Even if the MIRAB model is considered to be more durable and 
persistent than widely expected, and export-led growth unlikely in this context, there are 
however  ways  out  of  it  that  do  not  imply  a  fall  back  to  subsistence  economy and 
massive migration, tourism being perhaps the most important  (Treadgold 1999). But 
recently Greenland received more than half of its budget from Denmark (still about 36 per  
cent,  as  of  2015),  and  about  40  per  cent  of  its  workforce  is  employed  in  “public  
administration and service” (StatBank Greenland 2015).
38 One of the dynamics found in MIRAB economies by Bertram (1999, 111) is that “the size 
and persistence of financial flows into island economies from overseas, and labor migration 
out, have the effect of making capitalist private-sector activity unprofitable because of the 
resulting combination of strong exchange rates and high wages.” Indeed, a strong exchange 
rate and relatively high wages are among the problems that,  for  example,  Transnistria’s 
enterprises have to face, and are important obstacles to the export-led growth that is often  
presented as ideal for the territory. Bertram  (1986, 809) also argued that “capitalism as a 
system of production has no major role in these economies except where it is introduced as a 
deliberate  act  of  social  engineering  by policymakers,  with subsidies  provided  to  ensure 
profitability”. Again, it  is  clear that some of  Transnistria’s enterprises remain in activity 
thanks to subsidised gas prices, but also in South Ossetia there are example of companies set 
up through Russian grants which do not seem to make market sense outside of a subsidised 
environment (Gukemukhov 2017). For a critique of the hypothesis that aid and remittances 
“crowd out” export growth in MIRAB economies, see Fraenkel  (2006). An IMF working 
paper based on a large-scale quantitative analysis highlights that aid leads to over-valuation 
of the local currency, and largely as a consequence “aid inflows do have systematic adverse 
effects on growth, wages, and employment in labor intensive and export sectors” (Rajan and 
Subramanian  2005,  22);  indeed,  this  dynamic  could  well  apply  in  particular  to  the 
Transnistrian case.
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ultimately,  as  Pacific  islands  can  testify,  being  a  MIRAB  economy  has  many 
advantages,  and  for  large  segments  of  the  resident  population  and  its  ruling  class 
reaping its benefits may be preferable to struggling to escape it.
In Chapter 4, it was argued that employing analytical tools developed by scholars of 
island jurisdictions contributes to a better understanding of key features of the economy 
of  territories  which,  largely  due  to  conflict  and  lack  of  recognition,  have  become 
“insular” and strongly dependent on a patron. In this chapter, some observations on the 
nature  of  MIRAB  economies  have  been  tested  on  post-Soviet  de  facto  states,  in 
particular in reference to the key role of external aid and to the large share of people 
whose income directly depends on the state in these territories. At least in these respects, 
a number of characterizations drawn from the literature on MIRAB economies clearly 
applies also to post-Soviet de facto states. 
Conflict and lack of international recognition have been determinant in making these 
territories dependent, and in increasing their isolation. Since there is no indication that 
widespread international recognition, reintegration or some other form of agreement on 
their  status  is  forthcoming,  such features  should  be  analytically  considered  inherent 
characteristics of these territories. Further studies would be needed to test other features 
of the MIRAB model, and consider their analytical potential in reference to debates on 
the  sustainability  and development  patterns  available  to  post-Soviet  de  facto  states. 
Additional research on the first half of the MIRAB model (migration and remittances) 
focused on de facto states would also offer valuable contributions to understanding how 
cross-border dynamics fundamentally determine the economic structure of a territory 
and the livelihood of its residents. 
The next chapter, however, focuses on non-financial sources of external support that 
allow  residents  of  post-Soviet  de  facto  states  to  have  access  to  public  goods  and 
services. As will be seen, while only the patron effectively contributes directly to the 
budget of de facto states, a variety of actors – including international organizations, the 
parent  state,  and  diaspora  organizations  –  provide  support  in  different  forms  either 
directly to citizens or to structures under the control of the de facto authorities, such as 
institutions in the health and education sector.
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5.10. Illustrations and tables  
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Illustration 5.1: Yearly budget expenditures in post-Soviet de facto states (2001-2015, in  
million USD)
Details on  Illustration 5.1  
Data on budget incomes and expenditures are traditionally included in the statistical 
yearbooks published by authorities in de facto governments. In the case of Transnistria 
and Nagorno Karabakh, a backlog of publications is available directly on the website of 
the relevant statistical office.39 In the case of Abkhazia, only recent statistical yearbooks 
are available on the official website,40 while some issues of previous years are available 
in a scanned version on other reputable websites.41 In the case of  South Ossetia, the 
official website of the statistical department does not make public its yearbook (that is 
anyway regularly issued and presented in Tskhinvali), and official government websites 
do not publish information on the budget. Relevant data for recent years are however 
pedantically  mentioned  in  official  reports  following,  for  example,  parliamentary 
discussions on the budget: figures taken from multiple media reports have been collated 
to create this graph.42 During their fieldwork in South Ossetia before 2008, Kolstø and 
39 In the case of Transnistria, as of January 2016, all issues of the statistical yearbook released 
between  2013  and  2015  used  to  be  available  at  the  following  link 
http://mepmr.org/pechatnye-izdaniya/statisticheskij-ezhegodnik-pmr; as of June 2017, only 
the  yearbooks  for  2015  and  2016  are  available  at  the  following  link: 
http://mer.gospmr.org/pechatnye-izdaniya.html.  For  Nagorno  Karabakh,  see  http://stat-
nkr.am/en/2010-11-24-11-18-12. Where not otherwise stated, all links have been retrieved in 
June 2017.
40 As of June 2017,  only the statistical  yearbooks for 2013 and 2014 are available on the  
official  website  of  the  Department  for  state  statistics  of  the  republic  of  Abkhazia, 
http://ugsra.org/ofitsialnaya-statistika.php
41 Abkhazia’s statistical  yearbook for 2014 is  available on the website of  Abkhazia’s state 
university  (http://lib.agu.site/books/144/278/);  the  2005  issue  is  available  on  Apsnyteka 
(http://apsnyteka.org/2382-abkhaziya_v_tsifrakh_2005.html),  an  established  repository  of 
books and publications on Abkhazia. 
42 http://ugo-osetia.ru/index.php/2011-06-30-23-44-4/official/item/3176-ob-ispolnenii-
gosudarstvennogo-byudzheta-respubliki-yuzhnaya-osetiya-za-2013-god;  http://ugo-
osetia.ru/index.php/2011-06-30-23-44-4/documents/item/4002-o-gosudarstvennom-
byudzhete-respubliki-yuzhnaya-osetiya-na-2015-god;  http://south-
ossetia.info/postanovlenie-parlamenta-respubliki-yuzhnaya-osetiya-o-zakone-respubliki-
yuzhnaya-osetiya-o-gosudarstvennom-byudzhete-respubliki-yuzhnaya-osetiya-na-2016-
god/;  http://ugo-osetia.ru/index.php/2011-06-30-23-44-4/documents/item/4990-ob-
ispolnenii-gosudarstvennogo-byudzheta-respubliki-yuzhnaya-osetiya-za-2014-god; 
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Blakkisrud (2008, 497) were told that “detailed information about the budget is […] for 
official use only.”
Data,  however,  are  originally  published in  the local  currency (Transnistrian Rouble, 
Russian Rouble, and  Armenian Dram). In the case of  Transnistria, TRUB/USD daily 
exchange  rates  starting  with  2005  have  been  exported  from  the  website  of  the 
Transnistrian  national  bank,  and  the  correspondent  yearly  average  has  thus  been 
calculated.43 Average exchange rates for previous years have been calculated from items 
included in relevant yearbooks that presented data both in TRUB and USD. In the case 
of the  Russian Rouble and the  Armenian Dram, daily exchange rates are available on 
the website of the respective national bank, and yearly averages have been calculated 
accordingly.44 
The data presented in this graph point at trends, and outline the order of magnitude of 
central budgets of post-Soviet de facto states. Different accounting practices as well as 
the whether different sources of external assistance enter the central budget complicate 
direct comparison among cases.
43 Daily  exchange  rates  are  published  by  Transnistria’s  Republican  Bank 
http://www.cbpmr.net/kurs_val.php?lang=ru .
44 For  the  Russian  Rouble,  see  http://www.cbr.ru/eng/currency_base/dynamics.aspx?
VAL_NM_RQ=R01235&date_req1=01.01.1995&date_req2=31.12.2016&rt=1&mode=1; 
for  the  Armenian  Dram,  see:  http://api.cba.am/ExchangeRatesToCSV.ashx?
DateFrom=2000-01-01&DateTo=2016-12-31&ISOCodes=USD,GBP,RUB,EUR. 
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Details on  Illustration 5.2   and Illustration 5.3  
Official sources in Tiraspol or Chișinău do not publish regularly exact data on the total 
amount  of  Transnistria's  gas  debt.  Relevant  data,  however,  have  been mentioned in 
media  reports  since  the  mid  2000s.  Also,  at  least  in  one  occasion,  the  Moldovan 
government did publish exact figures on the total amount of debt due to Gazprom by 
authorities  in  Transnistria.45 Starting  with  2015,  economy  website  Infomarket.Md 
45 http://www.mec.gov.md/ro/content/ministerul-economiei-raspuns-la-adresarea-4000-de-
cetateni-legatura-cu-datoriile.
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Illustration 5.2: Total amount of Transnistria's gas debt (2006-2015)
Illustration 5.3: Transnistria's debt growth year on year (2007-2015)
reports details on the total debt due by Moldova (including both Transnistria and right-
bank Moldova) to Gazprom, based on the data published by Gazprom itself in line with 
Russian legislation.46 Even if these data do not separate Transnistria’s debt from that of 
right-bank Moldova, they still allow to provide meaningful estimates of the debt due by 
Transnistria, since officials in Chișinău occasionally provide information related to the 
division of the debt, with Transnistria’s debt usually in the 85-90% range of the total. In 
a  July  2016  interview,  Moldova's  ambassador  to  Moscow  mentioned  the  figure  of 
88%;47 Moldova’s  prime  minister,  after  a  meeting  with  Gazprom representatives  in 
Moscow in  March 2017,  said  that  88.6% of  the  total  debt  pertains  to  Transnistria; 
accepting this may not be perfectly accurate at all times, 88% is the coefficient applied 
in calculations whenever only data for the total debt are available.
Small inconsistencies in the data can easily be explained by the constant need to convert 
figures  based  on  exchange  rates  (Gazprom  publishes  data  in  Russian  Roubles, 
Moldovan sources often use Moldovan Lei, or USD). 
The graphs and the summary table reported below includes only data that allow for a 
coherent  pattern  of  debt  growth  that  is  in  line  with  the  most  trustworthy  sources; 
excluded data points were either approximate figures (e.g. "a debt of 3 billion USD"), or 
showed small  differences with other data due to exchange rates.  In no occasion did 
reliable sources such as those included present incompatible data.
46 The official website of MoldovaGaz routinely quotes data as published by Informarket.md. 
Relevant  data  for  recent  years  could  also  be  found  directly  in  relevant  documentation 
published  by  Gazprom;  see  for  example  http://www.gazprom.ru/f/posts/
36/607118/gazprom-ifrs-2q2016-ru.pdf, page 39.
47 https://sputniknews.com/europe/20160705/1042449911/moldova-russia-gazprom-dept.html. 
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Date USDmln Source Link
2006-01-01 1 163.4 NovostiPMR http://old.vspmr.org/News/?ID=469
2006-06-30 1 193 NovostiPMR http://old.vspmr.org/News/?ID=469
2009-04-03 1 500 NovostiPMR http://old.vspmr.org/News/?ID=2853
2009-10-27 1 800 VSPMR http://old.vspmr.org/News/?ID=3485
2011-03-30 2 500 OSW http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/anal
yses/2011-03-30/dividing-moldovagaz-and-
moldovas-gas-debts
2012-09-12 3 000 NovostiPMR http://novostipmr.com/ru/news/12-09-
12/moskva-podtalkivaet-pridnestrove-v-
edinuyu-moldaviyu
2013-03-01 3 600 Regnum http://regnum.ru/news/polit/1644426.html
2013-04-10 3 800 Regnum http://regnum.ru/news/polit/1647200.html
2014-04-07 4 000 Regnum http://regnum.ru/news/polit/1647200.html
2014-12-31 4 272.4 InfomarketMd http://www.moldovagaz.md/userfiles/imag
es/presa-2015/presa_01-09-
2015_InfoMarket_ro.png
2015-06-30 4 538.16 InfomarketMd http://www.moldovagaz.md/userfiles/imag
es/presa-2015/presa_01-09-
2015_InfoMarket_ro.png
2015-12-31 4 599.58 InfomarketMd http://www.moldovagaz.md/press/ro/2016
/september/article771
Table 5.1: Amount of Transnistria's debt to Gazprom
Year USDmln
2007 111.17
2008 111.47
2009 415.99
2010 492.29
2011 379.44
2012 628.84
2013 558.17
2014 325.99
2015 327.18
Table 5.2: Growth of Transnistria's gas debt during a given year in million USD.
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Data on Moldova effectively refer to Transnistria residents. Source: Russian pension 
fund (Pension Fund of the Russian Federation 2016)
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Illustration 5.4: Destination of Transnistria's exports, as share of total exports (2002-
2015)
Illustration 5.5: Number of recipients of Russian pensions residing outside of Russia.
Details on  Illustration 5.6  
Given the difficulty in finding data related to the same point in time for all cases, the 
significant  fluctuation of  exchange rates  of  local  currencies  with  the  US dollar,  the 
sometimes abrupt changes in the level of pension payments, as well as the different cost 
of life across cases, the comparison is unlikely to reflect perfectly the situation on the 
ground. However, these data still provide a meaningful term of reference. 
Data for  Azerbaijan,  Georgia,  Moldova and Ukraine have been retrieved from official 
sources. They have been converted to USD at the nominal rate for the relevant date, 
according to the exchange rate given by the respective national bank. Table 5.3 presents 
exact data, as well as a link to the source of the information. 
Country Date Curre
ncy
Amount Source
Azerbaijan 2016-01-01 AZN 176.03 http://abc.az/eng/news/93335.html
Azerbaijan 2016-01-01 USD 112.77 http://abc.az/eng/news/93335.html
Georgia 2016-07-01 GEL 180 http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?
id=29272
Georgia 2016-07-01 USD 77.59 https://www.nbg.gov.ge/index.php?
m=582&lng=eng
Moldova 2016-01-01 MDL 1 165.2 http://www.statistica.md/public/files
/serii_de_timp/protectia_sociala/9.2.xl
s
Moldova 2016-01-01 USD 59.27 http://www.bnm.org/en/content/offi
cial-exchange-rates
Ukraine 2016-10-01 UAH 1 745.54 http://www.pfu.gov.ua/pfu/doccatalo
g/document?id=267606
Ukraine 2016-10-01 USD 67.36 https://bank.gov.ua/NBUStatService/
v1/statdirectory/exchange?
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Illustration 5.6: Average pension in post-Soviet de facto states, their patron and parent 
state, and Ukraine.
valcode=USD&date=20161001
Armenia 2015 AMD 40 441 http://www.armstat.am/en/?
nid=126&id=19151
Armenia 2015 USD 55.33 http://api.cba.am/ExchangeRatesToCS
V.ashx?DateFrom=2000-01-
01&DateTo=2016-12-
31&ISOCodes=USD,GBP,RUB,EUR
Table 5.3: Average pensions in selected jurisdictions
Data for de facto states have been compiled from a number of sources, and the retrieval 
of data has been somewhat less straightforward, as figures found in different sources do 
not always correspond, and citizens receive their pension from more than one source.
In  the  case  of  Transnistria,  the  statistical  yearbook  includes  figures  on  the  average 
pension.  The data refer specifically to  Transnistrian pensions, even if a considerable 
amount of residents switched to  Russian pensions starting with 2015. No statistics are 
available for the average amount of the Russian pension to Transnistrian residents, but 
anecdotal evidence emerging from media reports suggests they are at comparable levels, 
so they are not reported separately on the graph.
In the case of Abkhazia, there are some residents who receive both a local and a Russian 
pension. Precise figures on the average level of  Abkhazian pension are included in a 
report by local scholars issued in 2016,48 according to which the average pension for the 
48 600  recipients  is  1 014  RUB (or  about  26  USD,  as  of  2014  exchange  rates).49 
Minimum pensions have been increased substantially in 2016 for those residents who 
do not  receive  other  pensions,  but  a  large part  of  the  increase has  been effectively 
nullified (in dollar terms) by the plunge of the  Russian Rouble in 2015. Until  more 
recent official data are made public, it is safe to keep the data for 2014 as a reference, 
estimating that even with the planned increase the average pension is due to be still less 
than 30 USD per month in 2016.50
48 http://ru.abkhaziastrategic.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/%D0%9C
%D0%B8%D1%80%D1%86%D1%85%D1%83%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B0-
%D0%98.%D0%92.-%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%8F.docx
49 Alternative  calculations  by  the  author  based  on  declared  yearly  expenditures  by  the 
Abkhazian pension fund for the same year give slightly higher figures, but this may due to  
other expenses being effectively included under the relevant section of the budget. 
50 Minimal pensions increased from 500 RUB (in 2014, and previous years) to 1 500 RUB in 
2016  (but  retroactively,  with  payouts  for  all  of  2015  scheduled  in  2016),  see 
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Data on the level of pensions paid to  Russian citizens in  Abkhazia are more readily 
available, partly due to the fact that pensions payment are among the issues formally 
discussed within the scope of Russia’s assistance to the territory. According to official 
Russian sources, as of 1 January 2015, there are 32 163 residents receiving a  Russia 
pension  averaging  6 262  RUB  (corresponding  to  about  102  USD  at  average  2015 
exchange rates), with increases scheduled in 2016 and 2017 for those receiving lower 
pensions.51 For example, in 2016 27 850 pensioners have received an average increase 
of 1 300 RUB (or about 19 USD), leading to an estimated average pension of 118.7 
USD per month.52 However, the vast majority of people with a Russian passport living 
in  Abkhazia have also Abkhazian citizenship; in absence of relevant agreements, they 
are thus entitled to both Russian and Abkhazian pensions. Given that the 2016 increase 
for  Abkhazian  pensions  did  not  relate  to  residents  who  already  received  another 
pension, the data shown in the graph corresponds to the average pension estimated for 
2016  (7 388 RUB),  plus  the  average  Abkhazian  pension  pre-increase  (1 014 RUB), 
resulting in about 123.8 USD.
In the case of  South Ossetia, relevant statistics are regularly made available through 
state-owned media. The graph shows the average figure given by the Head of  South 
Ossetia’s pension fund for 2015, i.e. 6 221 RUB, or about 100 USD per month  (Res 
news agency 2015).  No data  is  available  regarding the amount  given to  pensioners 
receiving the  Russian pensions (some of them officially registered in  South Ossetia, 
some  of  them  apparently  still  registered  in  North  Ossetia).  Unlike  in  Abkhazia, 
pensioners receive either the local or the Russian pension. Both in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, a relatively small number of local residents may also be receiving pension or 
social payments from Georgia.
In the case of Nagorno Karabakh, relevant statistics are regularly included in statistical 
yearbooks, and there is no indication that local residents receive foreign pensions.
http://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/27675316.html.  Even  assuming  that  the  average pension 
increased by 1 000 (and it is known that it must be less than that, since the increase did not 
involve all recipients), the average pension would still be under 30 USD per month. 
51 https://www.pnp.ru/social/2015/12/25/pensii-zhivushhikh-vabkhazii-rossiyan-stanut-
vyshe.html. 
52 http://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/27675316.html. 
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N.B.: These data include exclusively incomes to the budget; accordingly, other forms of 
support such as pension payments are not included.
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Illustration 5.7: Share of the budget from Russian aid versus domestic incomes in  
Abkhazia and South Ossetia (2012-2015).
Illustration 5.8: Total incomes to the budget of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, by source 
of income (in million USD, 2012-2015)
Details on  Illustration 5.7   and Illustration 5.8  
Neither  Abkhazia  or  South  Ossetia  publish  on  governmental  websites  or  statistical 
yearbooks structured data on the amount of aid they receive from  Russia. However, 
such figures have been mentioned in media reports or in press releases issued by state 
authorities,53 and correspond with those included in  Russia’s own budget.54 Exchange 
rates have been calculated from the the data published by the Russian central bank.
53 For  Abkhazia, see in particular:  http://abkhazinform.com/item/2640-gosbyudzhet-abkhazii-
1995-2015-gg;  http://sputnik-abkhazia.ru/Abkhazia/20160325/1017680770.html. For  South 
Ossetia,  see  in  particular:  http://ugo-osetia.ru/index.php/2011-06-30-23-44-
4/official/item/3176-ob-ispolnenii-gosudarstvennogo-byudzheta-respubliki-yuzhnaya-
osetiya-za-2013-god;  http://ugo-osetia.ru/index.php/2011-06-30-23-44-
4/documents/item/4002-o-gosudarstvennom-byudzhete-respubliki-yuzhnaya-osetiya-na-
2015-god;  http://south-ossetia.info/postanovlenie-parlamenta-respubliki-yuzhnaya-osetiya-
o-zakone-respubliki-yuzhnaya-osetiya-o-gosudarstvennom-byudzhete-respubliki-yuzhnaya-
osetiya-na-2016-god/;  http://ugo-osetia.ru/index.php/2011-06-30-23-44-
4/documents/item/4990-ob-ispolnenii-gosudarstvennogo-byudzheta-respubliki-yuzhnaya-
osetiya-za-2014-god;  http://south-ossetia.info/zakon-respubliki-yuzhnaya-osetiya-ob-
ispolnenii-gosudarstvennogo-byudzheta-respubliki-yuzhnaya-osetiya-za-2015-god/. 
54 Russian budget: http://www.roskazna.ru/ispolnenie-byudzhetov/federalnyj-byudzhet/. 
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Details on  Illustration 5.9   and Illustration 5.10  
Nagorno Karabakh regularly includes details on the amount of the ‘inter-state loan’ in 
its statistical yearbooks.
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Illustration 5.10: Share of Nagorno Karabakh’s budget from domestic incomes and aid 
(2009-2015)
Illustration 5.9: Total incomes to the budget of Nagorno Karabakh by source of income 
(2009-2015)
Details on  Illustration 5.11  
Data  on  external  financial  support  to  the  budget  of  selected  micro-states  are  not 
available in a unified database. Sources for all the data are presented in Table 5.4 below; 
they  include  government  budgets,  reports  issued  by  the  patron  and  IMF  reports. 
External support that does not go through the budget of local authorities has not been 
included in the calculations.
Country Year Aid Source
Cook 
Islands
2015 33.54%
http://www.mfem.gov.ck/images/MFEM_Documents/T
reasury_Docs/Budget_Documents/2016-17_Cook-
Islands_Budget-Book-1_Appropriation-Bill-and-
Commentary.pdf - page 73
Kiribati 2014 5.54%
http://www.mfed.gov.ki/sites/default/files/2016%20K
iribati%20National%20Budget_1.pdf - table 4, page 4
Marshall 
Islands
2012 62.45%
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14
26.pdf) - Table 2, p. 20
Micronesia 2013 60.37%
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15
128.pdf) - p. 5
Niue 2013 36.15%
https://pefa.org/sites/default/files/assements/comme
nts/NU-Aug11-PFMPR-Public.pdf
Palau 2015 37.04% http://palaugov.pw/rop-statistical-yearbooks/
Tokelau 2010 85.00%
https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/papers-
presented/current-
papers/document/49DBHOH_PAP22297_1/administrat
or-of-tokelau-report-of-the-administrator-of
Tuvalu 2014 29.43%
http://www.tuvaluaudit.tv/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/2016-Tuvalu-National-
Budget.pdf
Table 5.4: Share of incomes determined by external financial support in selected micro-
states (MIRAB economies)
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Illustration 5.11: Aid as share of budget expenditures in micro-states and post-Soviet de  
facto states
Details on  Illustration 5.12  
The Russian ministry of finance published data that include the share of the budget that 
comes  from  the  federal  government.55 To  be  more  precise,  in  line  with  Russian 
legislation (Art. 41 – 4, Budget code of the Russian Federation)56, this figure includes 
subsidies from the federal budget (or directly from budgets of other regions), as well as 
incomes from international organization or foreign countries. The approach used by the 
Russian government to calculate these figures confirms that from the point of view of 
federated entities all of these sources are considered “external”. 
55 “Svodnaya  tablitsa  ispolneniya  byudzhetov  sub’ektov  RF  na  01.01.2015”, 
http://info.minfin.ru/subj_analitics.php. 
56 http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_19702/c5a5b77bd2e9718ef6faf32c062
d3faeff632d8f/.
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Illustration 5.12: Share of subsidies to the budget in subjects of the Russian Federation 
and post-Soviet de facto states
Details on  Illustration 5.13  
For the sake of simplicity, World Bank’s indicator “Net ODA received (% of central 
government expense)” has been used here, even if it includes financial support that does 
not go through the budget of the central government. 
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Illustration 5.14: Share of public workers in workforce. The graph includes the ten 
countries with highest share of public workers among those included in the ILOSTAT 
dataset (ILOSTAT 2016), the five countries with lowest share of public workers, as well 
as the average among all 91 countries included in the ILOSTAT dataset.
Illustration 5.13: Aid as share of budget expenditures in post-Soviet countries
Details on  Illustration 5.14  
Data on the share of public workers from all of the world have been extracted from the 
ILOSTAT  database  (ILOSTAT  2016) maintained  by  the  International  Labour 
Organization. The relevant table is “Share of employment in the public sector by sex 
(%)”. 
Public sector workers are defined by ILO as follows: “Public sector employment covers 
employment  in  the  government  sector  plus  employment  in  publicly-owned  resident 
enterprises and companies, operating at central, state (or regional) and local levels of 
government. It covers all persons employed directly by those institutions, regardless of 
the particular type of employment contract.”
Exact definition used by statistical offices in de facto states are not currently available, 
but for the purpose of this comparison it is assumed that the definition coincides with 
the one used by ILO. The ILO dataset includes data from 91 countries and territories, 
with most recent data mostly from 2012, 2013 or 2014. For the purpose of comparison, 
latest data available are used for each country. No other large-scale datasets with similar 
data  have been found (also World Bank,  for  example,  refers  to  the ILO dataset  for 
public sector employment).
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Details on  Illustration 5.15  
This  graph  is  based  on  a  subset  of  the  Ilostat  dataset  (ILOSTAT  2016) used  for 
Illustration 5.14, including only former-Soviet countries. Data for Russia are taken from 
OECD dataset (OECD 2013). 
Illustration 5.16: Share of state employee in workforce (2014). Five regions with 
highest and lowest share of state employees in federal entities of the Russian 
Federation, Russian average, and post-Soviet de facto states. 
Details on  Illustration 5.16  
Source: Russia’s statistical office, “Raspredelenie srednegodovoi chislennosti zanyatykh  
v e’konomike po formam sobstvennosti – Okonchanie 2014” 
http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b15_14p/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/03-08-2.doc
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Illustration 5.15: Share of public workers in workforce (post-Soviet subset). The graph 
includes all post-Soviet countries for which relevant data are available in the ILOSTAT 
dataset (ILOSTAT 2016), plus Russia (OECD 2013). 
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Illustration 5.18: Share of civil servants in workforce in post-Soviet de facto states and 
Russian regions with highest and lowest share of bureaucrats in workforce.
Illustration 5.17: Share of civil servants in workforce in post-Soviet de facto states
Details on  Illustration 5.17   and Illustration 5.18  
Data for  Russian regions, referring specifically to personnel working in state or local 
authorities, have been published by the Russian statistical office.57
Disaggregated data outlining only those working in administration are available for both 
Transnistria58 and  Abkhazia59 through  their  statistical  yearbooks.  Data  from  South 
Ossetia including disaggregated data for the number of people employed in the state 
apparatus  have  been  published  by a  Russian  news  agency,  quoting  South  Ossetia’s 
office for statistics.60 The expression used in the report presenting the statistics from 
South Ossetia (“gossluzhshashchie”) usually does not comprehend people working in 
the army or police. Given that relevant data for people employed in security and defence 
are not reported separately, this exceptionally high figure may also include them. But 
even if they were included, civil servants would still represent an unusually high share 
of the employed by both regional and world standards.
In  the  case  of  Nagorno  Karabakh,  unfortunately,  ‘administration  and  defence’ are 
merged in a single category. In the absence of more detailed information, it is assumed 
here that half of the total number given for “administration and defence” is actually 
employed in administration.
57 Regiony  Rossii.  Sotsial’no-e’konomicheskie  pokazateli  –  2015  g.  - 
http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b15_14p/Main.htm -  “Kadry  gosudarstvennykh  organov  i 
organov  mestnogo  samoupravelniya;  3.27  Chislennost’  rabotnikov  gosudarstvennykh 
organov i organov mestnogo samoupravleniya (chelovek)”
58 Transnistria's  statistical  yearbook  2016,  table  3.3,  "3.3.  Chislennost’  zanyatykh  v 
e’konomike po otraslyam (na konets goda)". Figures do not include army and customs ("Bez 
silovykh struktur ii tamozhennykh organov,")
59 Department  for  state  statistics  of  the  republic  of  Abkhazia,  “Chislennost’  zanyatogo 
naseleniya  v  otraslyakh  e’konomiki  -  2015”,  http://ugsra.org/ofitsialnaya-statistika.php?
ELEMENT_ID=163. 
60 "Kto kem rabotaet v Yuzhnoi Osetii?”, Sputnik South Ossetia, 26 April 2016, http://sputnik-
ossetia.ru/infographics/20160425/1782970.html. 
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Details on  Illustration 5.19  
For data on de facto states, see details on Illustration 5.18. For micro-states, data have 
been  taken  from  official  sources  related  to  the  respective  territories.  Updated 
information was not available in all cases, and the relevant category had different names 
(in  the  case  of  Kiribati,  “Public  administration”61;  for  Tuvalu  “Government 
administration”62;  for  Palau the  figures  for  "Government  agencies",  "National 
government" and "State governments" have been merged63),  but overall  they present 
broadly comparable data.
61 Kiribati National  statistics  office,  “Cash  Employment  by  Age  Group,  Sex  and Industry 
2010”,  http://www.mfed.gov.ki/statistics/economic-statistics/labour-force/employment-by-
industry. 
62 Tuvalu  Central  statistics  division,  “Businesses,  employees,  normal  and  voluntary 
contributions  for  the  National  Provident  Fund:  2006-2007”, 
http://tuvalu.prism.spc.int/index.php/economic/labour/labour-employee-records-from-
provident-fund-. 
63 Bureau  of  Budget  and  Planning  (Republic  of  Palau),  “2015  statistical  yearbook”, 
http://palaugov.pw/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/2015-Statistical-Yearbook-1.pdf. 
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Illustration 5.19: Share of civil servants in workforce in post-Soviet de facto states and 
selected MIRAB economies
N.B.:  Nagorno  Karabakh’s  statistical  office  included  a  large  number  of  “self-
employed”, while other de facto states do not have this  category; to make the data  
comparable, self-employed have been excluded also in the case of Nagorno Karabakh.
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Illustration 5.20: Number of people with registered cash incomes.
Illustration 5.21: Share of people with registered cash incomes
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Illustration 5.22: Share of people with registered cash income, by type of income.  
Russian regions and post-Soviet de facto states.
Chapter 6. 
Non-budget support to 
state and capacity 
building in post-Soviet 
de facto states
“Не учи меня жить, лучше помоги материально”1
Having presented direct budget transfers to post-Soviet de facto states in Chapter 5, the 
next sections focus on non-financial assistance that enables better access to public goods 
and services to residents of these territories. As will be seen, the patron remains the 
dominant  external  player  also  from  this  point  of  view,  even  as  international 
organisations, third countries, as well as the diaspora, play a significant role.
1 “Don’t teach me how to live, and instead support me with funds” - a quote originally from 
the film “Moscow does not believe in tears” (1980) - mentioned in reference to international  
support by Abkhazia’s deputy minister for labour, employment and welfare Olga Kogonia in 
an interview with the author, Sukhumi, May 2016.
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This  chapter  is  based  on  interviews  with  representatives  of  de  facto  authorities  in 
Transnistria  and  Abkhazia,  as  well  as  representatives  of  international  and  local 
organisations working in these territories.2 This chapter presents in some details how 
non-financial  external  support  to  post-Soviet  de  facto  states  takes  place  and  which 
actors are involved. First, it provides an account of how external assistance has evolved 
since the 1990s focusing on Abkhazia, which is the case where changes in interactions 
with  external  actors  have  been  more  evident.  It  then  presents  in  more  details  how 
non-budget  assistance  reaches  these  territories,  contributing  to  local  capacities  or 
directly providing services that would generally be considered to be competence of the 
state. A structured analysis of materials published by press agencies in post-Soviet de 
facto  states  serves  as  a  starting  point  for  the  descriptive  sections  on  Abkhazia, 
Transnistria and Nagorno Karabakh.
Given the focus of this research on state building and service provision, this chapter 
does not deal with initiatives aimed at conflict resolution, unless they explicitly included 
a  dimension  focused  on  improving  the  livelihood  or  access  to  services  of  people 
residing in these territories.3 The case of  South Ossetia is not discussed separately; in 
the  post-2008  context  external  interactions  favouring  capacity  building  and  service 
delivery  are  almost  exclusively  limited  to  assistance  coming  from  the  Russian 
Federation,  so  this  case  would  add  little  to  dynamics  found  in  Abkhazia  and 
Transnistria.4
The conclusions highlight some of the ways in which non-recognition impacts external 
support to post-Soviet de facto states. Firstly, largely due to circumstances created by 
non-recognition,  most  donors  focus  their  assistance  on  social  infrastructure  and the 
health sector. Secondly, conditionality that often accompanies external assistance in the 
2 A full list of formal interviews with government representatives from both de facto and de 
jure  government,  as  well  as  of  interviews  and  informal  conversations  with  officers  of 
international organisations and local NGOs is included in Appendix A.
3 For extensive analysis and review of conflict resolution efforts in the context of the South 
Caucasus,  see  in  particular  International  Alert  (2012).  In  reference  to  Abkhazia,  see  in 
particular Francis (2011).
4 A partial  exception relates to the work of the International  Red Cross,  which facilitates  
access for residents of  South Ossetia to free healthcare services in  Georgia sponsored by 
Tbilisi.  This  programme,  available  also  to  residents  of  Abkhazia  (even  if  without 
involvement of the ICRC), is discussed in some detail in the section dealing with Abkhazia.
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region  cannot  be  applied  in  the  case  of  post-Soviet  de  facto  states.  Finally,  it  is 
highlighted how framing international assistance as ‘confidence building’ may impact 
negatively on its effectiveness.
6.1. Taking local media as a starting point: the ‘training’   
subset
In line with the methodological approach outlined in Chapter 2 and more extensively in 
Appendix B, in order to reduce researcher bias and define the sectors to be analysed in 
more detail in the following sections, a dataset has been created with all news published 
on  Abkhazia’s and  Transnistria’s state news agencies and currently available on-line, 
including 25 618 items published on Abkhazia’s ApsnyPress between January 2006 and 
December 2016 and 39 244 items published on  Transnistria’s Novosti Pridnestrov’ya 
(previously, Ol’via Press) between August 1999 and December 2016.5 Unlike in other 
post-Soviet de facto states, in Nagorno Karabakh there is not a news agency owned by 
de facto authorities; the most suiting alternative on-line source of news publishing also 
in  Russian or English is the privately-owned Artsakhpress, which has been in activity 
only since January 2014, but has published 15 209 news items in the three following 
years.
In order to obtain a meaningful number of materials that could be read and coded by a 
single researcher, yet capture an important part of non-financial assistance to de facto 
states, a subset composed exclusively of news items including reference to ‘training’ or 
the  Russian  ‘povyshenie  kvalifikatsii’ (qualification  course/refresher  training/further 
training) has been created. Each of the items in the subsets (261 news items in the case 
of Abkhazia, 467 in the case of Transnistria, 21 in the case of Nagorno Karabakh), have 
then been read and coded by the author, categorising each mention of ‘training’ by actor 
involved (if it involved an external actor) and by sector of activity. Many of the items in 
the subset made reference to an external actor, and by far the sectors of engagement that 
appeared more frequently have been education and health (see Table 6.1 and Table 6.2). 
As a consequence, these two sectors are analysed in more details, and other types of 
external assistance are discussed more succinctly.
5 In the case of Novosti  Pridnestrov’ya, since in recent years the news agency has started 
covering world events unrelated to  Transnistria, only articles including reference to either 
Transnistria (PMR/Pridnestrov’e)  or  Tiraspol  have been included.  This reduced the total 
number of news items from 67 550 to 39 244.
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While acknowledging that a single term such as ‘training’ does not capture all forms of 
non-financial external assistance, it is due to present a meaningful sample of activities 
aimed at  capacity  building,  and contributes to prevent possible  forms of researcher’ 
bias. While this exercise serves a starting point for the descriptive sections, other media 
sources, publicly available data on international cooperation in de facto states, as well as 
interviews and meetings held by the author in 2016 in Abkhazia, Transnistria and their 
respective  parents  states  effectively  represent  the  core  of  materials  included  in  this 
chapter. 
6.2. Surviving the 1990s in  Abkhazia  
The 1990s have been tough years for most of the population throughout the post-Soviet 
space, but not uniformly so. Indeed, among post-Soviet de facto states, there has been a 
great  variation  in  living  conditions  and  level  of  international  involvement.  In 
Transnistria, the fighting in 1992 caused limited destruction, and economic activities 
were not completely disrupted. There was not a total breakdown of state capacity that 
demanded immediate action from relief organisations, and availability of public services 
remained  on a  par  with  that  found in  recognised  countries  of  the  region.  In  South 
Ossetia, lack of an actual border and ongoing large scale trade gave some life to the 
local  economy  and  allowed  a  degree  of  mobility  to  local  residents.  In  Nagorno 
Karabakh,  support  from  Yerevan  and  the  Armenian  diaspora  enabled  post-war 
reconstruction and large infrastructural programmes already in the 1990s.
The situation in Abkhazia was quite different. According to a 1998 UNDP/World Bank 
report (1998, 3), “Abkhazia suffered from the sharpest economic decline in the [Former 
Soviet Union]”, since “the regional economy [in  Abkhazia] totally collapsed.” Ethnic 
cleansing  left  Abkhazia  with  less  than  half  of  its  pre-war  population,  and  fighting 
caused  extensive  damages  to  the  local  infrastructure.  As  a  consequence,  the  self-
proclaimed government in Sukhumi lacked both human and economic resources needed 
to run public services to any meaningful extent. The circumstances, vividly described by 
Górecki (2013) in his memoirs of his visits to Abkhazia in the early 1990s, have been 
thus summarised by Lynch (2004, 44): 
The  United  Nations  and  international  non-governmental  organizations,  such  as 
Acciòn  Contra  la  Hambre,  the  International  Committee  of  the  Red Cross,  and 
Médicines sans Frontieres, have become the pillars of social security in Abkhazia. 
The Abkhaz ministry of health is little more than a façade for the support of the 
vulnerable and ill provided by these international humanitarian organizations. The 
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money brought into  Abkhazia by international humanitarian organizations is far 
larger than the declared budget of the separatist state.
The situation was particularly difficult in the the period 1994-1999, when the Russian 
Federation  imposed an  economic  blockade on  Abkhazia,  further  contributing  to  the 
impoverishment of the region.6 In those years, the Russian government did not support 
the de facto authorities, and the local population relied on help from international relief 
organisations  for  basic  services  and  for  its  very  survival.  A report  by  one  of  the 
organisations involved stressed “the disastrous consequences  of the embargo for the 
indigenous population” and highlighted that “the survival of one in ten people living in 
Abkhazia  depends  on  the  help  of  relief  organisations”  (Binet  2002).  Besides  big 
international  governmental  and  non-governmental  organizations,  support  came  also 
from other initiatives, including the Hare Krishnas (Górecki 2013, 17; Brown 1997).7
Some agreements with  Russian regions, regional departments, or  Russian universities 
were  in  place  at  the  time  and  to  some  extent  contributed  to  capacity  building  in 
Abkhazia, or offered services to Abkhazian residents, even in the immediate aftermath 
of  the  war.  Agreements  and  treaties  between  Abkhazia  and  the  Republic  of 
Bashkortostan serve as a case in point. Already in the summer of 1993, Bashkortostan’s 
government issued a decision to offer free access to local higher education institutions 
to 75 students from Abkhazia (Government of Bashkortostan 1993);8 official decisions 
taken in 1996 and 2000 testify of substantial provisions of gas cylinders as humanitarian 
6 With the renewal of the war in Chechnya, a total blockade at the border on the Psou between 
Abkhazia and Krasnodar Krai was introduced by decree starting with 21 December 1994. 
On 7 July 1995, a new decision by the  Russian government opened the border to men of 
pensionable age (60 years), women independently of their age, and children until the age of 
16. These provisions were kept in place until 9 September 1999, when the new government 
headed by Vladimir Putin issued a decision, nullifying them (Volkhonskiy, Zakharov, and 
Silaev 2008).
7 For interesting details on the network of external support that  Abkhazian representatives 
tried to build before, during, and after the conflict of the early 1990s, including early forms  
of engagement with Russian regions, see in particular Studenikin (2002).
8 Daur Kove, who became  Abkhazia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2016, was apparently 
one of  the  beneficiaries,  since according to  his  official  bio  (Apsnypress  2016c) he is  a 
graduate  of  the  Bashkir  State  University,  served  as  a  point  of  contact  for  Abkhazia  in 
Bashkortostan for the period 1995-2000, and then as plenipotentiary representative for the 
period 2000-2009.
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assistance. In the summer of 1994, Bashkortostan signed with  Abkhazia a treaty “of 
friendship  and  cooperation”  (“Dogovor  o  Druzhbe  i  Sotrudnichestve  Mezhdu 
Respublikoi  Bahskortostan  i  Respublikoi  Abkhazii”  1994);9 in  the  following  years 
Bashkortostan  hosted  medical  students  from  Abkhazia  and  in  a  few  occasions 
dispatched humanitarian support and medical staff to Sukhumi.
Starting with  the early 2000s,  the welfare of  Abkhazia’s  residents  slowly  started to 
improve, largely in relation to increased interactions with the  Russian Federation: the 
border  on the Psou was opened,  small-scale trade was informally accepted,  Russian 
tourists started arriving, the process of acquiring Russian citizenship became easier, and 
Russian pensions began to be distributed to the increasing number of people who held a 
passport of the  Russian Federation. However, it  is only after  Russia’s recognition of 
both Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states in the wake of the war of August 
2008, that Russia exponentially increased its role in the region. Pre-existent links with 
Russian regions  and city  administrations  were  strengthened in some instances,10 but 
recognition opened the way for comprehensive support across all fields of government 
activities well beyond the sporadic assistance previously offered by some regions or city 
administrations  (see  next  section  for  more  details).  As  a  consequence  of  increased 
Russian engagement, the role of international organisations decreased significantly. The 
closure of the United Nations monitoring mission head-quartered in Sukhumi between 
1993 and 2009 (Unomig) has been a symbol of this change of direction. With a yearly 
budget of about 35 million USD and a total staff reaching 459 units (including more 
than 200 local staff),  Unomig has been a  highly visible symbol of the international 
commitment  to  the  region,  as  well  as  an  important  source  of  income for  the  local 
economy  (Unomig  2011).  Even  if  local  authorities  were  arguing  in  favour  of  a 
continued presence of the UN mission in  Abkhazia after  Russia’s recognition in 2008 
(Apsnypress 2008), the UN security council did not extend the mandate of the mission, 
ostensibly due to the fact that Russia took an inflexible approach on the naming of the 
mission (UN Monitoring Mission in Georgia was considered unacceptable).
9 Interestingly,  in  this  treaty  the  two  sides  recognise  “each  other’s  state  sovereignty”,  
highlighting how in the context of the early post-Soviet years being ‘sovereign’ was not  
understood as synonymous of being ‘independent’.
10 For example, Bashkortostan stipulated new agreements for offering training and courses of 
qualification to medical specialists from Abkhazia in 2016 (Sputnik Abkhazia 2016).
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The marginalisation of international organisations in post-recognition Abkhazia became 
more explicit a few years later under Ankvab’s presidency. As was initially announced 
in  an  official  meeting  in  late  2012  attended  by  representatives  of  all  international 
organisations  conducting  activities  in  Abkhazia  at  the  time  (UNDP,  Unicef,  Unhcr, 
Danish  and  Norwegian  Refugee  Councils,  World  Vision,  International  Red  Cross, 
Doctors without borders, Action Against Hunger, Première Urgence, and Halo Trust), 
non-Russian support was to be focused exclusively on the Gali  district  (Apsnypress 
2012).11 Some understood this new policy as a first step before forbidding completely 
the  work  of  international  organisations  in  Abkhazia,  similarly  to  what  happened in 
South Ossetia after 2008. The “new realities” - as  Russian officials called them – of 
Abkhazia being recognised by Moscow as independent, and openly sponsored by it, led 
organisations  focused  on  emergency  situations  such  as  Doctors  Without  Borders  to 
leave  the  territory  in  order  to  focus  on  other  priority  areas.  Overwhelmed  by  the 
humanitarian  crisis  following  the  conflict  in  the  middle  east,  Unhcr  reduced  its 
commitment to Abkhazia, and eventually re-addressed its activities from local residents 
in vulnerable situations to a group of refugees from Syria that arrived in  Abkhazia in 
2012-2013 (see below for more details).
Increased resources available from  Russia also led to a change of attitude by the de 
facto authorities: in 2003, then  Abkhazia’s minister of foreign affairs Sergei Shamba 
(2003) found it appropriate to thank sincerely international relief organizations, but a 
decade  later,  president  Ankvab  (2012) had  no  words  of  gratitude  for  international 
NGOs. Instead, he made clear that “assistance project cannot be tied to the issue of 
conflict resolution,” and that activities “must be aimed at supporting and developing the 
Abkhazian  society  itself.”  Without  a  doubt,  support  from  international  donors  is 
substantially smaller than that received from Russia, but it is not quite “a drop in the 
bucket” as some Abkhazian officials would suggest (International Crisis Group 2010a, 
12).  Indeed,  according to data provided to the author by deputy minister  of foreign 
affairs  Kan  Taniya,  the  total  budget  for  all  activities  conducted  by  international 
organisations in Abkhazia amounted to about 19 mln USD in 2014 and 2015, and was 
11 Even previously, however, the work of international organizations and NGOs has mostly 
focused on eastern  Abkhazia;  “this  was a  consequence of  the  double  bottleneck on aid 
programmes imposed from Tbilisi and Sukhumi, which in turn created a contrast between 
Gali  and the rest  of  Abkhazia,  where INGOs and international  institutions  were largely 
absent, or had to keep a low profile.” (Oltramonti 2016, 260)
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estimated  to  grow  to  21.5  mln  USD  in  2016,  and  to  22  mln  USD in  2017.12 For 
reference, as pointed out in Chapter 5, Russian budget assistance to Abkhazia in 2016 
amounted to approximately 80 mln USD. On top of that, in the same year the Russian 
pension fund is estimated to have distributed about 40 mln USD in total to Abkhazian 
residents.13
The following sections provide an overview of external assistance coming from the 
patron  as  well  as  other  international  actors  operating  in  Abkhazia  in  the  post-2008 
context, integrating inputs from structured content analysis of local media with insights 
gained during fieldwork.14
6.3. State and capacity building in  Abkhazia  
Among all news items published on Abkhazia’s state news agency ApsnyPress between 
January 2006 and December 2016 (25 618 items), 261 made reference to some form of 
training, and 169 of them made explicit contextual reference to an external actor, in 
most cases (107) either a direct emanation of the  Russian government or other actors 
based in Russia (see Table 6.1). There are however 51 references to training organised 
through  the  support  or  involvement  of  international  organisations  or  NGOs,  most 
noticeably  the  European  Union  (as  a  donor),  the  International  Red  Cross  (almost 
exclusively  in  relations  to  its  efforts  aimed  at  identifying  the  bodies  of  people 
disappeared during the 1992-1993 conflict), UNICEF, Save the Children (only before 
2008), UNDP, and World Vision.15
12 Interview with Kan Taniya, deputy minister of foreign affairs, Sukhumi, May 2016.
13 This estimate is based on the number of people receiving a Russian pension in Abkhazia in 
2016 – 32 553, according to official data (Pension Fund of the Russian Federation 2017) – 
multiplied by the average level of Russian pension in Abkhazia for the corresponding period 
– 7 072  Russian Roubles  (Redichkina 2015), or about 105 USD according to the average 
USD/RUB exchange rate – multiplied by 12 months. These figures are indicative, and do 
not include other forms of assistance coming from Russia, such as defence or scholarships 
for local students.
14 For a concise overview of international assistance to  Abkhazia and  South Ossetia in the 
aftermath of the conflict in August 2008, see also this diplomatic cable by US Ambassador 
Tefft released by Wikileaks (2009).
15 This list includes all international organisations mentioned in more than two items included 
in the subset.
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Among all sectors, education (50) and health (36) are by far the sectors that appear most 
frequently in the news in relation to trainings involving external actors, and accordingly 
they are discussed in more detail in the next few pages. Other sectors receiving external 
assistance are briefly discussed separately, highlighting in particular how support from 
international donors can be complementary to that received from the patron, and – even 
in the context of a strict non-recognition policy – still contribute to the goals of the de 
facto authorities.
Education
Various international organisations have contributed or interacted in some form with 
Abkhazia’s  education  system,  by  providing  training  programmes  or  sponsoring 
renovations  of  facilities;  among  them,  the  OSCE  High  Commissioner  on  National 
Minorities (already before 2008, and focused on the Gali district), UNDP (renovating 
village  schools),  Unicef  and World  Vision  (creating  youth  clubs  along schools,  and 
providing trainings for teachers on interactive education). As pointed out by Abkhazia’s 
deputy minister of education Dmitri Gvaramia in an interview with the author, these are 
project-based activities that mostly take place on a small-scale or for short periods of 
time; he argued that such activities do bring positive results in particular in villages or 
difficult situations, but ultimately do not contribute to definitively resolve the problems 
Abkhazia has in the education system.16
Even if indeed most projects take place on a small scale, international organisations 
working in the region definitely have interesting success stories to share. For example, 
‘Conciliation Resources’ together  with two local  NGOs (Sukhumi Youth House and 
‘Avangard’) organises a series of trainings for teachers of English in schools of all of 
Abkhazia’s districts; six of them every year (since 2015) go to Wimbledon in the UK for 
two weeks for additional methodological and practical trainings (Gogorian 2017). Such 
programmes contribute to the qualification of teachers in the public school system of 
Abkhazia, and have other positive consequences (for example, one of the attendants of 
the 2016 course opened a private language school for learning English in Ochamchire). 
Yet, from the point of view of state building, and unlike Russian support, they do not 
provide comprehensive solutions for Abkhazia’s education system.
Russian financial assistance is contributing to renovating or building anew schools and 
kindergartens  across  the  republic.  As  of  the  school-year  2011-2012  there  were  26 
16 Interview with Dmitri Gvaramia, Abkhazia’s deputy minister of education, May 2016. 
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kindergartens in  Abkhazia, out of 300 that were active in the Soviet period.17 As of 
2016, that number grew to 40, with 15-20 more needed to completely satisfy current 
demand.18 The  process  of  building  and renovating  schools  across  all  of  Abkhazia’s 
districts  has  also  proceeded swiftly:  deputy  minister  Gvaramia  estimates  that  at  the 
current  level  of  support  from  Russia,  within 10 years  Abkhazia  will  have  basically 
solved its problems with educational infrastructures, and will have modern and fully-
refurbished kindergartens and schools in all of its districts.
Abkhazia has a long-standing problem with qualified teaching staff. This problem is 
being slowly addressed, including through qualification programmes but perhaps even 
more fundamentally by substantially increasing the salary of teachers, as agreed in the 
Russia-Abkhazia treaty on alliance and strategic partnership  (Kremlin.ru 2014).19 The 
government of the city of Moscow directly sponsors a number of small-scale assistance 
programmes  to  Abkhazian  education  institutions  through  its  offices  in  Sukhumi 
(Illustration 6.1).20
Dealing  with  university-level  and  post-graduate  education  remains  a  long-term 
challenge, and one that in a small society must be approached through mobility, and 
again  Russia is the main point of reference. Federal agency ‘Rossotrudnichestvo’21 in 
2016 offered  200 scholarships  allowing students  at  all  levels  to  study in a  Russian 
university.22 The programme is aimed at residents of  Abkhazia, both with and without 
17 Interview with Indira Vardania (at the time,  Abkhazia’s Minister  of  Education), October 
2011. 
18 Interview with Dmitri Gvaramia, Abkhazia’s deputy minister of education, May 2016. 
19 It is worth highlighting that many qualification programmes for teachers specifically focus 
on Russian language education, or to the teaching of Russian. 
20 Interview with representative of the ‘Moscow House’ in Sukhumi, May 2016.
21 Rossotrudnichestvo’s full name is “Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent 
States,  Compatriots  Living  Abroad  and  International  Humanitarian  Cooperation.”  As  of 
2016,  Rossotrudnichestvo distributes up to 15 000 such scholarships across a number of 
countries (it used to be 10 000 in previous years).
22 In 2015, there were 220 places reserved for Abkhazia (114 at BA level, 23 at MA level, 8 at 
PhD  level,  and  59  for  specialisations,  residencies  and  advanced  trainings),  and  236 
applications in total (Apsnypress 2015). The number of scholarships has however decreased 
to a total of 150 units for the year 2017-2018 (Rossotrudnichestvo 2017).
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Russian citizenship, and offers a defined number of scholarships for various sectors; 
quota are defined after consultations with representatives of  Abkhazia’s government, 
and take in consideration local needs (in particular, the fact that many specialisations or 
MA programmes  are  not  available  in  Abkhazia).23 Through  direct  agreements  with 
universities across  Russia, there are about 100 additional students each year starting 
their  studies  in  the  Russian  Federation.  Such  scholarships  cover  accommodation, 
include a stipend, and last for the whole course of study. Through diaspora networks, 
some  students  obtain  their  university  education  in  Turkey.24 Georgia is  also  fully 
subsidising BA studies in  Georgian universities for residents of  Abkhazia;  as of the 
2015-2016 academic year, 86 such students (mostly from Gali) have been accepted in 
Georgian universities  (Agenda.ge 2015). There is some competition, in particular for 
some of the most coveted specialisations, but overall about 400 places for new students 
each year for a population such as the one of contemporary Abkhazia certainly gives to 
most ambitious students willing to study abroad the possibility to continue with their 
study through a scholarship one way or the other. 
Compared  with  this  relative  abundance  of  fully  sponsored  opportunities,  short-term 
trainings  or  exchange  programmes  proposed  by  international  organisations  seem 
negligible or marginal to the Abkhazian side, which would expect the European Union 
or other international organisations to introduce schemes comparable to the ones offered 
by  Russia, perhaps with a different set of selection criteria, yet with some centralised 
selection process. The fact that no such offer is provided, in spite of explicit requests 
from the Abkhazian side, is understood to be politically motivated, and ultimately just 
another component of the overall isolationist policy of Western governments towards 
Abkhazia.25 There are indeed many obstacles for Abkhazian students willing to proceed 
their education in a university in an EU country: diplomas of local schools are unlikely 
to be recognised, and some embassies simply refuse to give valid visas to  Abkhazian 
residents even if  they apply with a  Russian passport.  However, the sheer amount of 
support that  Abkhazia receives from Russia, combined with extensive familiarity with 
(post-)Soviet  practices  for  financing  higher  education  may  also  lead  to  misplaced 
expectations, namely on how extraordinarily rare it is for most EU-based universities to 
23 Interview with  representative  of  Rossotrudnichestvo  in  Abkhazia,  Sukhumi,  May 2016; 
interview with Dmitri Gvaramia, Abkhazia’s deputy minister of education, May 2016. 
24 Interview with Dmitri Gvaramia, Abkhazia’s deputy minister of education, May 2016. 
25 Interview with Dmitri Gvaramia, Abkhazia’s deputy minister of education, May 2016. 
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provide scholarships (including fees, accommodation and a stipend) for the full course 
of BA studies to foreign students.
Health
Health is perhaps the single sector where all types of external actors have been involved 
in  capacity  building  efforts,  and  one  of  the  few  contexts  in  which  international 
organisations do not shy away from directly contributing to the capacities of the de facto 
government. Unicef, World Vision, as well as UNDP with EU-financed projects, among 
others, have conducted initiatives in coordination with  Abkhazia’s ministry of health, 
have contributed to the modernisation of medical infrastructure, and sponsored training 
programmes.  International  organisations  mostly  offer  small  scale  support,  such  as 
refurbishing maternity wards (UNDP, in Gali and Gagra),26 creating child rehabilitation 
centres in currently existing hospitals (World Vision,  in Tkvarchali,  Ochamchire and 
Gali), or providing methodological support and training for a rehabilitation centre for 
children with disabilities built by local authorities thanks to  Russian support.27 In an 
interview with the author, Abkhazia’s deputy minister of health Tamaz Tsakhnakia made 
the  point  that  while  any support  was  extremely  useful  in  the  early  post-war  years, 
assistance on such a small scale is now not any more crucial, and as  Abkhazia’s state 
capacity grows humanitarian organisations understandably move to were there is more 
urgent need.28 He argued that at this stage Unicef was effectively the only international 
organisation  offering  support  to  the  ministry  of  health  on  a  significant  scale  by 
providing  for  free  all  the  vaccines  needed  to  run  immunisation  programmes  in 
Abkhazia,  covering costs  that  would  otherwise  amount  to  an  estimated  200 million 
roubles (or about 3 million USD at average 2016 exchange rates) per year.29
26 According to local  media reports,  the new maternity ward in  Gagra cost  about  900 000 
USD, while the one in Gali about 400 000 USD (Apsnypress 2013). 
27 Even an EU programme mostly focused on confidence building such as the “Confidence  
Building Early Response Mechanism (COBERM)” have occasionally sponsored initiatives 
in the health sector, such as for example a 56 000 EUR project run by the title “Supporting 
Capacity  Building  for  Provision  of  Breast  and  Cervical  Cancer  Prevention  and  Early 
Detection Services in Abkhazia, Georgia” (Coberm 2011).
28 For example, ‘Doctors without borders’ used to run an anti-tuberculosis programme, but it  
was phased out in 2013 and is currently fully managed by local authorities. 
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Among external actors involved in sponsoring activities in the health sector it is also 
worth mentioning the ‘International Fund Apsny’, which is a local foundation registered 
in Sukhumi, but which receives a substantial part of its budget through donations by 
successful  members  of  Abkhazia’s  diaspora  in  Turkey,  with  part  of  their  business 
activities taking place in Abkhazia itself.30 The Apsny Fund supports a number of small 
initiatives in the social and health sector, including renovation works in health facilities, 
or sponsoring healthcare treatments abroad together with other local foundations.31
Russia’s assistance is taking place at a different scale and fundamentally contributes to 
capacity  building  and service  delivery  in  Abkhazia’s  health  sector.  In  line  with  the 
Abkhazia-Russia treaty, Russia paid for substantial increases of salaries of medical staff, 
which is fundamental in attracting new medical specialists that  Abkhazia traditionally 
lacked; rates varied among categories, but deputy health minister estimated that salaries 
doubled between 2015 and 2016. Russia’s government offers scholarships for students 
from Abkhazia studying in Russia’s medical faculties as part of its support programme 
for higher education (see above), and direct contacts with universities or health centres 
in  Russia  provide  additional  opportunities  for  trainings.32 From  its  own  budget, 
Abkhazia’s ministry of health sends its specialists for refresher trainings or advanced 
courses, and under certain conditions pays for the cures of its citizens in  Russia when 
such services are not available in  Abkhazia.33 From university education to advanced 
29 Interview with  Abkhazia’s deputy minister  for health Tamaz Tsakhnakia, Sukhumi, May 
2016.
30 Formally, donor companies of Apsny Fund are registered in  Abkhazia, but they are still 
mentioned here in the context of external relations as many of them originate in Abkhazia’s 
diaspora in Turkey (Apsny Fund 2016).
31 Interestingly, such efforts do not necessarily involve only healthcare specialists or facilities 
from either  Russia or Turkey (where the Fund has strong contacts); in 2017, for example, 
the Fund sponsored treatment in a clinic in  Armenia for a group of children with cerebral 
palsy (Intenational Fund Apsny 2017).
32 News items from Apsnypress refer to training and support programmes involving institutes 
in Moscow, Ufa, Nizhny Novgorod, Stavropol, as well as trainings taking place in Armenia. 
33 In  2015,  60  million  roubles,  or  about  1  million  USD,  has  been  spent  for  Abkhazians 
receiving  healthcare  in  Russia  (Apsnypress  2016b),  and  50  million  roubles,  or  about 
750 000 USD, were included in the budget for 2016. (Apsnypress 2016a). Statistics related 
to 2013 presented even higher figures: 735 individuals receiving healthcare in Russia for a 
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trainings,  from clinical  protocols  to  standard  settings  and  certifications,  Abkhazia’s 
health system is dependent on interactions with actors based in the Russian Federation. 
Since there is no medical faculty in Abkhazia, almost all medical staff at all levels are 
obtaining  their  qualification,  specialisation  and  first  working  experiences  in  Russia, 
inevitably leading to a long-term convergence of practices.
While not contributing to local capacity building, it is worth highlighting that Georgia 
also  provides  healthcare  support  to  Abkhazia  residents.  The  scheme  is  specifically 
targeted at residents who do not hold a  Georgian passport, and accordingly it mostly 
does not apply to ethnic Georgian residents in Gali, who often hold a Georgian passport 
for other reasons, including for collecting pensions and IDP benefits. This programme 
(sometimes referred to as ‘health diplomacy’) is perhaps one of the most successful 
confidence  building  initiatives  taken  by  Tbilisi,  not  least  because  there  has  been  a 
conscious  effort  to  leave  the  matter  mostly  out  of  political  debates,  even  if  not 
completely out of the news. Through this initiative, residents of  Abkhazia can go to 
Tbilisi carrying exclusively their Abkhazian passport issued by the de facto authorities, 
which is implicitly accepted as a valid identification document, and – unlike Georgian 
citizens – benefit of quality healthcare services completely free of costs.34 While conflict 
narratives may suggest that few would trust the enemy side with their lives, it appears 
that in recent years the number of those benefiting from the programme can be counted 
in hundreds. According to the  de jure minister of health and social affairs of Tbilisi-
based ‘government of the autonomous republic of Abkhazia’ the number of people from 
Abkhazia receiving such services has grown substantially from about 30 in 2012 and 
2013, to 450 individuals in 2014, 540 in 2015, and 1 409 in 2016  (Nasha  Abkhazia 
2017).35 Abkhazia’s MFA in Sukhumi confirmed they are aware of this phenomenon, 
total expenditure of 76 million roubles, or about 2.4 million USD, at 2013 average exchange 
rates (Apsnypress 2014). USD calculated on the basis of the average exchange rate for the 
relevant year. 
34 Only in the case of cures for hepatitis C, which is very expensive (about 120 000 USD) and 
currently  offered  in  Georgia through  US  sponsors,  Abkhazians  are  requested  to  obtain 
Georgian citizenship.
35 Interview with Ketevan Bakaradze,  minister  of  health  and social  affairs  of  Autonomous 
Republic  of  Abkhazia,  Tbilisi,  May  2016.  According  to  Georgia’s  deputy  minister  for 
health, the total number of people from both Abkhazia and South Ossetia who have received 
healthcare in Georgia is 624 in 2013, 941 in 2014, and 1 577 in 2015, for a total cost in 2015 
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and claimed that Abkhazians who benefit of the system inform them of their intention to 
leave Abkhazia; according to their figures, 141 did so in 2015.36
In order to further advance this programme,  Georgia built a brand new hospital just 
across the de facto border with Abkhazia, with costs nearing 18 million USD and due 
for completion in 2017 (Agenda.ge 2016). Apparently in order to contrast this initiative, 
in January 2017 Abkhazia finally reached an agreement that would allow its residents 
with Russian citizenship to receive free healthcare in Russia (Sharia 2017). Abkhazia’s 
health minister Andzor Goov claimed that this would make possible “to close tightly the 
border [with  Georgia] as we give the possibility to receive healthcare in any  Russian 
clinic”  (Sputnik  Abkhazia 2017). The new agreement may well reduce the number of 
residents deciding to go to Georgia, but it is unlikely to stop the flow completely; this 
agreement gives the right to Abkhazian residents to refer to Russian clinics on the same 
terms  as  local  residents,  including  for  what  concerns  the  long  waiting  times,  the 
inefficiencies  and  the  widespread  corruption  that  characterise  the  Russian  public 
healthcare system (Gordeev, Pavlova, and Groot 2014), rather than the corruption-free 
first class service that Abkhazians currently receive in Georgia.
Other sectors
Cooperation between Abkhazia and Russia practically involves all imaginable sectors of 
state activity.  The extensive list  of sectors of cooperation included in the treaty “on 
alliance and strategic partnership” (Kremlin.ru 2014) has been integrated and developed 
in a further series of bilateral treaties between ministries and departments. The variety 
of sectors involved partially emerges also from the subset of ApsnyPress articles on 
trainings used as a starting point for this section: they include references to capacity 
building initiatives coming from the Russian side aimed at journalists, librarians, sport 
trainers, fiscal officers, staff of emergency services, and various other categories. 
Close  and  extensive  cooperation  with  Russian  state  actors  has  been  confirmed  by 
interviews held by the author at the level of deputy minister at the ministry of foreign 
affairs,  ministry  of  health,  ministry  of  education,  and ministry  of  labour  and social 
of 4 477 000  Georgian Lari,  or about two million USD  (Accent.com.ge 2016). For more 
details  on how healthcare is  provided,  see in particular  this  talk show realised with the  
support of EU’s Coberm programme and realised by Studio Re (2013).
36 Interview with Kan Taniya,  Abkhazia’s deputy minister of foreign affairs, Sukhumi, May 
2016.
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development;  all  of  them made  reference  to  direct  contacts  with  colleagues  within 
relevant  Russian structures,  mentioned training programmes and highlighted friendly 
relations,  including  the  practice  of  consulting  their  counterparts  in  the  Russian 
Federation on specific issues in case of need. One of the interviewees made reference to 
previous experience working in relevant structures of the Russian Federation. Another, 
mentioned an MBA programme organised by  Russia and specifically targeted at top 
governmental  officials  aimed  at  enhancing  their  administration  skills.  Members  of 
Abkhazia’s  parliament  have  also been attending for  two and a  half  years  dedicated 
masters programmes titled “Parliamentary activity and inter-parliamentary cooperation” 
at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in 
Moscow (Abkhazia’s parliament 2016). 
The  ministry  of  foreign  affairs  is  among  state  institutions  that  benefits  of  a  strong 
relationship with its Russian counterpart at multiple levels. Firstly, this means education 
and  training  programmes:  Abkhazia’s  MFA  (2017b) is  in  charge  of  selecting  five 
students every year who will receive a full scholarship to proceed with their studies at 
the Russian MFA’s own Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO).37 
Besides, MFA staff members regularly attend trainings at the Diplomatic Academy of 
the  Russian  ministry  of  foreign  affairs.  Secondly,  this  means  an  open  channel  for 
consultation:  when  authorities  in  Sukhumi  encounter  issues  or  have  not  relevant 
experience in dealing with a given matter, or wish to hear more about best practices, 
they can refer to their  Russian counterparts for advice. In the case of the MFA, such 
consultations  may  involve  for  example  issues  of  diplomatic  protocol,  diplomatic 
etiquette, signing of treaties, as well as other technical issues that may arise due to the 
limited experience of the MFA in Sukhumi.38 Finally,  the MFA can count  on direct 
assistance from Russia’s MFA in both pragmatic and political issues, from facilitating 
the speedy issuance of urgent visas for the hundreds of participants that took part to the 
Conifa  football  championship  in  June  2016,  to  providing  assistance  in  conflict 
negotiations or in other international interactions.
37 It is worth highlighting that – even beyond the realm of international relations – MGIMO is 
the most exclusive university in Russia, and having a dedicated quota for Abkhazian citizens 
is to be understood as an important privilege. 
38 Interview with  Abkhazia’s deputy minister for foreign affairs Kan Taniya, Sukhumi, May 
2016.
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Strong  cooperation  with  Russia  can  be  found  across  all  of  Abkhazia’s  government 
institutions.  There  are,  however,  initiatives  that  the  Russian  government  seems 
unwilling  to  finance,  and  sometimes  international  organisations  fill  this  gap.  For 
example, Abkhazian officials have long insisted that Russian financial assistance should 
have a more explicit focus on fostering the local economy, which – it is hoped – will in 
time increase Abkhazia’s chances to be self-sufficient.  Russia has sponsored pensions, 
raises  in  the  salaries  of  public  employees,  as  well  as  building  schools,  healthcare 
facilities,  and  roads.  However,  it  has  not  provided  substantial  stimuli  for  the  local 
economy such as micro-credit initiatives, facilitated credit for local business (e.g., in the 
tourism sector), or direct support to local farmers for scaling up their production beyond 
subsistence.
On the contrary, even if mostly at small scales, international organisations do sponsor 
some of these activities. Livelihood projects, often (but not always) focused on Eastern 
Abkhazia,  have  offered  micro-credit  to  local  residents  (see  Illustration  6.2 and 
Illustration 6.3), or even direct monetary transfers for residents willing to start up or 
develop a business. Agriculture has been object of specific support, including through 
projects  sponsored  or  implemented  by  the  European  Union,  UNDP,  Action  Against 
Hunger, and others. Overall, some of these programmes involve resources that may be 
unimpressive by international development standards, but are still substantial in a small 
territory such as  Abkhazia: EU’s ENPARD (European Neighbourhood Programme for 
Agriculture  and  Rural  Development)  Georgia II  programme,  for  example,  has 
earmarked 4 million USD specifically for  Abkhazia  (European Union 2015, 18).39 In 
particular  in  the  Gali  district,  such  funding  has  effectively  been  complementary  to 
Russian assistance:  Russia paid for new roads, renovation of schools and other public 
infrastructures, but has not done anything to support the livelihood of residents or prop 
up  the  local  economy,  which  is  no  less  important  for  Abkhazia’s  long-term  state 
building project.
An even more straightforward example of how international organisations’ assistance 
can be complementary to Russia, and – as a side effect – contribute to the declared goals 
39 The objectives are defined as follows in the project description: “improve employment and 
living  conditions  in  rural  areas  of  Abkhazia  through  the  gradual  adoption  of  a  rural 
development approach based on the diversification of the rural economy” (European Union 
2015, 16).
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of the de facto leadership is the case of Syrian “repatriates” in  Abkhazia.40 Since the 
early 1990s, Abkhazia’s authorities have set up a ‘State Committee for Repatriation’ in 
order to support people of  Abkhazian origins (whose ancestors were mostly forced to 
abandon their homeland and resettle in Turkey and the Middle East in the second half of 
the 19th century) who are willing to “return” to Abkhazia. The initiative clearly aims at 
changing the ethnic balance in the territory by increasing the number of self-identified 
ethnic Abkhaz; due to its nature, the issue of “repatriates” is highly sensible in terms of 
conflict dynamics. 
Between May 2012 and July 2013, the Committee for Repatriation facilitated the arrival 
of close to 500 individuals of Abkhazian heritage from Syria by paying their transfer via 
charter flights from Beirut to Sochi and by offering accommodation and a stipend once 
arrived.41 In the first year of the programme, Abkhazia’s authorities spent about 1.5 mln 
USD specifically for taking care of this group  (Abkhazia’s MFA 2013). According to 
Abkhazia’s  constitutional  law  ‘On  repatriation’,  people  who  come  to  Abkhazia  as 
“repatriates” maintain a special status that entitles them to have access to housing and 
benefits for five years (President of Abkhazia 1998, art. 7), which makes the initiative 
economically burdensome for de facto authorities.
In June 2014, Unhcr through the Danish Refugee Council  (DRC) started to support 
projects  aimed  at  improving  livelihoods  of  “persons  of  concern  from  Syria  in 
Abkhazia”,  as  emerges  from reports  issued by these  organisations  (Danish  Refugee 
Council  2015a,  2016).  Such  initiatives  include  language  classes  (in  Russian  and 
Abkhaz) to facilitate their integration in the local society, and other initiatives aimed at 
increasing access to livelihood, such as small start-up grants for those who have the 
skills  to  establish  an  own  business  in  the  local  environment,  work  placement 
programmes  for  others,  as  well  as  support  for  students  (Danish  Refugee  Council 
2015b).  In  2016,  DRC (with  Unhcr  funding)  implemented  projects  by  the  value  of 
40 Beyond the reports quoted in-line,  this  section has been informed by an interview with 
UNHCR officer in Tbilisi (May 2016), and a conversation with a DRC officer in Abkhazia 
(May  2016).  “Repatriates”  and  “return”  is  used  in  this  context  in  order  to  reflect  the 
terminology employed by authorities in Sukhumi, but is put in inverted commas in order to 
highlight the inadequacy of this terminology. For a more extended debate on the issue of  
Syrian “repatriates” to Abkhazia, see Lundgren (2017b). 
41 According to Abkhazia’s MFA (2014), more than 50 per cent of them are “mixed Abkhaz-
Adyg families”.
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almost 1 mln USD aimed at improving the livelihood of persons of concerns from Syria 
and Ukraine in Abkhazia (Danish Refugee Council 2016).
Unhcr’s and DRC’s engagement with Syrian “repatriates” is the result of a series of 
concurring dynamics. On the one hand, after Aleksander Ankvab’s removal from the 
presidential office in Sukhumi in 2014, it became once again possible for international 
NGOs to work throughout  Abkhazia (rather than only in its Eastern districts). On the 
other, while Unhcr was about to disengage from its livelihood programmes in Gali and 
presumably  close  its  office  there,  it  could  still  find  resources  from  budget  lines 
dedicated to refugees and people of concern from Syria. Besides,  Abkhazia’s budget 
was apparently struggling to continue its support of the “repatriation” programme, at 
least in part due to decreased Russian funding and the fall of the exchange rate of the 
Russian rouble in late 2014, substantially increasing the need of external assistance for a 
sector  of  activity  that  the  Russian  side  had  no interest  in  sponsoring.42 Finally,  the 
humanitarian nature of the initiative – among other things – led authorities in Tbilisi to 
allow the implementation of this programme, in spite of its potentially sensitive political 
background.
Ultimately,  however,  no  matter  the  combination  of  factors  that  made  this  specific 
programme  possible,  it  appears  that  non-Russian  assistance  to  Abkhazia  in  some 
circumstances  effectively  complements  Russian  support,  providing  resources  for 
activities  (such  as  support  for  agriculture  or  for  the  “repatriate”  programme)  that 
Moscow is unwilling to sponsor, or projects such as the one on vaccination that would 
otherwise weigh on Abkhazia’s limited domestic resources.
6.4. State and capacity building in  Transnistria  
Interactions with the  Russian Federation  
Out of a total of 40 721 items published on  Transnistria’s state news agency between 
August  1999  and  1  March  2017,  there  are  333  articles  including  reference  to 
“training”/“enhancing  qualifications”.  More  than  half  of  them  (182  items)  did  not 
explicitly relate to trainings involving external interactions; among those which did, the 
42 Apparently,  the  extra-budgetary  nature  of  the  Abkhazia’s  ‘Repatriation  Fund’,  and  the 
seeming incapacity of the fund to collect its credits, contributed to limited availability of 
resources.  As of March 2016,  the “Repatriation Fund” had credits  that  it  was unable to 
collect  from a number  of  Abkhazian  companies  for  almost  200 000 USD  (Bargandzhia 
2016).
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vast majority (122) made reference to interactions with a Russian actor (see Table 6.2). 
It is worth highlighting that often references are not to federal Russian authorities, but 
rather  to  specific  universities  or  institutions  of  higher  education  (e.g.  in  Bryansk, 
Voronezh,  or  Nizhny  Novgorod),  city  administrations  (in  particular,  Moscow), 
professional  organisations  (e.g.  procurors),  or a specific  sector  of  state  activities  (in 
particular, customs services). Sectors mentioned most frequently in the subset of media 
reports at the basis of this analysis are education (mentioned in 45 out of 151 cases), 
health  (39),  customs  officers  (15),  as  well  as  veterinary  and  agriculture  (14).43 
Prosecutors, judges and employees of the anti-monopoly services are also among those 
that have received trainings in Russia.
Relations  between  Transnistria  and  Russia  have  been  formalised  chiefly  with  two 
protocols (Zhukov-Smirnov protocol signed in May 2006, and the Rogozin-Shevchuk 
protocol in October 2013) that have served as the basis  for stipulating a number of 
agreements between ministries, departments and state agencies. Such direct agreements 
have  allowed  for  extended  technical  support,  including  study  visits  to  Russia  by 
Transnistrian  bureaucrats  from  different  sectors,  to  take  place  in  fully  formalised 
fashion, in spite of the fact that Russia did not recognise Transnistria’s independence.44 
Indeed, going beyond the strict parameters of this preliminary analysis, local media in 
Transnistria report consultations, cooperation or technical support from Russia across all 
imaginable sectors of state activities, from road building to the banking sector, from the 
postal service to archives and museums.
Along branches of relevant ministries providing consultations and trainings in line with 
bilateral agreements, there are other emanations of the  Russian government providing 
assistance to Transnistria. For example, Russia’s state aid agency ‘Rossotrudnichestvo’ 
offers  scholarships  to  local  students  wishing  to  continue  their  studies  in  a  Russian 
university and sponsors training programmes for state employees. The fund ‘Russky 
Mir’,  created by a presidential order by Vladimir Putin in 2007 to promote  Russian 
language and culture abroad, has opened its own centre in Tiraspol’s university in 2009 
and  sponsors  a  range  of  activities,  focussing  in  particular  on  the  education  sector. 
Finally, in recent years, a new vehicle of  Russian assistance to  Transnistria has been 
43 This may be related to the fact that agriculture and farming issues, following established 
Soviet practices, are frequently object of news reporting in Transnistrian media. 
44 Distance learning is also being increasingly used across a number of sectors.
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established  and  soon  became  a  trademark  of  Moscow’s  support  to  Tiraspol: 
“autonomous non-commercial organisation ‘Eurasian Integration’.”
Founded  in  2012  by  Aleksey  Zhuravlev,  a  Duma  member  and  head  of  Russia’s 
‘Motherland’ party,  ‘Eurasian  Integration’ has  become  one  of  the  main  sources  of 
support for socially oriented programmes in Transnistria, including building schools and 
hospitals, as well as sponsoring relevant training programmes; it has its headquarters in 
Moscow, and a representation office in “Tiraspol,  Moldova” according to its official 
website.  Little  information  is  publicly  available  about  its  exact  sources  of  funding, 
however there can be no doubt about the fact that this should effectively be considered 
the same as Russian governmental assistance. Official involvement is made explicit by 
the active participation of Russia’s deputy-prime minister Dmitri Rogozin in discussions 
on the activities of this “autonomous non-governmental organisation,” as well as by the 
fact that a number of buildings realised with its funding display a marble plate with the 
following  words  engraved  in  golden  letters:  ‘gift  of  V.V.  Putin  to  Transnistria’ 
(Pridnestrovecrf 2015; Samodelova 2016).45 Initiatives by ‘Eurasian Integration’ have 
very high visibility on the streets of Tiraspol (see Illustration 6.4), in Transnistria’s news 
(see  Illustration 6.5), as well as, for example, on the official website of  Transnistria’s 
government, which includes a dedicated section on initiatives sponsored by ‘Eurasian 
integration’ directly  on  its  homepage.  ‘Eurasian  integration’ was  established  with  a 
budget  of  120  mln  USD  (IA  Regnum  2013),  mostly  tied  to  plans  for  building 
kindergartens,  schools,  healthcare facilities,  and, among other things, a new medical 
faculty for the local university. Funding include resources for fully refurbishing the new 
structures as well as for capacity building.
Overall, reliance on Russia has increased in recent years. According to one of the news 
items included in the ‘training’ subset, in 2003 then minister of justice of  Transnistria 
highlighted  low  capacities  among  its  own  bureaucrats,  and  asked  “to  heads  of 
departments to make their choice, if it is worth it to send employees to study in the 
Republic of Moldova, or if it is better to provide financing for developing specialists in 
Transnistria, who would be guaranteed to stay and work in the republic” (Ol’via Press 
45 In an interview to Transnistria’s state television channel, director of “Eurasian integration” 
Aleksandr Argunov highlighted that he reports about the advancement of works to Moscow, 
claimed that Rogozin’s office receives thankful notes about the activities of the organisation, 
and made clear that “the Russian Federation” is behind the organisation (Transnistria’s First 
Channel 2016). 
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2003a). In the same year, authorities celebrated the opening in Tiraspol of a branch of 
the Ukrainian ‘Odessa juridical academy’, and then-minister of education highlighted 
how,  along  with  students,  “judges,  bureaucrats,  representatives  of  the  ministry  of 
interior  and the  ministry  of  defence  would  attend courses  of  re-qualification  at  the 
academy” (Ol’via Press 2003b). A decade later, as relations with  Russia strengthened, 
and those with Ukraine worsened substantially after Yanukovykh was ousted in 2014, it 
seems  unlikely  that  Transnistrian  authorities  would  primarily  refer  to  Moldova or 
Ukraine to train state officials.46
Interactions with  Ukraine  
While  the  ‘training’ subset  does  not  include  any reference  to  activities  initiated  by 
central  authorities in  Ukraine,  there are  substantial  examples of initiatives involving 
actors based in  Ukraine.  Transnistrian Ukrainian-language schools, for example, were 
reported  to  have  active  contacts  with  schools  in  Kiev  and  Vinnitsa,  and  Ukrainian 
language teachers could attend courses of qualification in Ukraine (Ol’via Press 2002). 
Students of the history faculty of Tiraspol University went for trainings to the state 
archive of Ukraine’s Vinnitsa region (Ustimenko 2008b). Even more recently,  Ukraine 
remained a  point  of  reference  for  training  medical  staff:  according to  a  2012 news 
report, only nine members of medical staff from Transnistria went through courses of 
qualification in Russia, while more than 350 did so in Ukraine (Novosti Pridnestrov’ya 
2012). Apparently, even when Russia sponsored trainings of medical staff the following 
year,  this  was  at  least  in  part  accomplished  through  Ukrainian  specialists  (Novosti 
Pridnestrov’ya 2014).
International support
The  ‘training’  subset  shows  effectively  no  trace  of  assistance  from  international 
organisations before 2012, which is likely due to a combination of factors. The more 
direct cause for this change at this specific point in time is likely related to the elections 
in  late  2011  that  led  to  the  ousting  of  Transnistria’s  long-standing  president  Igor 
Smirnov by Yevgeny Shevchuk, who came to power showing a more friendly approach 
towards the international community. However, various internal and external dynamics 
46 At the time, it was still presented as an achievement that members of the Duma elected in 
part with votes from  Transnistria were able to ensure that a group of medical staff from 
Tiraspol could go to Smolensk for trainings (Ol’via Press 2004), while a decade later such 
initiatives had become routine.
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have  also  been  at  play.  On the  one  hand,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  5,  Transnistria’s 
economy was doing relatively well until the mid-2000s, and it is only at that point that 
Russia started to directly subsidise authorities in Tiraspol. Social infrastructure such as 
schools and hospitals inherited from the Soviet times where broadly functional through 
the 1990s and 2000s, but by the 2010s both infrastructure and capacities – in particular 
in the health sector – were becoming increasingly inadequate. As a representative of 
Transnistria’s government put it, not a single new school or kindergarten has been built 
in Transnistria since the end of the Soviet Union until the large-scale projects sponsored 
by  Russia  through  its  ‘Eurasian  integration’  process  started  being  implemented.47 
Finally, it is only in recent years that an important donor such as the European Union 
increased  its  direct  involvement  in  Moldova (in  particular,  after  the  Association 
Agreement was signed in 2014). 
An earlier form of EU involvement in the region relates to the establishment in 2005 of 
the ‘European Union Border Assistance Mission to  Moldova and  Ukraine’ (Eubam). 
Headquartered in Odessa, Eubam “is an advisory, technical body mandated to enhance 
the  border-management  capacities  of  its  partners  –  the  border  guard  and  customs 
authorities and other law enforcement agencies of Moldova and Ukraine,” but – as part 
of  its  mandate  –  interacts  also  with  authorities  in  Tiraspol  (Eubam  n.d.).  At  first, 
Eubam’s presence may have been perceived as threatening by Transnistrian authorities, 
but it has likely contributed to solve in a pragmatic manner long-standing issues, as well 
as negative stereotypes on Transnistria as a black hole and a smuggling paradise. Eubam 
can  serve  as  a  contact  point  for  economic  actors  and  authorities  in  Tiraspol  for 
approaching issues  related to  trade  as  new regulations  are  being  implemented (e.g., 
introduction of the DCFTA), ultimately contributing to enhance their operations in a 
difficult context. There have also been a few instances of Eubam facilitating study visits 
- e.g. Transnistrian customs officials visiting the German-Swiss border near Basel (PMR 
State  Customs  Committee  2013) –  or  organised  practical  workshops  –  e.g.  for 
phytosanitary experts (Eubam 2017b). Finally, Eubam’s negotiating and monitoring role 
facilitated,  for  example,  an agreement  that  allowed to reduce the travel  time of  the 
passenger train between Odessa and Chișinău (Eubam 2017a).48
47 Interview with representative of Transnistria’s MFA, Tiraspol, February 2016.
48 This section has benefited from a meeting with a Eubam officer in Chișinău in February 
2016. 
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The main framework for EU assistance to  Transnistria is a programme running since 
2009 called ‘Support  to  Confidence Building  Measures  Programme’,  and as  of  this 
writing in its fourth iteration for the period 2015-2018. The total budget for the four 
phases (2009-2018) amounts to about 24 mln Euro; the programme targets beneficiaries 
on  both  banks  of  the  Dniester  river,  and  is  largely  managed  by  UNDP  as  an 
implementing partner  (UNDP 2015c).49 The programme includes different sectors of 
activities,  and  engages  at  different  levels  with  economic  actors,  NGOs,  local 
governments offices and central authorities in Tiraspol.50 EU-sponsored activities may 
be  complemented  by assistance  from other  partner  donors.  For  example,  the  Swiss 
Development  Cooperation  Agency  through  UNDP provided  almost  2  mln  USD  in 
assistance to Transnistria’s health sector, focusing in particular on perinatal institutions 
and involving also the World Health Organisations and Unicef (UNDP 2015b, 2016a). 
Swedish cooperation sponsors a programme on human rights involving a number of UN 
agencies, with a budget of over 1 mln USD for the period 2015-2018  (UNDP 2015a, 
2016b).
While the range of activities is broad, most of these programmes focus on the social 
sector and health in particular, in line with local needs and structural constraints  on 
international involvement in the region. Investments are substantial, but relatively small 
when compared with Russian assistance: rather than building a new hospital or school, 
for example, such funds allow to renovate a specific section, equip relevant institutions, 
or provide training. Some activities include an explicit confidence building component 
that involve actors from both sides in a shared activity (e.g. a training programme), but 
in  many  instances  this  initiative  is  pragmatically  operationalised  as  a  development 
assistance programme.
Non-recognition  impacts  on  assistance  at  multiple  levels.  Firstly,  international 
organisations operate in consultation with  Moldova’s government in Chișinău, but in 
line with Transnistria’s legislation (President of Transnistria 2008), activities must also 
be  approved  by  a  dedicated  “coordination  council  on  humanitarian  and  technical 
assistance” in Tiraspol. Similarly to what happens in Abkhazia, this “double bottleneck” 
49 Support to Confidence Building Measures had 3.7 mln Euro budget for 2009-2012 (phase 1 
and 2), 10.6 mln Euro for 2012-2014, and 10 mln Euro for 2015-2018. For reference, total  
allocation for EU assistance to Moldova for the period 2014-2017 “can range from EUR 335 
million to EUR 410 million based on successful implementation” (EEAS 2016).
50 For a detailed list of activities and related budget, see UNDP (2016c).
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leads to a focus on social infrastructure,  the health sector and business support,  and 
effectively precludes activities in sectors at the core of EU assistance to Moldova such 
as public administration and police reform (EEAS 2016).
Under EU-sponsored initiatives, need assessments take place in dialogue with the de 
facto authorities, but reconstruction works or new facilities cannot be transferred to state 
authorities in Tiraspol:  contracts  and grants are made either with local authorities at 
municipality or district level, or with local initiative groups such as a parent association 
or a local NGO.51 This approach may complicate implementation of activities at times, 
but makes assistance acceptable to all actors involved. The fact that capacity building 
initiatives,  for  example  in  the  health  sector,  necessarily  involve  what  are  ultimately 
Transnistrian state-employees has so far not been an obstacle to trainings in this sector. 
Assistance  to  non-governmental  organisations  based  in  Transnistria  has  been  taking 
place for years, but not without complications. UNDP accepts applications and provides 
funding also to NGOs that are registered only in Tiraspol, but when the EU delegation 
to  Moldova implemented  directly  a  programme targeted  to  civil  society  in  2016,  it 
included among eligibility criteria the requirement that NGOs be registered also at the 
ministry of justice in  Chișinău, which reduced substantially  the number of potential 
applicants.52 Besides, even when projects involve only NGOs, they often have to go 
through the above-mentioned coordination council (and must do so if they want to apply 
for relevant tax breaks). 53
In spite of broad contiguity between assistance programmes implemented by  Russia’s 
‘Eurasian  Integration’ and that  conducted  by  international  organisations,  there  is  no 
coordination of any sort taking place among them, as has been confirmed in interviews 
by representatives  of international  organisations based in  Chișinău.  Presumably,  this 
gives  more  discretion  to  authorities  in  Tiraspol,  who are  in  the  position  to  discuss 
priority areas with different donors separately.
51 Russian-sponsored initiatives such as ‘Eurasian integration’ have no such limitations and 
work directly with central authorities in Tiraspol. 
52 In reply to a direct question by a potential applicant, the EU delegation to Moldova replied 
that also “co-applicants [from Transnistria] have to be registered at the Ministry of Justice of 
the Republic of Moldova” (EU delegation to Moldova 2016).
53 For more details on the coordinating role of the MFA in Transnistria, see Chapter 7, section 
7.4.
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Finally, it is worth highlighting that many Transnistrian enterprises are registered also in 
Chișinău, and may have affiliated companies in other jurisdictions, thus making it easy 
for  them  to  have  access  to  technological  innovations  or  professional  training 
programmes through regular business channels.  This may have had some impact on 
capacity  building,  for  example,  in  the  health  sector,  with  seminars  taking  place  in 
Tiraspol and involving representatives from pharmaceutical companies from countries 
such as Slovenia, Hungary, and Switzerland (e.g. Ustimenko 2008a). 
6.5. State and capacity building in  Nagorno Karabakh  
In the case of Nagorno Karabakh, the ‘training’ subset offers few insights. Among the 
15 209 news published between January 2014 and December 2016, only 21 items make 
reference to ‘trainings’, and almost none of them explicitly characterises actors based in 
Nagorno  Karabakh  as  recipients  of  training.  In  this  context,  there  is  not  a  single 
reference  to  international  organisations.  There  is  one  reference  to  employees  of 
‘Artsakhbank’ who may attend courses in Yerevan if there will be such a need, and one 
to courses for judges in  Armenia. Other news items refer to trainings offered by the 
Russian side to Armenia (in sectors such as emergency situations, and defence), without 
clarifying if representatives of Nagorno Karabakh are in any way involved. 
Lack  of  relevant  news  is  not  surprising,  as  in  Nagorno  Karabakh,  the  support  of 
international  organisations  has  been  much  less  prominent  than  in  Abkhazia  and 
Transnistria, and has been largely supplanted by support from both  Armenia and the 
Armenian  diaspora.  Indeed,  across  most  sectors  of  state  activities,  state  building  in 
Nagorno Karabakh proceeds in the footsteps of Yerevan, with direct cooperation across 
the spectrum of state  activities,  from education to  defence.  As argued by Panossian 
(2001, 150), Nagorno Karabakh can be seen on many levels as “an informal region of 
Armenia”, due not only to intertwined political dynamics, but to overall convergence of 
institutional functioning, including harmonisation of laws.54 Initiatives emanating from 
actors  based in  Yerevan are  structurally  embedded in  the  everyday life  of  Nagorno 
Karabakh,  are  not  effectively  perceived  as  a  form of  external assistance,  and,  as  a 
consequence, they are not considered newsworthy.
54 ‘Harmonisation’ is perhaps not a strong enough word: as highlighted by Waters (2006, 410), 
“in the vast majority of cases,  Armenian laws are adopted verbatim, with the only change 
being in the name of the republic in the title of the act. Lawyers and judges in the Republic 
are as likely to have a copy of the  Armenian civil code on their desks as the Karabakh 
version.”
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The  Armenia  n diaspora  
As highlighted in Chapter 5, Armenia’s government provides more than 50 per cent of 
incomes  to  Nagorno  Karabakh’s  budget,  covering  for  an  important  part  of  current 
expenses. However, in terms of sponsoring infrastructure development, support from the 
diaspora is no less important. The largest diaspora organisation focused on fund raising 
in favour of  Nagorno Karabakh is Los Angeles-based ‘Hayastan All  Armenian Fund’. 
Its yearly Thanksgiving Day telethon specifically aimed at raising funds for  Nagorno 
Karabakh  surpassed  15 mln USD  in  donations  in  2016,  and  has  raised  more  than 
100 mln USD  in  the  last  decade.  An  overview  of  their  records  shows  that  these 
resources finance activities that would otherwise have to be financed by the budget (or 
remain unfunded), such as building roads, social housing, as well as construction and 
renovation of education and health facilities (Armenia Fund 2017).55 The news section 
of the website of the ‘Hayastan All Armenian Fund’ provides a regular stream of news 
regarding the inauguration of new facilities, and as of early 2017 its ‘ongoing projects’ 
section includes about two dozens initiatives, such as the construction of community 
centres,  kindergartens,  schools,  and  even  a  highway  (Hayastan  All  Armenian  Fund 
2017). 
Quoting the prime minister of Nagorno Karabakh, Caspersen (2009, 54) pointed out that 
“in 2009, the Armenian diaspora is expected to finance half of all public construction in 
the entity,  including schools,  hospitals  and water  supply.” This claim does not fully 
align  with  data  issued  by  the  local  statistical  office,  but  may  be  a  more  accurate 
description  of  the  actual  state  of  affairs,  since  statistics  are  due  to  report  all  of 
construction works paid from the state budget, but may underestimate what it considers 
‘humanitarian relief’. Yet, even according to official data, infrastructures built through 
‘humanitarian  relief’ account  for  a  large  part  of  public  constructions;  for  example, 
according to figures released by the  Nagorno Karabakh statistical office, construction 
activities  financed through ‘humanitarian  relief’ amounted  to  9.6 mln USD in  2015, 
compared to 16.6 mln USD financed from the state budget (which includes domestic 
resources as well as Yerevan’s official assistance; see Illustration 6.6 for a summary of 
relevant data).
55 Already in the 1990s, MacFarlane and Minear  (1997, 67) characterised assistance by the 
Armenia Fund as “major contributions of quasi-governmental nature.”
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International organisations
Due to strong opposition from Azerbaijan, the funding of projects in Nagorno Karabakh 
is severely limited, as few governments or organisations unaffiliated with the Armenian 
diaspora sponsor activities in Nagorno Karabakh. It is also worth highlighting that the 
situation stabilised soon after the war ended, and that Nagorno Karabakh did not stand 
out as a humanitarian emergency by regional standards. MacFarlane and Minear (1997, 
61–62) claim  that  “by  mid-1996,  […]  reconstruction  of  damaged  and  destroyed 
buildings in Stepanakert itself was largely complete […], the humanitarian emergency 
in Nagorno Karabakh largely has been overcome, […] [and] Nagorno Karabakh appears 
to be in a better condition than Azerbaijan from a humanitarian perspective.”
In particular in the 1990s, however, a few international organisations (including Doctors 
Without  Borders,  Halo Trust,  and Christian Solidarity) were present  and carried out 
activities  in  Nagorno  Karabakh.  The  International  Red  Cross,  active  in  Nagorno 
Karabakh  since  1992,  engaged  in  a  wide  spectrum  of  activities,  including  food 
distribution, rehabilitation of destroyed villages, reconstruction of water supplies, and 
programmes aimed at facilitating agricultural self-sufficiency (MacFarlane and Minear 
1997,  65).  As  recently  as  2010  it  would  still  list  among  its  activities  in  Nagorno 
Karabakh  support  to  primary  health-care  services,  provision  of  food and household 
items to vulnerable people, water projects, and “construction of infrastructure such as 
safe play areas for children” (ICRC 2010). According to public records, the ICRC has 
scaled down such activities in recent years and has focused more on clarifying the fate 
of missing people from the conflict area, as well as facilitating exchange of prisoners or 
residents across the de facto border.
The  US  are  the  only  country  –  beyond  Armenia –  providing  direct  assistance  to 
Nagorno Karabakh; “in 1998 Congress for the first time designated Nagorno Karabakh 
a recipient of humanitarian aid distinct from  Azerbaijan”  (International Crisis Group 
2005). USAID assistance enabled activities of international organisations such as Halo 
Trust and Save the Children  (e.g. Asbarez 1999), and sponsored projects in  Nagorno 
Karabakh mostly aimed at “humanitarian relief and assistance” for a total of 45 mln 
USD  between  1998  and  2015  (Beglaryan  2015).56 USAID-sponsored  activities, 
56 The  Armenian  National  Committee  of  Armenia (ANCA)  claims  that  successive  US 
administrations  have  failed  to  maintain  the  level  of  expenditure  on  Nagorno  Karabakh 
intended  by  Congress:  according  to  their  calculations,  25 mln  USD  more  should  have 
actually been spent on Nagorno Karabakh in the period 1998-2010 (ANCA 2010).
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however,  must  take  place  within  the  boundaries  of  Soviet-time  NKAO,57 and  this 
condition is not without consequence for UK-based Halo Trust, a demining organisation 
active in Nagorno Karabakh since 2000 which received most of its funding for activities 
in  the  region  from  USAID  (HALO  Trust  2017).  In  this  case,  it  is  again  diaspora 
organisations  which  increased  their  involvement  in  order  to  provide  additional 
resources, for example by organising successful crowd-funding campaign specifically 
targeting demining activities.58
Since 2010, the European Union has been sponsoring the European Partnership for the 
Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over  Nagorno Karabakh (EPNK), a multi-million 
peace building programme aimed at invigorating dialogue across the conflict line and at 
enhancing the capacities of civil society organizations and media that are willing to join 
such initiatives.59 Starting with 2017, through its Instrument contributing to Stability 
and  Peace  (IcSP),  the  European  Union  has  been  financing  a  new  programme  – 
‘Peacebuilding through Capacity Enhancement and Civic Engagement’ (PeaCE) – with 
a  budget  of  1.86  mln  EUR for  a  three-year  period.  Even  if  its  name may  suggest 
otherwise,  the programme is again strictly focused on civil society actors and peace 
building  initiatives.  Unlike  EU-sponsored  initiatives  in  Transnistria  and  Abkhazia, 
neither  of  these projects  includes  financial  assistance for  social  infrastructure or  for 
capacity building initiatives beyond the NGO sector.
6.6. Conclusions  
As  emerges  from  this  chapter,  lack  of  recognition  is  hardly  synonymous  with 
international isolation. In recent years, a variety of external actors have contributed to 
state and capacity building in post-Soviet de facto states, in particular in sectors such as 
57 NKAO, or Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast’, is the administrative unit that delimited 
Nagorno Karabakh in Soviet times. Since the conflict in the early 1990s,  Armenian forces 
control  a  substantially  larger  territory.  Apparently,  not  only  USAID,  but  also the  ICRC 
(MacFarlane  and  Minear  1997,  65) and  even  the  ‘Hayastan  All  Armenian  Fund’ 
(International Crisis Group 2005, 13) do not sponsor projects in this extended area.
58 For  an  account  of  how  one  such  effort  by  US-based  ONEArmenia managed  to  raise 
95 000 USD from donors between February and April 2017 using modern approaches to 
crowd-funding, see ONEArmenia (ONEArmenia 2017).
59 EPNK funding is substantial, with EPNK-2 (2012-2015) and EPNK-3 (2016-2019) worth 6 
mln EUR each (EPNK 2014, 2016).
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health and education. Indeed, even if for different reasons, both the patron and other 
international actors largely focus on social issues and welfare. 
In  the  case  of  international  actors  working  in  these  territories  this  is  due  to  a 
combination of factors. On the one hand, the parent state would mostly protest against 
any activity that explicitly relates to state building in these territories. With the partial 
exception  of  the  US  providing  direct  assistance  to  Nagorno  Karabakh  without 
requesting Baku’s approval, international organisations and state donors comply with 
the regulations set by the parent state, and often directly discuss activities with relevant 
institutions  of  the  governments  in  Tbilisi  and  Chişinău.  As  a  consequence,  only 
activities that have a humanitarian or confidence building dimension receive approval. 
From their side, de facto authorities are effectively in the position to veto any initiative 
by international organisations that is not of their liking, thus excluding, for example, 
democracy promotion or activities aimed at enhancing governance that are frequently 
found in the recognised countries of the region. In the case of the patron state, assistance 
is also framed as humanitarian; however, well beyond direct support, both Russia and 
Armenia effectively  serve  as  models,  and  state  and  capacity  building  initiatives 
sponsored by the patron structurally lead to convergence of governance practices. 
Lack of  recognition  and prevalent  dynamics  lead  to  the  fact  that  conditionality  – a 
common staple of international assistance in the region – cannot be applied to post-
Soviet de facto states. On the contrary, as appears particularly in the case of Abkhazia, 
de facto authorities are sometimes in the position to cherry-pick from the (admittedly, 
limited)  set  of  activities  that  international  organisations  would  be  willing  to  offer. 
Emboldened by substantial  support from the patron,  they insist  that  assistance from 
international  organisations  is  of  little  importance  to  them:  interviewees representing 
Abkhazian authorities have been overall dismissive of the importance of international 
donors,  and  claimed  they  could  easily  do  without  them.60 Due  to  the  fact  that 
60 This  approach  appears  also  from  relevant  press  releases.  For  example,  when  UNHCR 
representatives  met  with  Georgian  authorities  in  Tbilisi,  they  were  thanked  –  as  it  is 
customary  –  for  their  work  (UNHCRC  Georgia 2017).  When  UNHCR  representatives 
visited  Abkhazia’s MFA in Sukhumi, it was on the contrary UNHCR which “thanked the 
Foreign Minister of Abkhazia for the opportunity to carry out their activities in the country” 
(Abkhazia’s  MFA 2017a).  According  to  the  press-release  issued  by  the  MFA itself,  the 
Abkhazian side did not express gratitude, in spite of the fact that a large part of UNHCR 
work in  Abkhazia is now focused on - effectively – supporting  Abkhazia’s “repatriation” 
programme. Rather than being simply a matter  of  diplomatic courtesy, this  difference is 
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international  organisations and donors wish to  remain engaged in  Abkhazia and are 
afraid of the implicit (or explicit) threat of not being allowed to continue their activities, 
they mostly keep a pliant approach, accepting the limitations on the scope of activities 
they implement.  Abkhazian authorities would not be happy to see these organisations 
leave, but feel confident enough of their will to stay to demand substantial limitations to 
their activities.
Besides, non-recognition removes many of the levers needed to apply conditionality on 
recipient  countries.  Countries  in  the  region  such  as  Moldova and  Ukraine accept 
conditionality and must demonstrate a degree of goodwill in implementing reforms in 
order to receive financial  assistance from actors such as the European Union or the 
International Monetary Fund, but since no such assistance is offered to de facto states 
due  to  non-recognition,  there is  also no basis  for  conditionality.  In  other  words,  an 
upside of the inability of de facto states to access international credits and thus grow an 
external debt is the fact that neither markets nor creditor countries can put pressure on 
domestic policy-making; as a consequence, under the current circumstances, the patron 
is the only actor able to apply conditionality on the governments of de facto states.61
Without  a  doubt,  assistance  from  Russia  comes  loaded  with  implicit  conditionality 
which limits  foreign policy choices available to de facto states.  However,  given the 
circumstances  and  the  fact  that  –  even  without  considering  security  guarantees  – 
Russian assistance is offered on a scale that brings an immediate and positive impact on 
the  livelihood  of  large  sections  of  the  resident  population,  such  limitations  are 
seemingly  perceived  as  an  acceptable  price  to  pay.62 Among  other  things,  Russian 
assistance  to  Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia  allowed  to  boost  the  salary  of  state 
emblematic  of  the  perceived  fragility  of  the  position  of  international  organisations  in 
Abkhazia, and reflects power relations. This approach is reflected also by the scant coverage 
given by state media to activities by international organisations: for example, among the 
dozens of news items mentioning Syrian repatriates published by ApsnyPress. there is not a 
single  reference  to  the  support  given  by  UNHCR  through  DRC  in  favour  of  Syrian 
“repatriates”,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  they effectively finance a  large share  of  the  total  
activities in favour of “repatriates” in Abkhazia.
61 In the case of Transnistria, which does not share a border with the Russian Federation and 
trades  mostly with  Moldova and EU countries,  the  situation is  less  straightforward:  the 
possibility to give or deny access to key markets at favourable conditions gives the EU and 
Moldova more leverage on Tiraspol in relation to business regulations and standards.
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employees, increase pensions, enhance the quality of services in key sectors such as 
health and education, and gave the possibility to hundreds of residents every year to 
receive full scholarships for their whole course of studies. In Transnistria, it allowed to 
start a large-scale programme of building and renovating social infrastructure, to offer 
gas  at  discounted prices  to  residents,  and keep higher  pensions (as  well  as a  lower 
pension  age)  compared  to  neighbouring  countries.  Finally,  by  not  recognising  in 
principle political processes taking place in these territories, international actors such as 
the European Union lose another potential lever to push for more inclusive democratic 
practices. 
As highlighted in Chapter 5, budget transfers to de facto states from the patron reach 
levels unseen in recognised countries of the region. Non-budget support from both the 
patron and international donors is also substantial. Interestingly, if only funding aimed 
at social issues is taken in consideration, de facto states may actually be receiving more 
support from international organizations per capita than their recognised peers in the 
region. EU assistance to Moldova and Georgia for the period 2014-2017, for example, is 
concentrated  on  the  priority  areas  defined  by  the  respective  ‘Single  Support 
Framework’:  public  administration  reform,  agriculture  and  rural  development,  and 
police reform and border management in the case of Moldova (EEAS 2016) as well as 
justice sector reform in  Georgia (EEAS 2014). The priority areas are defined jointly 
with the recipient governments; they may well reflect their needs and contribute to long-
term development  of  these  countries.  However,  this  also  implies  that  few  external 
resources go to socially-oriented programmes that would have a more direct impact on 
the life of many residents of the region.
The dynamics outlined in this chapter also highlight Russia’s “statalist” approach when 
acting as a donor towards these territory. Almost all of Russia’s assistance is aimed at 
enhancing state capacities, at building or renovating infrastructures that directly belong 
to state authorities, and provide trainings to civil  servants across all  sectors of state 
activities. On the contrary, and only partly due to non-recognition, international donors 
such as the European Union prefer interacting with civil society and private economic 
actors.
62 Occasionally,  public  figures  in  Abkhazia  make  the  argument  that  Sukhumi  should  stop 
accepting financial assistance from Russia (Zavodskaya 2015); they are, however, isolated 
voices with little influence on actual policy-making.
178
Finally, insistence on including a large part of international assistance to Abkhazia and 
Transnistria under the label of confidence building initiatives partly contributes to defeat 
their  nominal  purpose.  Acknowledging  that  straightforward  confidence  building 
initiatives  may  not  be  viable  or  fruitful  in  these  contexts,  local  officers  often 
pragmatically  decline  confidence  building  measures  as  –  effectively  –  traditional 
development assistance. However, authorities and individuals in de facto states often 
look  suspiciously  at  such  interventions,  assuming  that  their  final  goal  is  territorial 
reintegration with the parent state, rather than their welfare; given public insistence of 
most  international  actors  on  territorial  integrity  of  the  parent  state,  this  is  hardly 
surprising. This state of affairs leads to a paradoxical situation. If similar programmes 
were labelled as development assistance, they would likely be received more warmly by 
local authorities and residents alike in de facto states, and may increase confidence of 
local societies towards international organisations and perhaps even the parent state. On 
the  contrary,  the  label  of  ‘confidence  building’ politicises  what  could  otherwise  be 
welcomed as humanitarian or development assistance; as things stand, de facto states 
remain  understandably  suspicious  of  the  motivations  behind  these  initiatives,  and 
disapprove of the seemingly unaltruistic nature of assistance.63
To  summarise,  the  patron  remains  the  main  external  actors  for  state  and  capacity 
building in post-Soviet de facto states well beyond direct budget support. However, a 
variety of  actors  may have a  role  that  is  far  from negligible,  and in  some respects 
complement the patron’s assistance. The “triple bottleneck” imposed on assistance by 
the  parent  state,  by  de  facto  authorities,  and by the  limited  number  of  sectors  that 
international  donors  are  willing  to  support  leads  to  increased  focus  on  social 
infrastructure  and  healthcare;  this  state  of  affairs  is  largely  to  be  imputed  to  non-
recognition, as it would be unusual for small dependent jurisdictions, independent states 
in the region, or post-conflict territories. 
This analysis of the impact of non-recognition on the external relations of post-Soviet 
de facto states continues in the next chapter by focusing on the ministry of foreign 
affairs of de facto states. Since the MFA does not even exist as such in sub-state entities 
or in post-conflict territories that do not have a claim to sovereign independence, and 
63 In  reference  to  the  negative  impact  of  limited  international  involvement  in  Nagorno 
Karabakh, MacFarlane and Minear (1997, 70) argue that “if effective humanitarian aid can 
serve as a confidence-building device, its absence in this instance seems to have had the 
opposite effect.”
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conducts  many  of  its  activities  through  diplomatic  networks  that  remains  mostly 
unavailable to unrecognised states, it  seems to be a promising venue for pointing at 
some of the ways in which contested status impacts on the external relations of an 
entity.
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6.7. Illustrations and tables  
Sector All external Russia Others
education 50 43 7
health 38 16 22
journalism 14 10 4
disappeared 8 0 8
customs 6 5 1
business 5 3 2
human rights 5 0 5
MFA 5 4 1
invalids 4 1 3
justice 4 4 0
library 4 4 0
women rights 5 0 5
youth 4 4 0
bureaucrats 3 3 0
emergency situations 3 3 0
police 3 2 1
procuror 3 3 0
university 3 2 1
defence 2 2 0
fiscal 2 2 0
sport 2 2 0
tourism 2 2 0
translation 2 0 2
water 2 0 2
access to information 1 0 1
child care 1 1 0
comprehensive 1 1 0
conflict resolution 1 0 1
elections 1 1 0
financial control 1 1 0
interior 1 1 0
migration 1 1 0
minorities 1 0 1
museum 1 0 1
Total 189 121 68
Table 6.1: Number of references to sector of activity by actor for all items included in 
the ApsnyPress (Abkhazia) 'training' dataset making reference to an external actor
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Sector All external Russia Others
education 44 35 9
health 39 28 11
customs 14 14 0
veterinary 11 10 1
bureaucracy 8 7 1
culture 6 5 1
justice 4 3 1
anti-monopoly 3 3 0
business 3 1 2
MFA 3 3 0
procuror 3 2 1
agriculture 2 2 0
archiving 2 1 1
comprehensive 2 1 1
finance 2 2 0
journalism 2 2 0
youth 2 1 1
accounting 1 1 0
arts 1 1 0
banking 1 1 0
engineering 1 1 0
machine-building 1 1 0
police 1 1 0
social 1 0 1
sport 1 1 0
Total 158 127 31
Table 6.2: Number of references to sector of activity by actor for all items included in 
the Novosti Pridnestrov'ya (Transnistria) 'training' dataset making reference to an 
external actor
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Illustration 6.1: The headquarters of the 'Moscow house' in Sukhumi, built by the city 
administration of Moscow. It includes hotel rooms and a number of other facilities 
(http://mkdc-sukhum.com/). Photo by the author, May 2016.
Illustration 6.2: Advertisement by World Vision of credit opportunities for small 
business found at a crossroad next to Sukhumi's central market. Photo by the author, 
September 2011. 
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Illustration 6.4: Trolleybus in Tiraspol decorated with a Russian flag, the symbol of 
“Eurasian integration” (the main organisation building social infrastructure in  
Transnistria through Russian funds), and the words “future together with Russia!”. 
Photo by the author, February 2016. 
Illustration 6.3: Shop sign in Gali including the notice "this business has been 
supported by the European Union and the Danish Refugee Council.” Photo by the 
author, May 2016.
Illustration 6.5: Number of occurrences of selected external actors in all news items (n 
= 44 449) published by 'Novosti Pridnestrov'ia' in the period 2013-2016.
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Illustration 6.6: Volume of construction in Nagorno Karabakh by source of funding 
(2000-2015)
Chapter 7. 
MFAs in post-Soviet de 
facto states
“Dear Max, 
are you there?”
(Baudelaire 2014)
“Letters  to  Max”,  a  film  by  French  artist  and  film-maker  Eric  Baudelaire  (2014) 
released  in  2014,  recounts  of  the  epistolary  encounter  between the  author  and then 
Abkhazia’s minister of foreign affairs Maxim Gvinjia. The film is built around letters 
sent  by  post  from Paris  to  the  address  of  Abkhazia’s  ministry  of  foreign  affairs  in 
Sukhumi, including only brief and often ostentatiously naive questions, starting with an 
uncertain  “Max,  are  you there?”.  Further  correspondence  includes  queries  on issues 
such  as  war  and  memory,  as  well  as  pragmatic  aspects  (“Dear  Max,  what  does  a 
diplomat for a  country that  isn’t  recognised do when he comes to  the office in  the 
morning?”)1. In the 110 minutes of film, as images from contemporary Abkhazia fill the 
screen,  the  spectator  hears  Maxim Gvinjia’s  slow,  warm voice  answering  all  these 
1 Gvinjia’s answer: “A diplomat of country which is not recognised does exactly the same as 
one of a recognised country. Maybe I even have more job to do because I have to make 
every time the first step. […] I spent three hours for correspondence in the morning, then 
another three or four hours for correspondence in the evening” (Baudelaire 2014). 
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questions, talking about Abkhazia, and reasoning on the unusual condition of living in 
an unrecognised country.2
This chapter does not deal with the minutiae of daily activities of diplomats of de facto 
states, but rather strives to offer an overview of public activities of MFAs of post-Soviet 
de facto states, as well as of those efforts that are given less visibility, but directly relate 
to the mechanisms that enable external assistance to post-Soviet de facto states. As will 
be seen, a consistent part of the work of the MFAs of these entities can be be framed 
around its role as both a facilitator and gatekeeper of external relations, as well as that 
of “narrative-builder” for domestic and international audiences.
In  relation  to  the  main  questions  underlying  this  research,  two  aspects  are  given 
particular  attention.  First,  how  does  non-recognition  impact  the  activities  of  an 
institution  such  as  that  of  the  MFA?  Second,  given  the  prominence  of  external 
assistance in ensuring domestic capabilities, how does the MFA come into play? 
Since there is no data that can directly serve as a basis for comparison for MFAs, this 
chapter  takes  an  exploratory  approach based on word frequency analysis.  In  a  first 
section, in order to appreciate the relative importance of MFAs versus other branches of 
government in de facto states, frequency of mentions of the names of all members of 
government in the main local news agencies based in these territories are presented. 
Based on the contents of news reports and contextual knowledge of these entities, this 
section serves to outline the main priorities of MFAs of de facto states as seen from a 
local perspective.
The following section looks at the press releases of MFAs of de facto states, in order to 
point at differences among them. The comparison is then extended to highlight some of 
the  ways  in  which  MFAs  in  de  facto  states  act  (and  communicate  their  activities) 
differently  from  their  peers  in  uncontested  territories.  Such  a  comparison  is 
complicated, and admittedly problematic on many levels. First, MFAs of many micro-
states or small jurisdictions, including all of the cases chosen as terms of reference in 
Chapter 5 (MIRAB economies and US compact island states), do not even have an own 
2 The film was then complemented by a series of events called “The secession sessions”, a 
touring  exhibition  that  made  it  to  major  art  museums  around  the  world  (including  the 
MOMA in New York), and even an “Abkhazian Anembassy”, a month-long performance at 
Bétonsalon  in  Paris  that  consisted  in  Maxim  Gvinjia  (by  then  already  former foreign 
minister of Abkhazia) actually holding regular office hours as “Anambassador” of Abkhazia 
(MOMA 2015; Bétonsalon 2014).
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website (or if they do, it is not updated). This observation is in itself telling (MFAs of 
small uncontested states have seemingly little reason to bother with an on-line presence 
or with issuing official statements), yet it does not enable a more structured comparison. 
Even  if  sub-state  entities  engage  in  external  relations  and  sub-state  diplomacy  (as 
discussed in Chapter 3), they are unlikely to have an institution that can directly be 
compared with  an MFA. Instead  of  discarding completely  the possibility  to  look at 
MFAs comparatively, and acknowledging the substantial limitations of this approach, 
this chapter introduces a comparison based on word frequency analysis of press-releases 
issued in a three-year period by 13 different MFAs including internationally recognised 
countries bordering post-Soviet de facto states, countries of recent independence, and 
European micro-states.
It is argued that, even if a comparison based on a limited number of keywords is not 
sufficient  to  provide  a  comprehensive  description  of  the  visible  activities  of  these 
MFAs, it still  enables to point at important ways in which non-recognition bears an 
impact on the activity of institutions in de facto states. Within the scope of this research, 
this part is complemented by a section on the coordinating role of MFAs, based on an 
analysis  of  relevant  legislation,  interviews  with  representatives  of  the  MFAs  of 
Transnistria and Abkhazia, as well as with international actors that interact with them. 
As will be seen in particular in the case of  Abkhazia and  Transnistria, even beyond 
conflict  negotiations, MFAs play a central  role in particular in relation to initiatives 
involving international organisations; indeed, specific legislation “on the coordinating 
role” of the MFA aimed at ensuring this role is in place in both cases, and is taken as a 
starting point to analyse their activities in this respect. 
In  the  conclusions  to  this  chapter,  the  insights  gained  through  these  two  different 
approaches are summed up in order to highlight the impact of non-recognition on the 
activities of MFAs of post-Soviet de facto states.
7.1. The role of MFAs in post  - Soviet de facto states  
Post-Soviet  de  facto  states  largely  based  their  institutions  on  pre-existing  Soviet 
structures.  With  the  partial  exception  of  Transnistria,  each  of  them had  some local 
correspondent of a ministry for education or ministry for health, for example, as well as 
a local parliament. However, the ministry of foreign affairs had to be built from scratch, 
as no correspondent institution existed in any of these places. De facto states are not 
unique in this respect, since this is true for most countries that achieve independence, 
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including in the context of decolonisation: there was no comparable office in previous 
colonial  governments  (East  1973,  497).  But  lack  of  recognition  posed  additional 
challenges,  well  beyond the  lack  of  domestic  capacities.  Due to  their  unrecognised 
status, some of the commitments that absorb a significant part of the work of MFAs, 
including  consular  and  diplomatic  activities,  as  well  as  interactions  through 
organisations such as the UN, are largely to be excluded. Interactions with officials of 
foreign countries or governments are additionally complicated by the fact that any such 
meeting  could  be  construed  as  proof  of  the  international  standing  of  the  local 
government and some sort of recognition (or acceptance) at the international level; as 
Ker-Lindsay (2015, 278) put it “[t]he one official post that presents a problem in almost 
all cases is the foreign minister of a contested state,” exactly because non-sovereign 
jurisdictions do not have an MFA. It is often easier for representatives of NGOs as well 
as economic actors to move across borders, and be received in their personal capacity, 
without involvement of government authorities.
Activities of MFAs of de facto states, as well  as their  foreign policy priorities have 
received  some  scholarly  attention  (Owtram  2011),  in  particular  in  the  case  of 
Transnistria  (Kosienkowski 2012a), and  Abkhazia  (Frear 2014). Owtram  (2011, 145–
46) thus summarises the main aims of foreign policy for de facto states:
“The first aim of these unrecognized states is survival – militarily, politically, and 
economically – in the form of promotion of trade, investment, or aid. […] The 
second  aim  is  to  acquire  material  resources  in  the  form  of  aid  and  foreign 
investment.  The  third  aim  is  to  engage  in  foreign  policy  to  demonstrate  the 
apparatus and behaviour of a state […]. Underlying all this is a fourth aim, which 
is to increase the degree of recognition by recognized states, either of a de facto or 
of a formal kind.”
Indeed, while the issue of international recognition is routinely mentioned among top 
priorities  in  relevant  document  and interviews,3 it  has  increasingly  been left  on the 
back-burner,  under the understanding that  international recognition is  more likely to 
come  as  a  result  of  big  power  politics  or  so-called  ‘chequebook  diplomacy’  (Ó 
Beacháin, Comai, and Tsurtsumia-Zurabashvili 2016, 452–54), rather than the merits or 
efforts  of a given group. In the first  place,  however,  the above quote highlights the 
3 For  example,  in  the  official  ‘foreign  policy  concept’ of  Transnistria,  achieving  “legal 
international  recognition  and becoming a  member  of  the  United  Nations”  is  listed  first 
among foreign Tiraspol’s policy goals (Transnistria’s MFA 2012b). 
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central  role  of  ensuring  external  assistance  among foreign  policy  goals  of  de  facto 
states.
7.2. Outlining priorities of MFAs through their relative   
importance
In the context of decolonisation, East (1973, 503) argued that the value of the MFA is at 
least in part proved by the extent to which it can contribute in achieving key domestic 
goals:
“Because of the high priority given to state building and economic development in 
[small developing] states, the ministries primarily responsible for these areas are 
likely to be the most influential in the government. The MFA will be considered 
important to the extent that it aids in achieving these objectives.”
Applying this reasoning to post-Soviet de facto states, it would appear that the relative 
importance  of  the  MFA can  to  some  extent  be  used  as  a  measure  of  the  MFA’s 
contribution to matters of public interest. In order to approach this question, visibility on 
local media is taken as a proxy for relative importance of the MFA in the governments 
of de facto states. By comparing the frequency of mentions for each minister in the local 
media, it should be possible to gauge the relative importance of the MFA, in relation to 
other  ministries.  Illustrations  6.1  to  6.7  present  the  number  of  mentions  that  each 
member of government received on national media in post-Soviet de facto states, based 
on the Russian-language version of state-owned Novosti Pridnestrov’ya (Transnistria), 
ApsnyPress  (Abkhazia),  and  Cominf  (South  Ossetia),  as  well  as  privately-owned 
ArtsakhPress for Nagorno Karabakh (which has no state-owned news agency). The data 
refer to the latest two governments for each of the cases, excluding governments that 
lasted less than six months.4 The head of the MFA is highlighted among other members 
of government in the graphs.5
4 In the case of Nagorno Karabakh, where Araik Arutyunyan has been serving since 2007, the 
data account for change in ministerial seats for the period for which data are available, i.e.  
since 2014.
5 Focus on the individual which heads the ministry may be partially misleading, as in some 
cases deputy-ministers may have relatively high visibility in the media, while in others they 
may be almost invisible. All things considered, this approach still seems to be more robust  
than alternatives, as it can be uniformly applied across cases. 
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The  data  show  that  the  head  of  the  MFA is  in  almost  all  cases  among  the  most 
frequently mentioned ministers. Some of the differences may partly be explained by the 
personalities involved and contextual political dynamics. In the case of Transnistria, for 
example, Nina Shtanski was notoriously outspoken and media-friendly, was known for 
her pro-active use of social media (Kosienkowski 2012b), and would eventually leave 
her post to marry then president of Transnistria Evgeny Shevchuk. But as appears from 
Illustration 7.2 even her successor Vitaly Ignatiev, has been highly visible during his 
tenure, appearing in the media much more frequently than all other ministers, excluding 
the prime minister. 
Also in  the  case  of  Abkhazia  both  Vyacheslav  Chirikba  and Daur Kove have  been 
among  the  most  frequently  mentioned  ministers  of  their  government,  yet  without 
distancing themselves from all other ministers as is the case in  Transnistria. In  South 
Ossetia,  on the contrary,  it  seems that the MFA is an unremarkable ministry: David 
Sanakoev did feature among the most frequently mentioned members of government, 
but he was a former presidential candidate and the leader of a political party (‘New 
Ossetia’), so not all mentions were related to his job as a foreign minister. His successor 
Kazbulat Tskhovrebov, which had no other major reason to be mentioned in the media 
beyond  his  role  as  head  of  the  MFA,  was  among  the  least  frequently  mentioned 
ministers of his government. In  Nagorno Karabakh, minister of foreign affairs Karen 
Mirzoyan is  also mentioned exceptionally  frequently,  on a  par  with  the  ministry of 
Defence, yet much more than all other members of government, including the prime 
minister (Illustration 7.7). 
Due to its prestige, its international standing, and the media appeal that derives from 
meetings with international guests, or from visits to foreign country,  the ministry of 
foreign affairs is traditionally among the ministries that appear most frequently in the 
media also in big, recognised states.6 This succinct analysis is insufficient to generalise 
results,  yet it  offers the opportunity to introduce some of the differences among the 
MFAs  of  post-Soviet  de  facto  states.  Inductively,  beyond  the  political  weight  or 
media-friendliness of a given minister, there seems to be three main determinants of the 
visibility of the MFA. One is the actual relevance of the MFA in dealing with issues that 
6 For example, an analysis of all news items published on  Russia’s First Channel under the 
tenure of Dmitri  Medvedev’s government (including data for the period May 2012-May 
2017)  shows that  Russian Minister  of  foreign affairs  Sergey Lavrov is,  after  Medvedev 
himself, by far the most frequently mentioned member of government.
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have a direct impact on the life of residents, including initiatives related to state building 
and  availability  of  services.  A  second  aspect  is  the  frequency  of  meaningful 
international interactions: how often the head of the MFA travels abroad, or how often 
newsworthy international guests visit the entity. As will be seen, interactions with the 
patron often do not matter in this regards, as beyond framework agreements they mostly 
do  not  involve  the  MFA.  Finally,  another  key  element  is  the  role  of  the  MFA in 
countering the claims of the parent state; while such statements are ostensibly addressed 
at the international community (and thus must be channelled by the MFA), they are no 
less important for domestic purposes in strengthening the narrative that the entity is 
under constant threat.
In the case of  Transnistria, the MFA’s involvement in negotiations with authorities in 
Chișinău on matters such as car  insurance regulations and border crossings make it 
structurally part of the daily news routine. Besides, frequent statements by the MFA 
pointing at some new unfriendly move by Chișinău or Kyiv serve as a reminder of the 
fact that  Transnistria is surrounded by enemies, which is a central component of the 
narrative that legitimises the government in Tiraspol. Finally,  the MFA takes part  to 
official negotiations with foreign representatives (e.g. in the 5+2 format), interacts with 
the OSCE, and receives foreign guests:  each of  these interactions is  newsworthy in 
Transnistria, as it highlights the international status of the authorities in Tiraspol. It is 
worth pointing out that interactions with Russia mostly do not involve the MFA: if they 
are at a high political level, then  Transnistria’s president is usually directly involved, 
while  if  they  regard  regular  assistance,  then  they  go  directly  through  competent 
authorities in the relevant departments.7
In the case of  Abkhazia, the MFA certainly maintains some prestige; the head of the 
MFA does occasional foreign travels, takes part to the regular conflict negotiations in 
Geneva, interacts with representatives of the diaspora, as well as the occasional foreign 
guest. However, unlike its counterpart in Transnistria, Abkhazia’s MFA is not involved 
in regular negotiations bearing a direct impact on the life of residents, and does not 
focus as much as it did in previous years to counter statements and initiatives taken by 
Georgia;  indeed,  Georgia is  less and less frequently mentioned in  Abkhazia’s media 
7 This observation is in line with the hypothesis brought forward by Underdal  (1987, 175), 
who – in a different context – posited that “Other things being equal, the role of the MFA 
relative  to  those  of  ‘domestic’  agencies  tends  to  decline  the  higher  the  volume  of  
communication and transaction between actor and ‘recipient’.”
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(Illustration 7.8), as the legitimising narrative shifts from that of a territory living under 
constant  threat  of  the  enemy  to  one  of  a  secure  and  independent  state  looking 
confidently  and  safely  at  its  future.  Similarly  to  what  happens  in  Transnistria, 
Abkhazia’s  MFA is involved only in  the negotiation of framework agreements  with 
Russia; besides direct meetings between Russia’s and Abkhazia’s MFA (e.g. Apsnypress 
2017), regular interactions with Russian authorities, ministries and department happen 
without  the public involvement of the MFA. Finally,  a key sector of activity of the 
MFA, i.e. that of interacting with international organisations active in the territory, only 
rarely appears in the media, as external assistance coming from the West does not fit  
into the mainstream narrative that authorities present to their domestic audience. 
In the case of  South Ossetia, there are effectively few occasions that give the role of 
protagonist  to  the  MFA.  Similarly  to  Abkhazia,  South  Ossetia’s  MFA takes  part  to 
conflict negotiations in Geneva, but does little foreign travels beyond that. Since almost 
all  external  interactions  of  South  Ossetia  take  place  with  Russia,  and these  mostly 
happen without the involvement of the MFA, the minister of foreign affairs has fewer 
occasion of visibility. There are almost no international organisations active in  South 
Ossetia (only the International Red Cross has a local office), and, as is the case with 
Abkhazia, Georgia appears less and less in the local news (Illustration 7.9).
Finally, in the case of Nagorno Karabakh, the situation is again different. The MFA is 
not involved in direct negotiations that bear an impact on the life of residents (such as 
the ones found in Transnistria) and is not involved in formal conflict negotiations (such 
as  5+2 format  for  Transnistria,  or  the  meetings  in  Geneva for  Abkhazia  and  South 
Ossetia). The MFA is only mildly involved in external assistance coming from Armenia, 
as  this  takes  place  in  the  form of  direct  budget  support  or  direct  interactions  with 
relevant  authorities  in  Nagorno Karabakh.  Yet,  the  MFA has  high  visibility,  due  to 
foreign travel, interactions with the diaspora, and its central role in reminding to the 
world (and in the process, to domestic audiences) the constant threat coming from Baku.
7.3. What MFAs say about themselves  
This  exploration  of  the  role  and  activities  of  MFAs  of  post-Soviet  de  facto  states 
proceeds by focusing on the visible activities of post-Soviet de facto states,  as they 
themselves  describe  them in  the  press-releases  they  publish  on  their  websites.  This 
exercise based on word frequency analysis is  used to offer a characterisation of the 
activities of MFAs of post-Soviet de facto states, first by outlining which countries are 
193
mentioned  most  frequently  in  their  communication  materials,  second  by  exploring 
differences in the priorities of de facto MFAs by comparing the frequency of a set of 
keywords  representing  potential  sectors  of  activity,  and  finally  by  expanding  the 
comparison to other MFAs in order to point at features that are peculiar to post-Soviet 
de facto states.
Which countries are mentioned most frequently?
At least in part tue to their lack of international recognition, post-Soviet de facto states 
have limited formal interactions with the outside world. Given the fact that any such 
meeting can be presented as proof of the international standing of the local government 
and some sort  of  recognition  (or  acceptance)  at  the  international  level,  whenever  a 
representative of the MFA of a de facto state has a meeting involving a foreign official, 
this is duly reported in a press release on the MFA's official website. To the extent that 
they are considered newsworthy, even meetings with delegations or individuals that do 
not  officially  represent a foreign country are  reported on the official  website  of the 
MFAs.8 A word-frequency analysis of the news section of the official website of the 
MFA of a de facto state should thus provide information about which countries are more 
frequently involved in such interactions, as well as which countries are mentioned for 
other reasons.
Without  access  to  the  data,  based  on  knowledge  of  the  environment  in  which 
post-Soviet de facto state operate, it would be reasonable to expect frequent mentions of 
the patron state (reporting meetings, agreements, and instances of cooperation), of the 
parent state (mostly, to denounce its policies or to voice past grievances), of other states 
or  de  facto  states  that  have  recognised  the  independence  of  the  territory  (recording 
meetings  or  publicizing  congratulatory  statements),  as  well  as  countries  where 
significant communities of ethnic kins are located. In order to test if such hypotheses are 
confirmed in practice, the frequency with which each UN member state is mentioned in 
press releases of MFAs of post-Soviet de facto states has been calculated. A small group 
of international organisations involved in conflict resolution mechanisms or active in 
these territories (EU, UN, OSCE, ICRC), as well as ‘Geneva’ (as a signifier for conflict 
negotiations), have been included for reference.9 
8 In some instances, even visits by foreign scholars – a most unremarkable event by other 
standards  –  have  been  advertised  on  the  website  of  the  MFA of  de  facto  states (e.g. 
Transnistria’s MFA 2012a).
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As appears  from Illustration  7.10,  7.11,  7.12,  and  7.13,  based on all  press  releases 
published in the 5 years between 1 May 2012 and 30 April 2017, most of the results fall  
broadly in line with expectations. These data offer an additional opportunity to explore 
some of the reasons behind the prevalence of a determinate set of entities in each of the 
cases included in the analysis. First, it is worth highlighting that the parent state is either 
the first or the second most frequently mentioned country in all cases; in the case of 
South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh, the patron is mentioned about half as often as the 
parent. This observation points at the fact that denouncing the policies and narratives of 
the parent state continues to be a central element of the mission of MFAs, even in a case 
such as  South  Ossetia  where  interactions  with  the  parent  state  are  limited,  and  the 
impact of  Georgian policies on the local population minimal.10 Second, the relatively 
high number of mentions of entities associated with conflict-related negotiations (OSCE 
for Transnistria and Nagorno Karabakh, ‘Geneva’ for Abkhazia and South Ossetia) hints 
at the fact that international negotiations continue to be one of the main priority areas 
for MFAs in post-Soviet de facto states. Both the high number of mentions to conflict-
related venues, and frequent references to the parent state suggest that conflict-related 
dynamics still shape a prominent part of the activities of MFAs of post-Soviet de facto 
states, as they are presented on their official websites. 
Third, the fact that countries which at some point conferred recognition to Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia such as Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru and Tuvalu appear in the top spots 
among most frequently mentioned countries hints at the ceremonial nature of many of 
the press releases issued by the MFAs of de facto states. Given the fact that limited 
actual  interactions  beyond  diplomatic  formalities  exist  with  countries  in  Central 
9 The list of world countries on which this exercise is based has been extracted from the list of 
member states of the United Nations  (United Nations 2017). After adding de facto states, 
adequate  measures  have been taken to  ensure  that  all  relevant  occurrences  are  properly 
captured; for example, occurrences of ‘United Kingdom’, ‘Great Britain’, and ‘UK’ are all  
counted  as  United  Kingdom;  ‘Moldova’ is  counted  as  such  only  if  the  preceding  or 
following word does  not  imply that  the  reference is  actually to  Transnistria in  order  to 
prevent  ‘Transnistrian  Moldovan  Republic’  to  be  counted  as  both  ‘Moldova’  and 
‘Transnistria’;  most  frequent  alternative  spelling  of  relevant  entities  have  also  been 
accounted for.
10 The  Tbilisi-sponsored  scheme  offering  free  healthcare  treatment  to  residents  of  South 
Ossetia (and discussed is  Chapter 6)  is perhaps the most  significant exception. Yet,  this  
policy does not appear in press releases issued by the MFA in Tskhinvali.
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America,  and  even  less  with  Pacific  Island  states,  the  relatively  high  frequency  of 
mentions of these countries effectively serves as a reminder of the very limited number 
of countries with which the MFA engages in substantive interactions.
Indeed, the MFAs of post-Soviet de facto states seem to mention with any regularity 
only  few  countries,  beyond  those  belonging  to  the  above-mentioned  categories.  It 
should also be highlighted that even apparent exceptions are not necessarily the result of 
any  substantive  relationship,  but  may  appear  for  a  number  of  reasons,  such  as  to 
describe the nationality of a visiting representative of an international organisation; for 
example,  in the case of  Nagorno Karabakh, references to Czech Republic,  Bulgaria, 
United  Kingdom,  and  Hungary  are  almost  exclusively  related  to  the  nationality  of 
members of the OSCE team that regularly monitors the line of contact. In terms of the 
analysis being proposed, such references should be considered ‘background noise’; the 
fact that basically no country beyond those belonging to the above-mentioned categories 
emerges  from such noise  effectively  confirms  that  MFAs of  de  facto  states  do  not 
engage  in  regular,  public,  and  meaningful  interactions  with  representatives  of  third 
countries. 
Italy appears as the most evident exception in the case of both  Abkhazia and  South 
Ossetia. There is no particularly strong economic connection between  Italy and these 
two territories, and the the Italian authorities in Rome have been consistent in their non-
recognition policy and in their  support to  Georgian territorial  integrity as much any 
other country in Europe.  As an overlook at the actual contents of the press releases 
shows, it appears that  Abkhazia  in primis, and to a lesser extent  South Ossetia, have 
established direct relations with various individuals in Italy, who have facilitated formal 
agreements  with  municipalities,  associations,  and  business  organisations  in  different 
Italian regions as well as in  San Marino. The question of why there is all this activity 
around  Italy,  and  almost  nothing  around  other  European  countries  is  certainly 
interesting, but goes well beyond the scope of this research.11 In reference to the main 
11 Tentative  explanations  should  be  sought  in  a  combination  of  factors,  including  direct  
engagement  of  a  small  group of  individuals,  geographic  proximity with Geneva (which 
makes it easy and cost-effective to visit Italy after conflict negotiations there), the presence 
in  Italy of  various  and  diverse  secessionist  movements,  and  the  sympathy  that  the 
Abkhazian cause in particular attracts in two different contexts. On the one hand, a part of 
Italy’s  anti-imperialist  left  maintains  sympathy  for  the  struggle  of  small  peoples,  and 
somewhat  instinctively  combines  it  with  a  mix  of  anti-Americanism  and  pro-Russian 
feelings. On the other hand, there seems to be groups of business-oriented people who may 
196
question at the basis of this research, it suffices to say that such interactions with actors 
based in Italy do not contribute in any form to Abkhazia’s state-building efforts, nor do 
they lead to technical or financial assistance from either private or public partners based 
in Italy.
Key terms in de facto states
In order to present some of the features of the visible part of activities of MFAs of de 
facto states,  this  section presents  a  series  of  comparisons  based  on word frequency 
analysis. First, it looks at terms such as ‘trade’/‘economy’ and ‘support’/‘assistance’ as 
signifiers  for  pragmatic  activities  conducted  by  the  MFA.12 Then  it  looks  at 
‘independence’/‘recognition’, and finally at ‘anniversary’/‘congratulations’, which have 
been chosen as signifiers for communications that are formalistic, or mostly expression 
of the strand of activity that Owtram (2011, 146) characterised as to “engage in foreign 
policy to demonstrate the apparatus and behaviour of a state” (see Illustration 7.14-7.21)
This comparison points at some differences in the priorities of MFAs of de facto states. 
Given its economic structure and its geographical location, trade-related issues are a top 
priority for  Transnistria's  MFA, much more so than for the MFAs of other de facto 
states. On the other hand, in its statements,  Transnistria’s MFA seems to focus less on 
issues such as independence and international recognition, and publishes relatively less 
celebratory and congratulatory notes. There is no substantial difference in the frequency 
of  references  to  ‘support’,  but  ‘assistance’ is  most  frequently  mentioned  by  those 
express support for the causes of Abkhazia and South Ossetia at least partially in the hope to 
facilitate lucrative business opportunities with Russian companies. As for direct contacts, in 
earlier years they were largely enabled by Abkhazia’s former representative to Italy Mauro 
Murgia, who after a public spat with Abkhazia’s MFA in 2015 (Abkhazia’s MFA 2015) has 
been working exclusively on South Ossetia. In recent years, this connection has been partly 
supplanted,  partly  complemented  by  direct  contacts  of  Abkhazia’s  deputy  minister  of 
foreign affairs Kan Taniya, who had obtained his MA degree in Italy and speaks fluently in 
Italian. Finally, it is worth highlighting that central ministries in Rome have issued direct 
notices towards municipalities that  engaged with representatives of  Abkhazia and  South 
Ossetia or have visited these territories, but are ultimately powerless, since they have no 
authority over local authorities on such matters.
12 For example, in one of the rare studies specifically dealing with the activities of the MFA in 
Pacific micro-states in their constitutive years, ‘trade’ and ‘aid’ have been mentioned as the 
first two functions of the MFA in the Cook Islands (Jonassen 1982).
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territories (Transnistria and Abkhazia) which have more regular occasions of interaction 
with international partners.
In order to proceed beyond the descriptive, and to understand if along these measures 
the MFAs of post-Soviet de facto states differ substantially from those of other potential 
terms of reference, MFAs of post-Soviet de facto states are compared with the MFAs of 
parent  states  (Moldova,  Georgia,  Azerbaijan),  countries  bordering  de  facto  states 
(Ukraine,  Russia,  Armenia,  Iran), de facto states elsewhere in Europe (North Cyprus), 
countries  of  recent  independence  in  Europe  (Kosovo and  Montenegro),  as  well  as 
similarly  sized  micro-states  in  Europe  (Malta,  Iceland and  San  Marino).13 For  this 
example, in order to offer consistent results, only the English language version of the 
websites of MFAs are considered; English is not an official language of either of the 
territories included (with the exception of  Malta), and it is assumed here that a self-
respecting  MFA in  Europe  today  would  use  English  to  highlight  its  international 
activities, and would write about them on its official website. The analysis is limited to 
the two-year period between 1 July 2014 and 30 June 2016, for which data is mostly 
available for all the MFAs included in the comparison.14
Some preliminary insights can be gained simply by looking at how frequently do all of 
these MFAs publish. A quick overview (Illustration 7.22) shows that MFAs of post-
Soviet de facto states mostly publish less often than the bigger and recognised states that 
border with them, but more often than similarly sized but wealthier and long-established 
micro-states elsewhere in Europe, such as Iceland and San Marino, which may have less 
pressing concerns.  Even if  frequency of  online publications  cannot  be considered  a 
meaningful proxy of the level of activities of these MFAs, the capacity and practice of 
issuing regular press releases in English should not be taken as a given. Indeed, the 
MFA of a recognised country such as  Moldova has not always been able to publish 
13 The MFAs of smaller European countries such as  Andorra,  Liechtenstein and Monaco are 
not included because they do not have a full-fledged English language website. 
14 Table 7.1 details the date of earliest available publication for each of the websites included. 
In  the  case  of  Georgia,  the  archive  of  press-releases  is  patchy for  the  early  years  and 
includes  regular  English-language  updates  only  starting  with  2015.  Since  the  analysis 
presented in the following pages is based on word frequency, rather than absolute number of  
occurrences, this should not have a substantive impact on the results. 
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regularly press releases in English, and sometimes has left the English language version 
of its website without updates for lengthy periods.15
Proceeding  with  this  comparison  by  looking  at  the  word  frequency  of  the  above-
mentioned  keywords  provides  additional  evidence  on  some  of  the  elements  that 
differentiate the public activities of MFAs of post-Soviet de facto states from those of 
their recognised peers. Looking at the word frequency of ‘trade’ and ‘economy’ for all 
MFAs included in this analysis (Illustration 7.23 and  Illustration 7.24), for example, 
allows to appreciate how Transnistria is not effectively an outlier in terms of references 
to  ‘trade’,  and  that  it  mentions  ‘economy’ just  about  as  frequently  as  the  MFA in 
Chișinău.  MFAs of  other  post-Soviet  de  facto  states  make reference  to  these  terms 
considerably less often than all  of their  their  recognised peers;  in the case of  South 
Ossetia,  ‘trade’ does  not  appear  even once in  the whole two years  included in  this 
analysis.16
The pair of keywords ‘support’/‘assistance’ refers directly to one of the central issues 
discussed in this research. If one of the main goals of MFAs of de facto states was that  
of ensuring availability of streams of aid from external partners, it would be reasonable 
to expect frequent mentions to these keywords, as part of messages aimed at thanking 
donors, or presenting ongoing negotiations. In contrast with this hypothesis, post-Soviet 
de facto states make reference to ‘support’ noticeably less frequently than all other cases 
included  in  this  analysis  (Illustration  7.25).  Frequency  of  references  to  ‘assistance’ 
(Illustration 7.26) are perhaps even more telling: among all cases, it  is the MFAs of 
Ukraine and Moldova (countries which have been involved in lengthy negotiations on 
15 For example, an archived version of the home page of  Moldova’s MFA retrieved in July 
2013, still shows only news from 2012 (Moldova’s MFA 2013). Since 2015, the website of 
Moldova's MFA has been working thanks to support of foreign donors and carries a notice  
on its home page that is more characteristic of a civil society project, rather than of an MFA 
of a sovereign state: “This web site was developed with the financial support of the Estonian 
Government within the Project ‘Building Institutional Capacity of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs  and  European  Integration’  implemented  by  the  United  Nations  Development 
Programme (UNDP),  Moldova.  The opinions expressed in  this  website  are  the  authors’ 
opinions  and  do  not  necessarily  reflect  the  views  of  the  Estonian  Government,  UNDP 
Moldova.”
16 ‘Trade’ is mentioned, however infrequently, both before June 2014 and after July 2016; the 
fact that not even a passing reference to trade has been made during two full years remains  
however telling.
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assistance  packages  from  international  donors  in  the  period  under  analysis)  which 
mention  this  keyword much more  frequently than  all  others.  Among post-Soviet  de 
facto  states,  it  is  those  entities  that  have  more  interactions  with  international 
organisations  (Abkhazia  and  Transnistria)  that  make  reference  to  ‘assistance’ more 
frequently.
With the exception of Transnistria, MFAs of unrecognised states talk more frequently of 
issues such as ‘independence’ and ‘recognition’ than other cases included in the sample 
(Illustration 7.27 and  Illustration 7.28). ‘Independence’ is found in the press releases 
issued  by  MFAs  of  unrecognised  states  about  twice  as  often  as  in  those  by  their 
internationally  recognised  peers.  In  the  case  of  Kosovo,  ‘recognition’  and 
‘independence’ are mentioned about as frequently as in the case of South Caucasus de 
facto  states,  at  least  in  part  due  to  its  relatively  recent  achievements  in  having  its 
independence recognised. In the case of North Cyprus, it is on the contrary remarkable 
how rarely ‘independence’ or ‘recognition’ are mentioned at all: these data, as well as 
the relatively low figures related to Transnistria, point at the fact that not all MFAs of de 
facto states need to focus ostentatiously on their struggle for internationally recognised 
independence. Tentatively, such staggering differences may be explained by the fact that 
internationally recognised independence is  not  effectively a priority  for either  North 
Cyprus  or  Transnistria,  or  at  least  not  to  the  extent  found in  other  other  contested 
territories. The relatively high frequency of such mentions in the case of South Ossetia 
is largely to be explained by the celebratory nature of many of these statements.
Other  keywords  selected  as  signifiers  of  ceremonial  aspects  are  ‘anniversary’ and 
‘congratulations’ (Illustration 7.29 and  Illustration 7.30). Do MFAs of post-Soviet de 
facto states issue a disproportionate amount of press-releases to congratulate foreign 
leaders or celebrate anniversaries? The data seem to support this hypothesis in reference 
to  ‘anniversary’ (with the only exception of  Transnistria).17 However,  in  the case of 
congratulatory messages,  only  Abkhazia’s  MFA stands out.  This  peculiarity  may be 
related to better internal organisation in Sukhumi’s MFA, which may have a structured 
procedure to publicly issue relevant notes on key occasions.
17 The high figure for Armenia’s MFA in relation to ‘anniversary’ can be explained by the fact 
that  in  the  period  under  analysis  Armenia commemorated  one-hundred  years  since  the 
Armenian genocide.
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7.4. On the coordinating role of the MFA  
While the above sections focused on the visible activities of MFAs of post-Soviet de 
facto states, the next part deals with an aspect that is central to the main question at the 
basis of this research: how do MFAs of post-Soviet de facto states contribute to the 
external  relations  of  these  territories,  and  in  particular  those  that  enable  access  to 
services for the local population.  Similarly to the first  part  of this  chapter,  also this 
section  starts  with  a  quote  from  East’s  (1973) study  on  how  Uganda’s  recently 
established MFA functioned in its early post-colonial years, a study that seems to be – 
perhaps surprisingly – relevant to the study of MFAs of post-Soviet de facto states. One 
of the issues approached by East relates to the level of control that the MFA should have 
in managing interactions with external actors; in the context of Uganda at the time, at 
least in part due to low capacities from the side of the MFA, a large part of activities and 
assistance  programmes  took  place  through  direct  interactions  between  international 
organisations and various state agencies, without any involvement of the MFA. East 
argues in favour of delegating specialised activities to competent ministries, but makes 
the point that the MFA should at least serve the role of a gatekeeper:
[…] it  is  argued that the MFA should maintain its  role as the principal  agency 
responsible for all of Uganda's relations with other states and the external world in 
general. In order to carry out this function at even a minimal level of effectiveness, 
the ministry should be able to act as the central clearing house and coordinator for 
those activities being carried out elsewhere in the government.
There is a scholarly and practical debate on the extent to which the MFA should be in 
control of external relations, and to what extent “domestic” branches of government 
should engage in international interactions. In general, there is a broad expectation that 
the MFA keeps at least a coordinating role in matters of foreign policy, as lack thereof 
may  lead  to  what  Underdal  (1987,  170) called  “’vertical  disintegration’ of  foreign 
policy, whereby ‘micro-decisions’ tend to be de-coupled from the overall policy purpose 
and  strategy”.  As  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  pages,  this  risk  has  been  taken 
particularly seriously in post-Soviet  de facto states,  where coordinating actions with 
external actors seems to be one of the main tasks of the MFA, and specific legislation 
“on the coordinating role of the MFA” has been introduced.
Transnistria  (President of  Transnistria 2002, 2012),  Abkhazia  (President of  Abkhazia 
2006) and  South Ossetia  (President of  South Ossetia 2005) have all introduced a law 
“On the Coordinating Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs […] in the Conduct of a 
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Unified Foreign Policy Line.” This trend may have found some inspiration in legislation 
originally introduced in Russia by Boris Yeltsin in 1996 (President of Russia 1996) and 
then updated under the presidency of Dmitri Medvedev in 2011  (President of  Russia 
2011), as the title of the law is almost identical. However, the contents of the law are 
quite different in each of the cases. The  Russian version is significantly longer, as it 
deals in details with the procedures for external interactions involving federal subjects, 
but it is ultimately less restrictive than the one found in Transnistria or Abkhazia, i.e. it 
mandates consultations with the MFA in fewer circumstances. 
The MFA as a gatekeeper in  Transnistria  
Indeed, in the case of  Transnistria, both law and practice go quite far in demanding 
coordination with the MFA. According to the law ‘On the coordinating role’, the MFA is 
responsible for all international interactions of state organs, including the executive, the 
legislative, and the judiciary (art. 1.). Government representatives must coordinate and 
agree with the MFA any meeting with external actors, explicitly including among them 
also international organisations  and foreign NGOs (art.  2),  unless the meeting takes 
place by initiative of the president or of the prime minister.
All representatives of state institutions must inform the MFA about any work-related 
trips,  consultations,  and  negotiations  (art.  3).  Interactions  or  agreements  by 
“administrative-territorial  units”  (cities  and districts)  with counterparts  abroad or  by 
departments of state institutions must be coordinated with the MFA (art. 4). Only the 
MFA and the president are entitled to make statements related to Transnistria’s foreign 
policy (art.  6).  Other  sections  of  the law make clear  that  any state  institution  must 
inform  the  MFA  of  any  work-related  travel  of  its  staff  beyond  the  borders  of 
Transnistria, including for meetings organised by NGOs and research centres. Within 
seven days after the foreign visit, a written report must be sent to inform the MFA about 
the  mission.  Finally,  all  local  organisations  implementing  projects  financed  by 
international organisations or NGOs must inform the MFA of their activities.
The law is far-reaching, and in some parts it seems to give to the MFA a role of control 
of  any  sort  of  foreign  activity  (excluding  private  and  economic  activities)  that  is 
traditionally  associated  with  the  security  services.  It  is  difficult  to  ascertain  with 
certainty  if  this  law  is  thoroughly  implemented.  However,  this  author  has  been 
confirmed  that,  for  example,  university  professors  (who  are  state  employees)  must 
receive approval from the MFA before attending conferences abroad. Before accepting 
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to  be interviewed, some of my interlocutors made sure that the MFA was informed 
about  my  visit  to  Transnistria.  In  reply  to  a  direct  question  on  this  matter,  a 
representative of the MFA said that in the case of an independent researcher, they would 
not strictly speaking be required to consult with the MFA, but they may still do so it if 
they feel it is appropriate.18 If, however, an individual is representing an international 
organisation, then preliminary coordination with the MFA would be mandatory. He also 
highlighted that the main goal is not to exercise some form of control on people, but 
rather – considering local specificities – the need to keep a common line: since the MFA 
is aware of all international initiatives, it is also best-positioned to ensure that there is no 
duplication of activities, or other such problems.19
International organisations and donors based in Chişinău confirmed that basically all of 
the initiatives taking place in  Transnistria that they sponsor must be approved by the 
relevant committee in Tiraspol. Even if (as discussed in Chapter 6) donors go at great 
lengths in finding local partners and initiative groups that are not directly part of the 
state authorities, they must necessarily coordinate activities with them, and the MFA 
plays a clear coordinating role in the process.
Finally, economic actors based in Transnistria do not need to interact with the MFA to 
conduct their international activities. As highlighted by a representative of the MFA in 
an interview with the author, from many points of view, commercial enterprises are best 
positioned  to  gain  access  to  new technologies  without  worrying  about  the  issue  of 
non-recognition; for example, a large company such as as Interdnestrkom (the privately-
owned  monopolist  of  mobile  communication  and  fast  internet  in  Transnistria),  can 
license  all  the  technology  it  needs  from  international  vendors,  including  through 
subsidiary companies in third countries if needed. Services such as banking and money 
transfers  are  also  available  in  Transnistria  mostly  through  the  activity  of  private 
companies. The involvement of the MFA is needed only when specific technical cross-
border issues emerge (e.g. on the frequencies to be used by mobile phone operators, or 
calls to landline numbers in  Transnistria, which as of this writing cannot be reached 
from Chişinău); in such cases, the issue is brought to the negotiating table, through the 
assistance of the MFA, and with the involvement of relevant economic actors when 
needed. 
18 Interview with representative of Transnistria’s MFA, Tiraspol, February 2016.
19 Interview with representative of Transnistria’s MFA, Tiraspol, February 2016.
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In  brief,  excluding  private  and  economic  activities,  in  Transnistria  the  MFA seems 
indeed to function as a gatekeeper of all external interactions that involve to any extent 
state institutions, or that involve local NGOs but are sponsored by foreign donors. The 
fact that in the law ‘On the coordinating role’ interactions with Chișinău are explicitly 
mentioned as requiring coordination with the MFA, suggests that such measures are 
largely in place to prevent a process of “creeping reintegration” with Moldova. Due to 
its  lack  of  a  shared  border  with  its  patron,  and unlike  de facto  states  in  the  South 
Caucasus,  Transnistria  had  to  accept  a  number  of  compromise  solutions  that  link 
Transnistrian actors to the republic of Moldova on matters such as trade, licensing, mail, 
and others.20 Beyond elite political discourse, interaction across the de facto border is 
not stigmatized, and partly as a consequence relations that may be undesirable from the 
point  of  view  the  government  must  be  formally  policed,  at  least  in  part  with  the 
involvement of the MFA, rather than left to a combination of self-restraint and social 
condemnation.21
The MFA as point of reference for international 
organisations in  Abkhazia  
In the case of  Abkhazia, the corresponding law  (President of  Abkhazia 2006) is less 
restrictive than in  Transnistria,  as it  mostly applies  only to the executive branch of 
government. However, also in  Abkhazia ‘administrative-territorial units’ are requested 
to  concord  with  the  MFA projects  of  international  agreements.22 Even  if  it  is  less 
demanding, the law includes a number of provisions similar to those found in the case 
of  Transnistria, and makes clear that in  Abkhazia the MFA “is the chief coordinating 
organ  for  relations  with  foreign  countries  and  international  organisations”  (it  is 
understood that this includes both governmental and non-governmental organisations).
20 For example, international mail reaches Tiraspol through Chişinău; postal offices in Tiraspol 
routinely  sell  Moldovan postal  stamps  for  all  mailings  to  addressees  located  outside of 
Transnistria.
21 One of the features that make it less problematic to be registered as ‘Moldovan’ may be 
terminological;  after  all,  the  full  name  of  Transnistria  is  ‘Pridnestrovian  Moldavian 
Republic’,  and  ‘Moldovanism’ has  long  been a  central  part  of  the  Transnistrian  nation 
building project (Dembinska and Danero Iglesias 2013).
22 It is worth highlighting that it is exactly the lack of a similar provision in other countries that 
gave the opportunity to municipalities in Abkhazia to stipulate agreements with counterparts 
in EU countries such as Italy, or Russia before 2008.
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Abkhazia’s  MFA works  as  both  a  gatekeeper  and  a  facilitator  for  the  activities  of 
international organisations and NGOs. Since citizens of most-countries (excluding CIS 
countries) need to apply for a visa to enter  Abkhazia, in principle the MFA is in the 
position to control who enters and exits the territory. However, none of the interviewees 
that accepted to meet the author in this or previous visits to the region asked if the MFA 
had been informed about the visit. Broadly speaking, when local NGOs in  Abkhazia 
consider applying for a grant or for implementing a project, they do not seem to be 
worried about formal procedures by the authorities denying them the possibility to do 
so.  Instead,  they  seem  to  be  more  worried  about  their  domestic  legitimacy,  and 
instinctively know what initiative they can engage with and what projects would be 
considered socially unacceptable.
Abkhazia’s  deputy  minister  of  foreign  affairs  Kan  Taniya,  who  is  responsible  for 
interactions with international organisations, highlighted in an interview with the author 
the  role  of  facilitator  played  by  the  MFA,  as  a  first  port  of  call  for  international 
organisations  active  on  the  territory.  He  mentioned  the  fact  that  he  holds  regular 
meetings with representatives of the most active among the international organisations 
headquartered in Abkhazia, and that he interacts with them by phone to deal with any 
issue that may arise with the implementation of projects, including when other state 
institutions are involved:
“if  there  are  difficulties  we  can support  them,  and ensure  their  work  proceeds 
smoothly;  on the one hand,  we coordinate,  on the other  we offer  support  with 
accreditation, documentation, and such.”23
Indeed, the MFA serves also as a “middle-man” for interactions between certain state 
institutions  and  international  organisations;  for  example,  if  the  tax  service  needs 
information on a contract that involves international organisations, they would request it 
through the MFA.
At the same time, the MFA also serves as a gatekeeper, deciding which initiatives are 
acceptable for Abkhazia. As an example of this role, deputy minister of foreign affairs 
Taniya told a local newspaper that a project on ‘Native-language learning’ proposed by 
Unicef that was allegedly meant to address only the Georgian-speaking population was 
to  be  extended  in  order  to  include  also  the  Abkhazian  and  Armenian  groups  upon 
request of the MFA: “if a project is not useful for our country, then we reject it,  or 
23 Interview with Kan Taniya, deputy minister of foreign affairs, Sukhumi, May 2016.
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demand  adjustments”  (Kvaratskhelia  2016).24 Representatives  of  other  ministries 
interviewed by this author also made reference to their role in defining which projects 
would be acceptable to the Abkhazian side, so it seems that while the MFA is formally 
tasked with the vetting process, the process involves also direct interactions between 
representatives of international organisations and relevant ministries or departments. 
Even if from the point of view of  Abkhazia’s authorities  Russia is to be considered a 
foreign country, it does not seem that all initiatives involving Russian actors require the 
involvement of the MFA. For example, the ‘Moscow House’ in Sukhumi or the office of 
‘Rossotrudnichestvo’ are to be considered from the legal standpoint of authorities in 
Sukhumi as foreign organisations, yet they are never mentioned among international 
organisations working in  Abkhazia.  In interviews with the author,  representatives of 
these organisations mentioned interactions with the ministry of education, but not with 
the  MFA.  In  all  likelihood,  their  activities  take  place  on  the  basis  of  a  framework 
agreement that initially involved also the MFA, however, unlike with what happens with 
non-Russian international organisations, their activities do not seem to require recurrent 
approval and monitoring from the MFA.
Indeed,  while the work of international organisations takes place under  the constant 
monitoring required by the law ‘On the coordinating role of the MFA’, it appears that 
relevant provisions are not consistently applied in other contexts. Former minister of 
foreign affairs Vyacheslav Chirikba stated during an official meeting with  Abkhazia’s 
president specifically dedicated to this issue (President of Abkhazia 2016) that that law 
is “systemically violated in all its parts”, and that “the list of officials who break this 
law would be very long; it is violated also at the highest level [of government].” In the 
same occasion, president Khajimba pointed out that heads of ministries must inform the 
MFA of their foreign journeys, as well as of visits they receive from foreign colleagues, 
and that the MFA must then report to him about this: none of this was apparently taking 
place, if not sporadically.
24 This account of events has not  been independently verified,  and is  provided here as an 
example  of  how  the  MFA presents  its  role  to  a  domestic  audience.  It  is  also  worth 
highlighting that domestic priorities change, and as highlighted in Chapter 6, the previous 
Abkhazian  government  specifically  requested  that  international  organisations  limit  their 
activities to the Abkhazia’s eastern districts, where ethnic Georgians live compactly.
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7.5. Conclusions  
In order to explore, analyse and compare the activities of MFAs of post-Soviet de facto 
states, this chapter took two distinct approaches. First, in line with the considerations 
presented  in  Appendix  B,  different  textual  datasets  have  been  used  to  explore  the 
relative importance of MFAs within post-Soviet de facto states (looking at mentions of 
members of government in local media), to find out more about which countries are 
involved in interactions with these MFAs (looking at press-releases issued by the MFAs 
themselves), and to compare these MFAs with those of selected terms of comparison 
along a set of keywords. The second part of this chapter dealt specifically with the role 
of MFAs in  Abkhazia and  Transnistria in coordinating the external relations of these 
territories, by analysing relevant legislation, media reports, and insights gained during 
interviews with relevant actors. 
Results obtained with primitive tools such as word frequency should not be considered 
exhaustive evidence,  but rather as additional information that may be used to build, 
corroborate, integrate, or enhance one's argument. The conscious choice of limiting the 
analysis to carefully selected keywords, rather than extended thematic dictionaries or 
more advanced techniques, while certainly oversimplifying, provides meaningful results 
that can be understood and interpreted by any informed reader. 
The data presented in this chapter point at some of the ways in which non-recognition 
impacts the activities of MFAs in post-Soviet de facto states. First, and at least in part 
due to their contested status, all of these MFAs have an active on-line presence; while 
uncontested micro-states in other  parts  of the world do not even bother  to set  up a 
website, post-Soviet de facto states need it to present their perspective to the outside 
world. Indeed, as appears from the high frequency of mentions of the parent state, as 
well as to signifiers of conflict negotiations, conflict dynamics continue to shape the 
public activities of post-Soviet de facto states. 
Second, as appears from their own websites, MFAs of post-Soviet de facto states have 
very limited interactions  with third countries,  beyond the patron state  and countries 
which host a substantial number of ethnic kins. Also micro-states in Europe and other 
world regions interact directly with a limited number of countries (mostly, their patron 
and neighbours), in line with their pragmatic interests, but membership to international 
organizations gives them the opportunity to have regular contacts with a much larger 
number of countries and to some extent take part to debates on regional issues or global 
questions. 
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The relatively high frequency of terms related to conflict dynamics, also points at the 
role of the MFA as a narrative builder for both domestic and international audiences. 
Frequent mentions of ‘independence’ and ‘recognition’ similarly serve to highlight these 
entities’ international standing. The regular publication of press-releases, partly made 
possible  by  the  relatively  frequent  issuing  of  ceremonial  statements,  contributes  to 
demonstrate the capability of these institutions to interact with the rest of the world.
However, it appears that in some cases the MFAs of de facto states engage in activities 
that  are  not  advertised publicly,  as  projects  involving international  organisations  are 
implemented in these territories through mechanisms that involve the MFA, but only 
rarely  feature  in  their  communication  materials.  In  Abkhazia,  such  interactions  are 
frequent and seemingly regularly accompany the activities of international organisations 
(but mostly not those involving  Russia).  In  Transnistria,  local actors associated with 
state-authorities must coordinate with the MFA all of their foreign interactions. While it 
is common for the MFA to serve as a point of reference in foreign policy matters, it 
seems that in the context of non-recognition and contested independence, such practices 
gain more prominence. These policies have certainly a pragmatic function (the goals of 
external donors may not coincide with those of the local leadership), but they also serve 
as a constant reminder for the need of national unity against external threats, as well as 
to depict the de facto authorities as strenuous defenders of these entities’ independence.
Methodologically, this chapter introduced content analysis of contents extracted from 
the web as a new approach to explore the activities of institutions of post-Soviet de 
facto states, as well as to compare them with those of other entities in a context in which 
there are no self-evident measures that can be used for comparison. In terms of contents, 
it contributed to provide a picture of the ways in which the MFAs of post-Soviet de 
facto states differ from those of their recognised peers, by working both as facilitator 
and gatekeeper  of  external  relations,  as  well  as  by contributing  to  promote  its  own 
narratives  for  domestic  and  international  audiences.  Finally,  it  also  highlighted 
differences  among post-Soviet  de facto states,  with both external  circumstances  and 
domestic  priorities having an important  impact  on the activities  and communication 
strategies enacted by the MFAs of these entities.
208
7.6. Illustrations and tables  
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Illustration 7.1 Members of Turanskaya’s government (Transnistria) by number of 
mentions on NovostiPmr.com during the tenure of the government (10 July 2013-13 
October 2015)
Illustration 7.2 Members of Prokudin’s government (Transnistria) by number of 
mentions on NovostiPmr.com during the tenure of the government (25 December 2015-
17 December 2016)
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Illustration 7.4 Members of Bartits’ government (Abkhazia) by number of mentions on 
ApsnyPress.info during the tenure of the government (4 October 2016 - )
Illustration 7.3 Members of Mikvabia’s government (Abkhazia) by number of mentions 
on ApsnyPress.info during the tenure of the government (20 March 2015-26 July 2016)
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Illustration 7.5 Members of Khurgaev’s government (South Ossetia) by number of 
mentions on cominf.org during the tenure of the government (26 April 2012-20 January 
2014).
Illustration 7.6 Members of Kulumbegov’s government (South Ossetia) by number of 
mentions on cominf.org during the tenure of the government (21 January 2014-24 April 
2017).
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Illustration 7.7 Members of Arutyunyan’s government by number of mentions on the  
Russian language version of ArtsakhPress.am between January 2014 and May 2017
Illustration 7.8 Word frequency of ‘Russia, ‘Georgia’, and ‘European Union’ in all 
articles published on the website of Abkhazia’s news agency ApsnyPress between 1 
January 2006 and 31 December 2016 (N=25 618), calculated on a rolling average of 
90 days for clarity.
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Illustration 7.9: Word frequency of ‘Russia, ‘Georgia’, and ‘European Union’ in all 
articles published on the website of South Ossetia’s news agency Cominf.org between 1 
January 2006 and 31 December 2016 (N=30 664), calculated on a rolling average of 
90 days for clarity.
Illustration 7.10: Entities mentioned most often on the website of Transnistria's MFA
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Illustration 7.11: Entities mentioned most often on the website of Abkhazia's MFA
Illustration 7.12: Entities mentioned most often on the website of South Ossetia's MFA
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Illustration 7.13: Entities mentioned most often on the website of Nagorno Karabakh's 
MFA
Illustration 7.14 Word frequency of ‘trade’ on the websites of MFAs of post-Soviet de 
facto states
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Illustration 7.15 Word frequency of ‘economy’ on the websites of MFAs of post-Soviet de  
facto states
Illustration 7.16 Word frequency of ‘support’ on the websites of MFAs of post-Soviet de 
facto states
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Illustration 7.17 Word frequency of ‘assistance’ on the websites of MFAs of post-Soviet 
de facto states
Illustration 7.18 Word frequency of ‘independence’ on the websites of MFAs of post-
Soviet de facto states
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Illustration 7.19 Word frequency of ‘recognition’ on the websites of MFAs of post-Soviet 
de facto states
Illustration 7.20 Word frequency of ‘congratulations’ on the websites of MFAs of post-
Soviet de facto states
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Illustration 7.21 Word frequency of ‘anniversary’ on the websites of MFAs of post-Soviet  
de facto states
Illustration 7.22 Average number of publications per day on the website of selected 
MFAs
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Illustration 7.23 Word frequency of ‘trade’ on the websites of selected MFAs
Illustration 7.24 Word frequency of ‘economy’ on the websites of selected MFAs
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Illustration 7.25 Word frequency of ‘support’ on the websites of selected MFAs
Illustration 7.26 Word frequency of ‘assistance’ on the websites of selected MFAs
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Illustration 7.27 Word frequency of ‘independence’ on the websites of selected MFAs
Illustration 7.28 Word frequency of ‘recognition’ on the websites of selected MFAs
Name of website
Earliest 
publication 
available
Total number of 
publications
Average number 
of publications 
per day
Abkhazia MFA 2012-04-16 734 0.48
Armenia MFA 2007-01-09 1 873 0.54
Azerbaijan MFA 2012-03-05 1 049 0.67
Georgia MFA 2015-01-05 1 057 1.95
Iceland MFA 1995-05-15 821 0.11
Iran MFA 2001-02-20 10 179 1.82
Kosovo MFA 2008-12-03 1 330 0.27
Malta MFA 2013-03-15 411 0.34
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Illustration 7.29 Word frequency of ‘congratulations’ on the websites of selected MFAs
Illustration 7.30 Word frequency of ‘anniversary’ on the websites of selected MFAs
Moldova MFA 2007-03-07 963 0.28
Montenegro MFA 2013-07-25 497 0.64
Nagorno Karabakh MFA 2008-11-05 488 0.17
North Cyprus MFA 2013-02-12 361 0.29
Russia MFA 2003-01-04 16 229 3.30
San Marino MFA 2007-04-20 267 0.08
South Ossetia MFA 2010-04-19 347 0.15
Transnistria MFA 2009-01-06 1 335 0.49
Ukraine MFA 2010-01-12 1 812 0.77
Table 7.1: List of websites included in the analysis and date of earliest publication 
available for each of them. Data reflect the situation of 30 June 2016, and refer to the 
frequency of publications for the whole period for which data are available.
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Chapter 8. 
Conclusions
8.1. How should we study de facto states?  
De facto states are here to stay, not only as a component part of the international system 
of  the  21st century,  but  also  as  an  analytical  category.  As  long  as  non-recognition 
remains the main criteria for case selection – as has been the case in this research – it 
seems only natural for researchers to focus on issues related to the contested status of 
these territories. However, researchers dealing with these entities should not be blinded 
by lack of international recognition, and explore both their external relations and their 
domestic developments along established patterns, employing analytical tools routinely 
used in  uncontested  territories,  looking for  relevant  terms of  reference  well  beyond 
other de facto states and conflict regions.
Research on external assistance may well deal with the issue of dependency and its 
impact on on the meaning of sovereignty in the contemporary international system, but, 
in developing a new research agenda on post-Soviet de facto states, other venues of 
research typically associated with external assistance in other contexts should also be 
explored, including questions on the effectiveness of aid, the potential impact of aid 
volatility,  issues  of  sustainability,  of  domestic  legitimacy,  etc.  It  is  argued here that 
shifting the focus away from the issue of recognition allows not only to gain a better 
understanding  of  ongoing  dynamics  in  these  territories,  but  will  also  ultimately 
contribute  to  find  better  answers  to  questions  related  to  the  issue  of  status  and 
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international sovereignty. In other words, the richer understanding of these territories 
that would emerge as a result would then usefully contribute to established debates on 
the nature of de facto states, and their place in the contemporary international system.
Normative issues have also been an obstacle  to developing a more vibrant research 
agenda  on  these  territories.  For  example,  there  is  a  relatively  large  scholarship  on 
possible long-term “solutions” for post-Soviet de facto states, but many of them seem to 
be based on a problematic set of assumptions. More than two decades after they were 
established, the understanding that de facto states are a temporary phenomenon, and that 
their situation must somehow be “normalised” to fit into established categories of the 
international system seems to be still widespread. Even in relatively recent publications 
(e.g. L. Anderson 2011), such “normalisation” is debated largely within the context of 
different options for territorial reintegration. This trend is of course understandable for 
research  explicitly  aimed  at  Western  policy-making,  yet  the  prevalence  of  such 
approaches is analytically problematic, as it leaves little space for structured research on 
what at this stage should be considered the most likely trajectory of development for 
this  places;  as  international  recognition  or  territorial  reintegration  seem  equally 
unrealistic in the short and medium-term (and difficult to imagine in the long term), 
researchers would do well to consider more explicitly in their research the possibility 
that these entities will continue to exist in their current contested configuration for the 
foreseeable future, likely proceeding in their path towards further integration with the 
patron. Fundamentally, and arguably unlike in the 1990s, local policy-makers have also 
started to earnestly think in the long-term about their course of development,1 and do 
not seem to have real expectations of an international breakthrough in relation to the 
status issue (as some of them had at least in late 2008).
Normative issues have seemingly had an impact also on the terminology employed to 
describe empirically observable dynamics. Many of the activities conducted by Russia 
in  these  territories  would  undoubtedly  fall  under  established  categories  of 
institution-building, capacity-building, or development aid, but, apparently because such 
activities are sponsored by Moscow instead of international organisations or Western 
actors,  the same vocabulary is  rarely applied.  This  is  analytically  problematic,  as  it 
1 For example, in 2015 Abkhazia’s government has issued the development of a “Strategy for 
the  social-economic  development  of  Abkhazia  until  2025”  (Tsentr  strategicheskikh 
issledovanij pri Prezidente Respubliki Abkhazii 2015). 
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prevents  employing  established  analytical  tools  to  gain  a  better  understanding  of 
ongoing dynamics.
Even when  Russia’s implementation of certain forms of assistance is evidently quite 
distant  from  established  international  practices,  it  may  still  be  useful  to  apply  the 
terminology and analytical tools used in other contexts, even if only to highlight the 
differences. For example, a rich debate on Russian peacekeeping in its “near abroad” in 
the 1990s  (Baev 1994; Allison 1994; Shashenkov 1994; Baev 1999; Mackinlay and 
Cross 2003) has allowed to gain important insights on the peculiar dynamics sustaining 
Russian peacekeeping missions.  By the same token,  analysing  Russian assistance to 
post-Soviet  de  facto  states  as  a  (possibly,  but  not  necessarily)  sui  generis  case  of 
externally-led state building may also prove to offer valuable insights. Even applying a 
concept  such  as  ‘security  sector  reform’,  often  associated  with  a  democratisation 
agenda,2 to  –  for  example  –  Russia’s  assistance  in  revamping  Abkhazia’s  police, 
military and customs service may contribute to shed light on the impact of  Russia’s 
“occupation” on local  governance dynamics,  and Moscow’s role  in  the region.  It  is 
worth highlighting that applying the language of ‘state building’ and ‘security sector 
reform’ does not imply a positive value judgement on these policies; for example, even 
scholars who may normatively disapprove of the US policy in Iraq, and use terms such 
as ‘invasion’ and ‘occupation’ to describe it, would still apply to American assistance in 
the region concepts such as institution-building, development aid, and security sector 
reform, even if only to criticise how such activities have been implemented.
As has been pointed out in the introduction, there is nothing “magic” about de facto 
states; non-recognition does not confer any special aura to the political, economic and 
social processes taking place in this context. In brief, they should be studied employing 
the same concepts and analytical tools that are used in other contexts.
8.2. De facto states as small dependent jurisdictions  
Without denying the usefulness of established characterisations of post-Soviet de facto 
states as ‘unrecognised’, ‘(post-)conflict’,  and ‘post-Soviet’ entities, it  is argued here 
that conceptualising them as small dependent jurisdictions may contribute to a better 
2 For example, Sedra (2007, 7) pointed out how the model of security sector reform has been 
associated with “a normative framework featuring a holistic vision of reform that balanced 
the  need  to  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  the  security  forces  with  the  imperative  of 
entrenching principles of democratic governance and the rule of law.”
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understanding of underlying dynamics across a number of possible areas of research, 
well beyond that of external relations at the centre of this study.
Fundamentally,  conceptualising  post-Soviet  de  facto  states  as  small  dependent 
jurisdictions  contributes  to  reset  expectations  about  their  long-term  perspectives  of 
development and their external dependence. The clash between a stereotyped idea of the 
sovereign nation state (broadly accepted and replicated by the leadership of de facto 
states  themselves  in  self-celebrating  narratives  of  proud  nations  fighting  for 
independence)  and  high  levels  of  dependence  and  integration  with  the  patron,  is 
oftentimes used to highlight how these territories are not “de facto independent.” 
Proud narratives  and idealised understandings  of  independence  and sovereignty  that 
ill-apply to the realities of the 21st century represent an unrealistic term of comparison 
that cannot be taken as a starting point for an impartial analysis of post-Soviet de facto 
states. Many of the apparently anomalous features attributed to post-Soviet de facto 
states  become  “normal”  as  soon  as  they  are  conceptualised  as  small  dependent 
jurisdictions:  strong  dependence  as  well  as  widespread  popular  support  for  further 
integration with a patron is common in small jurisdictions. This special relation brings 
with it a number of important benefits, including security guarantees and an unusually 
high  amount  of  aid  per  capita.  Finally,  similarly  to  small  dependent  jurisdictions 
elsewhere in  the world,  post-Soviet  de facto states  do not  seem to have much of  a 
choice: being “more independent” but destitute and externally vulnerable is hardly an 
alluring perspective.3
This  conceptualisation  opens  the  door  to  an  apparently  distant  literature  that,  as 
discussed  in  Chapter  5  and 6,  may usefully  contribute  to  a  better  understanding of 
post-Soviet  de  facto  states.  For  example,  the  experience  of  small  island  states 
demonstrates that lack of self-sufficiency does not imply unsustainability, as long as 
external sources of support remain in place thanks to ‘aid entitlement’. As other sources 
of  rent,  ‘aid entitlement’ may disappear  one day,  but  may as  well  offer  sustainable 
incomes for decades as has been the case in both sovereign and non-sovereign small 
dependent jurisdictions around the world.
As  argued  in  Chapter  5,  conflict  and  lack  of  international  recognition  have  been 
determinant  in  making  these  territories  dependent  and  relatively  isolated.  However, 
3 In principle, de facto states could also opt for reintegration with the parent state. However, 
at the time of this writing, the parent state is still mostly perceived more as an existential  
threat than as a potential port of salvation. 
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since there is no indication that widespread international recognition, reintegration or 
some other form of agreement on their status is forthcoming, such features (being small, 
dependent, and not fully integrated into the international system) should be analytically 
considered inherent characteristics of these entities in all studies aimed at understanding 
and explaining – rather than changing – the object of research.4
8.3. Limitations of the comparison and new venues of   
research
In its juxtaposition of post-Soviet de facto states and small dependent jurisdictions, this 
research solidly focuses on similarities between distant jurisdictions that, as has been 
highlighted,  share  a  number  of  features,  without  explicitly  discussing  the  all  too 
apparent differences. This selective approach, which has previously been employed by 
scholars working on the post-Soviet space in order to break out of the boundaries of 
area studies, does not aim at discounting geography (in particular, the actual remoteness 
of many island jurisdictions, and the physical distance between them and their patron), 
or the different histories and cultures that pertain to small dependent jurisdictions in 
different  world  regions.  Instead,  it  points  at  sectors  in  which  –  in  spite  of  all  the 
differences  –  analytical  approaches  developed  in  the  context  of  small  dependent 
jurisdictions may contribute to our understanding of post-Soviet de facto states.
This juxtaposition, however, has important limitations. For example, highlighting that 
both sets of jurisdictions are not striving towards fully-fledged independence does not 
imply that they are facing choices on status in similar conditions. Indeed, unlike post-
Soviet de facto states, many other small dependent jurisdictions were actually given the 
possibility to head towards sovereign independence, and detach themselves from their 
former colonial master. In recent decades, irrespective of the formal international status 
achieved  by  these  jurisdictions,  they  instead  mostly  sought  to  adjust,  retain,  and 
sometimes reinforce ties with a patron. As the alternative was in many cases economic 
deprivation,  this  choice  can  hardly  be  characterised  as  fully  free.  Yet,  they  were 
arguably open-ended debates based on democratic consultations, even if they took place 
in circumstances that were less than ideal. In the case of post-Soviet de facto states, 
non-sovereignty is the outcome of conflict dynamics and prevalent international norms, 
not  a  “rational  and  pragmatic”  choice  based  on a  cost-benefit  analysis,  which  is  a 
4 Of course, research that is explicitly oriented at policy-making or conflict resolution may 
well take a different perspective. 
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popular albeit not unproblematic narrative used to explain the outcome of status debates 
in small dependent jurisdictions (Veenendaal 2016, 153). Yet, it is argued, awareness of 
the experience of small dependent jurisdictions around the globe can usefully contribute 
to our understanding of prevalent dynamics in post-Soviet de facto states, including in 
reference to the sustained preference among a majority of residents for close ties with 
their patron (Toal and O’Loughlin 2016).
Besides,  the  fact  that  the  dynamics  that  generated  and  sustain  the  patron-client 
relationship in these different sets of territories are fundamentally dissimilar does not 
preclude the applicability to post-Soviet de facto states of approaches established in the 
study  of  small  dependent  jurisdictions.  This  article  has  preliminary  explored  the 
applicability of the MIRAB model to post-Soviet de facto states. While the model is in 
itself descriptive, further research aimed at observing the accuracy and the shortcomings 
of MIRAB in the context of post-Soviet de facto states may inform in-depth analysis on 
one of the long-standing questions on post-Soviet de facto states  (e.g. Kolstø 2006): 
how do these entities sustain themselves? Approaching this question through the prism 
of MIRAB allows to fully acknowledge the importance of the patron, but also to explore 
local dynamics that enable the sustained existence of these entities and fundamentally 
contribute to shape their political economy. Awareness of criticism to the MIRAB model 
(Bertram 1999, 113–15) contributes to  avoid potential  pitfalls,  or at  least  to include 
them in the analytical process (e.g. does MIRAB’s focus on macro-economic aspects 
effectively misrepresent prevalent dynamics on the ground? does MIRAB discount too 
easily the potential for domestic economic development?).
Finally,  conceptualising  post-Soviet  de  facto  states  as  small  dependent  jurisdictions 
provides inputs well beyond economic aspects. For example, research on elections and 
democratic  processes  in  de  facto  states  may  find  it  useful  to  refer  to  literature  on 
democracy in very small polities. Relevant studies show that micro-states tend to be 
more democratic than bigger states  (Anckar 2008), but also point at the prevalence of 
personalistic  politics  (Veenendaal  2013b),  at  the  dominance  of  the  executive 
government, at lack of checks and balances, and at widespread nepotism and pork barrel 
politics (Baldacchino 2012, 107). Other features of the political context of post-Soviet 
de facto states (largely associated with post-conflict dynamics) are also found in small 
dependent jurisdictions that have not experienced conflict. For example, Baldacchino 
(2012,  109) argues  that  in  small  island  societies  there  is  frequently  ‘a  set  of 
homogeneous values […] to which significant social players conform and subscribe (at 
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least in public)’; in the case of non-compliance, ‘the threat of ostracism is immense.’ 
Tapping into the scholarship on small jurisdictions may contribute to point at some of 
the ways in which smallness interacts with perceived external threats to shape public 
discourse and political competition in post-Soviet de facto states.
8.4. Extending the comparison  
Small dependent jurisdictions come in different shapes, and post-Soviet de facto states 
may have more in common with some of them than with others, also depending on the 
angle  of  analysis.  The  juxtaposition  between  post-Soviet  de  facto  states  and  small 
dependent  jurisdictions  outlined  in  this  study  has  focused  on  the  issue  of  external 
assistance,  but  even in  this  context there would be room for considering alternative 
terms of comparison.
The role of military bases
For example, should the patron’s military presence in these territories be understood as 
part of the assistance package to residents (and thus aimed at enhancing their security), 
or rather as the main motivation behind the patron-client relationship? In the case of 
islands  jurisdictions  that  receive  assistance  from  the  United  States,  for  example, 
financial and technical assistance should largely be understood as a side effect of the US 
desire to secure basing rights for their military, or – particularly in the past  - grounds 
for testing weaponry. As argued by Vine (2015, 179), “one could reasonably regard all 
the federal spending in each territory as the cost of maintaining bases and troops there.” 
Quite clearly, initiatives such as military nuclear testing in the Bikini Atoll, which had 
major health consequences for generations of Marshallese residents, cannot possibly be 
understood as “military assistance” to residents of the  Marshall Islands. The primary 
motivation for US presence in remote islands has clearly been military, and the welfare 
of residents has been at best a secondary matter, to be kept in consideration to the extent 
that it prevents or reduces local opposition to the US military presence. Indeed, in a few 
instances, the US have removed the population from places such as Diego Garcia and 
the Bikini Atoll in order to use the islands exclusively for military purposes (Vine 2015, 
chap. 3).
While the US have been rather straightforward about the military nature of their interest 
in  Pacific  islands,  Russia  has  justified  its  interventions  in  its  “near  abroad” with  a 
number  of  reasons,  foremost  among  them the  need  to  defend  its  own citizens  and 
Russian speakers under threat. Few analysts, however, would take such motivations at 
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face value, and many would be willing to accept that Russian interventions in its “near 
abroad” and its support to de facto states in the region can at least in part be explained 
by a desire for military positioning and military posturing. At the same time, in post-
Soviet de facto states  Russian military presence is actually welcomed as a source of 
security by a large majority  of residents,  rather  than tolerated for its  economic side 
effects,  as  emerges  also  from  surveys  conducted  in  these  territories  (Toal  and 
O’Loughlin 2016, 117–18).
Depending on the research question, for analytical purposes it may be useful to simplify 
complex  dynamics,  as  -  for  example  –  Poirine  (1999) does  when  he  argues  that 
assistance to small jurisdictions should be understood as “a payment for an invisible 
strategic service” and ultimately as a surrogate to outright annexation and colonialism.5 
Yet, as is the case with other patron-client relationships, also Russian assistance to post-
Soviet  de  facto  states  is  likely  related  to  a  combination  of  factors.  Military 
considerations,  hard  security  interests,  as  well  as  “affective  geopolitics  involving 
identity, status, and memory” (Toal 2017, 257) are deeply intertwined.
More broadly, the dynamics that have developed around small territories that host US 
military bases could be taken in consideration as a source of inspiration, rather than a 
direct term of comparison,  for approaching a number of research questions well beyond 
the issue of external assistance. For example, it is clear that the presence of military 
bases has influenced domestic politics in hosting countries, and most notably in time of 
unrest  or  coup.  For  example,  “during  the  2009 coup against  Zelaya,  the  Honduran 
military flew the president from Tegucigalpa to [U.S. military base] Soto Cano before 
sending  him  into  exile  in  Costa  Rica,  fueling  suspicion  about  a  U.S.  role  in  the 
overthrow” (Vine 2015, 93). When Abkhazia’s president Ankvab was ousted in a coup 
in 2014, he took refuge in a  Russian military base before fleeing to  Russia  (Beacháin 
2015, 243). The context is so different that it hardly calls for direct comparison, yet the 
role  of  foreign  military  bases  in  facilitating  or  impeding the  overthrow of  a  sitting 
president may well be relevant also in the case of post-Soviet de facto states, and the 
literature on US bases in hosting countries may provide useful hints for aspects that 
should be kept in consideration.
5 As Poirine (1999, 835) put it, “the payment of a strategic rent, generally qualified as aid, has 
replaced  military  conquest  and  colonization  as  a  means  of  securing  strategic  outposts  
throughout the world.”
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Not only MIRAB
Island jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands, the Isle of Man, and the British Virgin 
Islands have been found to have a political economy that is substantially different from 
that  of MIRAB presented in  some detail  in  Chapter  4  (Bertram 2006,  7).  They are 
unlikely, however, to serve as models for post-Soviet de facto states, since they lack the 
key features that make British offshore jurisdictions so attractive: full access to global 
financial  markets,  and a solid  legal  and judiciary system. A so far  minor  exception 
relates to  South Ossetia, which due to the jigsaw puzzle of recognitions in the post-
Soviet context has been best-positioned to provide financial services for the “Donetsk 
People’s republic” (Twickel 2017).6 
Post-Soviet  de facto  states  have  been characterised as  inherently  ideal  locations  for 
murky  business.  They  may  indeed  offer  some  room  for  smuggling  and  shady 
transactions across boundary lines, as well as, under certain circumstances, provide a 
context that enables more advanced financial schemes (e.g. Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2017, 
511). But while the concern that  Transnistria was being used for “the laundering of 
criminal  finance”  (Wiersma  2002) may  have  not  been  completely  misplaced,  the 
volumes  involved  pale  in  comparison  with  money  laundering  schemes  involving 
uncontested small jurisdictions. It is not de facto states, but small jurisdictions such as 
the British Virgin Islands which feature most prominently in publications dealing with 
money laundering in the post-Soviet space.7 Leaks of documents related to offshore 
financial activities such as the “Panama papers” (Obermayer and Obermaier 2017) have 
vividly demonstrated the centrality  of  small  offshore jurisdictions  to  illicit  financial 
schemes and legal, but no less scandalous, tax avoidance strategies. De facto states have 
occasionally featured in this context (e.g. Cushevici and Thoric 2016), but it is clearly 
other, uncontested small jurisdictions which are the real protagonists of both global and 
regional money laundering strategies.
6 The  fact  that  Russia  recognised  the  independence  of  South  Ossetia,  and  South  Ossetia 
recognised the independence of DNR, made it possible to have fully formalised transactions 
between banks in Donetsk and Russia through South Ossetia. 
7 See, for example, the recent damning portrayal of crooked elites and crony capitalism in  
Central Asia by Cooley and Heathershaw (2017).
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Former de facto states
Finally, reasoning on the nature of external assistance to small dependent jurisdictions 
may shed some light on the dynamics that underpin the political economy of territories 
that for a time have been de facto states, but have finally been reintegrated by their 
parent state or have been making their  way towards wide internationally recognised 
independence.
The political economy of contemporary  Chechnya, for example, is largely determined 
by the patron-client relationship that unites central authorities in Moscow with Grozny. 
Moscow has spent at least 14 billion USD in reconstruction in Chechnya starting with 
2001 (Yaffa 2016), and the local economy has largely been built upon subsidies from 
the federal centre. The flow of external assistance is determinant for the current power 
balance in  Chechnya, as it ensures a degree of state capacity and gives to the current 
leadership the means (both coercive and economic) to dissuade potential challengers to 
its  power.  On  the  contrary,  Chechnya as  a  de  facto  state  in  the  period  1996-1999 
(Caspersen 2012, 12) clearly lacked a solid patron able to provide extensive assistance 
and to put limits to domestic infighting. Indeed,  Chechnya as a de facto states (1996-
1999) eventually failed for a number of reasons, and the renewed strength of central 
authorities in Moscow was only one of them: internal infighting and collapsing de facto 
institutions  were  no  less  important,  and  an  external  patron  is  often  instrumental  in 
preventing both.
Republika Srpska Krajina (Caspersen 2007; Kolstø and Paukovic 2014), a de facto state 
within  the internationally  recognised  borders  of  Croatia  between 1991 and 1995,  is 
another case in point, as dwindling assistance from its patron Serbia and the distancing 
between  the  de  facto  leadership  and  Belgrade  have  been  key  determinants  of  its 
eventual collapse.
In  the  case  of  Gagauzia (Kosienkowski  2017) – a  former  de  facto  state  peacefully 
reintegrated in the Republic of Moldova  - the situation is more complex, at least in part 
due to the fact that  Gagauzia lacked an obvious patron and that,  after  reintegration, 
central authorities in Chișinău would not have the resources to bankroll Comrat even if 
they wished to do so. Yet,  Gagauzia is still trying to make the most of its position in 
order to gain increased access to direct external funding; in spite of (or perhaps, because 
of) the largely pro-Russian rhetoric expressed by its leadership, Comrat has been able to 
attract  direct  funding  from  a  large  number  of  external  donors,  including  from  the 
European Union (Barbăroșie 2017; Nica 2016).
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What about Kosovo, a rare occurrences of a de facto state that has achieved widespread 
international recognition? In spite of the different outcome, Kosovo’s economy seems to 
fit quite well the MIRAB model found in small dependent jurisdictions as well as in 
post-Soviet  de  facto  states,  with  aid  and  remittances  covering  for  a  large  part  of 
household incomes (Lemay-Hébert and Murshed 2016).
To  summarise,  this  brief  section  reiterates  a  central  point  of  this  research:  small 
dependent jurisdictions are a useful and so far unexplored term of comparison for post-
Soviet de facto states. This juxtaposition, however, is not to be understood as exclusive, 
but rather as complementary to both established terms of comparisons (e.g. other de 
facto  states)  as  well  as  a  starting  board  for  other  and yet  unexplored  comparisons, 
including jurisdictions hosting military bases. In this context, depending on the research 
question,  even more explicit  references to  the literature on post-colonialism may be 
appropriate.
8.5. Structured analysis of textual  contents published   
on the web
Physically  visiting  places,  observing  ongoing  dynamics  first-hand,  and  interviewing 
relevant actors remains a crucial part of research in area studies and in the scholarship 
on  de  facto  states  in  particular.  However,  researchers  should  use  all  available 
opportunities that are available to them to find pieces of evidence that may help in 
answering their research questions. As has been highlighted in different parts of this 
research and elsewhere  (Comai 2017), looking at  websites as a structured source of 
textual  contents,  rather  than  as  an  inordinate  mass  of  materials,  offers  substantial 
benefits. Firstly, such an approach allows to formalize the exploration of online sources, 
which in recent years has become an important (even if mostly unacknowledged) part of 
the research process for scholars working on contemporary issues. Beyond that, basic 
quantitative analysis of contents based on word frequency can be usefully integrated 
into qualitative studies in order to provide additional background information, fine-tune 
interview guides, or corroborate evidence. Word frequency analysis can also be used to 
compare among cases, as well as to offer effective illustrations of trends.
As the amount of textual contents available on-line produced even in previously isolated 
(and, sometimes, still inaccessible) territories grows, and structured analysis becomes 
less  technically  complex,  structured  analysis  of  web  contents  should  become  more 
common in the study of de facto states, and in area studies more in general.
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8.6. What  is  the  effect  of  non-recognition  on  the   
external relations of de facto states?
Finally, it is time to approach the main question that has led this research endeavour: 
what is the effect of non-recognition on the external relations of de facto states?
Once  these  entities  are  conceptualised  as  small,  dependent,  and  partly  isolated 
jurisdictions,  many  seemingly  unusual  features  of  their  external  relations  can  be 
explained  without  reference  to  lack  of  recognition.  Indeed,  prevalent  dynamics  of 
external relations found in these territories, such as strong dependence on a patron, are 
compatible with those found in uncontested territories on both sides of the sovereignty 
divide. Most features of external relations described in different parts of this research 
can  be  related  to  underlying  dynamics,  rather  than  -  strictly  speaking  -  lack  of 
recognition.  Ultimately,  non-recognition  is  a  symptom rather  than  the  cause  of  the 
complex environment that surrounds these entities and determines the boundaries of 
their external relations.
In other words, the effect of non-recognition cannot effectively be disentangled from 
that of post-conflict  dynamics and geopolitical realities, as both conflict  and lack of 
recognition  have been fundamental  in  making these territories  dependent  and partly 
isolated.  In  principle,  it  would  be  possible  to  explore  the  effect  of  non-recognition 
through counter-factuals, but how far can such a thought-exercise go before it becomes 
completely  meaningless?  For  example,  if  not  for  non-recognition,  these  territories 
would  have  likely  qualified  for  substantial  international  support  in  line  with  the 
principle of ‘state building for peace’. However, given the sheer amount of resources 
that  Russia  has  transferred to  these territories  after  2008,  such assistance may have 
been, at least in financial terms, inferior to what de facto states have actually received 
through their patron-client relationship. Also, post-conflict assistance tends to dry up 
quickly, while patron’s assistance is expected to continue for the long term. On the other 
hand, openness to the wider world enabled by an uncontested status may have opened 
the door for more economic opportunities. But such opportunities should also not be 
overestimated, as the attractiveness of the region to foreign investors has been limited.8 
In brief, exploring possible paths of development for post-Soviet de facto states if their 
8 Even in the current situation, lack of widespread international recognition can hardly be 
presented  as  an  obstacle  to  potential  Russian  investments  to  Transnistria,  Abkhazia,  or 
South Ossetia.
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status was not contested soon becomes a futile exercise, at least in part due to the fact  
that no realistic solution to the status issue is in sight.
In conclusion, the main contribution of this research is not that of offering a definitive 
answer to possible counterfactuals, but rather to provide a better analytical framework 
for understanding the external relations of post-Soviet de facto states, and how they are 
determinant  in  shaping  societal,  economic  and  political  dynamics  within  these 
territories. 
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Appendix A.
Fieldwork
List of interviews and meetings
Sukhumi/Gali
Kogonia,  Ol’ga.  Abkhazia’s  deputy  minister  for  labour,  employment  and  welfare. 
Sukhumi, May 2016.
Gvaramia, David. Abkhazia’s deputy minister for education. Sukhumi, May 2016.
Taniya, Kan. Abkhazia’s deputy minister for foreign affairs. Sukhumi, May 2016.
Tsakhnakia, Tamaz. Abkhazia’s deputy minister for health. Sukhumi, May 2016. 
Representatives  of  international  NGOs  working  in  Abkhazia,  including  with 
representatives  of  International  Red Cross,  Danish Refugee Council,  Action Against 
Hunger, and World Vision, as well as representatives of local organisations, in particular 
the Centre for Humanitarian Programmes, Inva-sodeistvie and the International Fund 
Apsny. 
Tbilisi
Bakaradze,  Ketevan.  Minister  of  health  and social  affairs,  Autonomous Republic  of 
Abkhazia. Tbilisi, May 2016.
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Officers from the EU delegation in Tbilisi, as well as from Unhcr’s office in Tbilisi 
(April 2016). 
Tiraspol
Vataman, Aleksandr. Abkhazia's consul in Transnistria. Tiraspol, February 2016.
Khonitski, Aleksandr. Head of the department for the countries of the far abroad and 
international organizations, Transnistria’s ministry of foreign affairs. Tiraspol, February 
2016.
Lysenko, Vlada. Vice-rector, Transnistria state university in Tiraspol, February 2016.
Chișinău
Moroz,  Nicolai.  Office  for  reintegration,  Moldovan government.  Chișinău,  February 
2016.
Officers  of  EU delegation  in  Moldova,  EUBAM, UNDP,  as  well  as  head of  child-
protection NGO. Chișinău, February 2016.
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Appendix B.
Introducing ‘castarter’
A human-readable version of the technicalities 
involved
Creating a textual dataset from a website involves multiple steps. In most cases, the 
researcher is interested only in specific sections of a website (e.g. its ‘news’ section, 
rather than the ‘about’ or ‘contacts’ pages), and in almost all cases it is not interested in 
the  menu,  banners,  or  other  clutter  that  that  is  frequently  found around the  textual 
content of a specific page (see Illustration B.1 and B.2).
‘castarter’ facilitates the process of creating direct links to archival pages of a section of 
a website by mimicking the functioning of the content management system of a given 
website, e.g. by creating URLs that correspond to pages that would appear by clicking 
on “previous” or “load more” in index pages of a given section. Once index pages have 
been downloaded, it then facilitates the process of systematically extracting direct links 
to individual pages (while excluding irrelevant links to other sections of the website or 
to advertisement); this is accomplished mostly either by defining a common pattern in 
all links of interest (e.g. all URLs include the string “/press-release/”), or by delimiting 
the area of the page from which links are to be extracted (e.g., selecting only the central 
column in a complex page). As a result of this process, a list of URLs to all web pages 
including relevant content is created. On institutional websites such as MFAs of de facto 
states, these may just  be a few hundred items; on media websites such as the news 
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agencies of de facto states, the number grows into thousands; on websites of larger 
media organisations, there may well be hundreds of thousands of news items. As of 
early 2017, for example,  Abkhazia’s state news agency  ApsnyPress  makes available 
online more  than  15 000  news  items,  Transnistria’s  Novosti  Pridnestrov’ya about 
50 000, while Russia’s state-owned news broadcaster Vesti.ru more than half a million.
In order to limit  the load on the servers hosting the respective websites,  by default 
‘castarter’ waits  for  at  least  one  second between each  page  download attempt:  this 
inevitably slows significantly the download process, but within the scope of research 
projects such as this one, letting a process run for a few hours (or a few days) on a 
computer  seems an acceptable  compromise.  Once all  pages  have  been downloaded, 
‘castarter’ can then be used to extract title,  date,  and main contents for each of the 
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pages, after the user sets a few criteria, such as information on the date format (e.g. if it 
is ‘dd.mm.yyyy’, or ‘dd month, yyyy’) or the page element that contains the main text.1
The resulting ouput can be then filtered in order to conduct qualitative analysis (as has 
been done, for example, to outline training programmes conducted with the involvement 
of external actors in Chapter 6) or quantitatively,  as has been done in Chapter 7 to 
describe and compare MFAs. ‘castarter’ includes a number of functions that facilitate 
polishing the output and preparing it for analysis with other established packages. It also 
allows  to  create  a  straightforward  web  interface  that  can  be  used  to  analyse  data 
interactively, or to to give the possibility to colleagues and the wider public to explore 
data independently by accessing a limited set of visualisations (see Illustration B.3).
1 Libraries that allow for automatic identification of the main contents of a web page exist 
(e.g.  Annau and Kohlschuetter  2015), but  when the number of websites involved in the 
analysis is limited, custom solutions are likely to be more reliable.
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Further development and new venues for sharing data
‘castarter’ is publicly available and still under active development as an open source 
project. Beyond improving its efficiency, planned features include the development a 
web interface that facilitates the creation of new datasets without the need to input data 
into a terminal, as well as integration with online data repositories. In due time, this may 
allow researchers with limited technical skills to create new datasets relevant to their 
research, as well as give to other users the possibility to access them and conduct basic 
analysis  online,  directly  from within the browser.  In such an environment,  it  would 
become increasingly easy to make new comparisons, or to preliminarily test hypotheses, 
as datasets created for one research could easily be used (or integrated) in order to deal 
with other, unrelated research questions. For example, the dataset with all press-releases 
of more than a dozen MFAs presented in Chapter 7 could reasonably be integrated with 
other cases and used by researchers with no interest in the issue of post-Soviet de facto 
states. By using exclusively free, open source technologies and making it possible to 
share scripts used to generate datasets it becomes possible to effectively enable online 
analysis of such datasets without breaching the rights of respective copyright holders.
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It  is  anyway  worth  highlighting  that  some  government  websites  include  explicit 
copyright  wavers.  For example,  all  contents  available  on the official  website  of the 
Russian president (www.kremlin.ru) are published with a Creative Commons license 
(CC BY 4.0) that explicitly allows to “copy and redistribute the material in any medium 
or format”, to “adapt, remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, 
even  commercially”,  under  the  only  condition  that  full  attribution  is  given.  As  a 
consequence, in the case of Kremlin.ru, it  would be perfectly legal to share the full 
textual dataset of all press releases issued by Russia’s president in any format. In other 
cases, when licensing may be an issue, it would still be possible to allow the creation of 
word-frequency  graphs,  to  show  keywords  in  context  (which  is  effectively  what 
established search engines have been doing for years), and to share the scripts used to 
generate the dataset (thus ensuring the possibility to review the research process, and 
replicate the procedure if needed). In any case, the full procedure would be open and 
freely reproducible by anybody with a computer and an internet connection, without 
requiring  access  to  databases  that  are  often  prohibitively  expensive  for  researchers 
without institutional access.
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